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Abstract 
 
Shareholders have always been fundamental to an understanding of the 
corporation. The same is true today. However, the assumptions that the firm should be 
run to meet only the demands of shareholders, and that those shareholders are 
concerned only about the maximization of financial returns, are problematic in light 
of the multitude of demands placed on corporations by both shareholders and other 
stakeholders. 
At a time when issues such as climate change and the widening gap between 
rich and poor have become pressing societal concerns, the role of business, its 
purposes and its practices have been challenged in the public, private, and academic 
spheres. Responsible investment, diverse investor types, multi-stakeholder initiatives, 
communities, activist campaigns, and a variety of other stakeholders have resulted in 
multiple and diverse demands on the company which go well beyond financial 
interests.  
This thesis takes the perspective of one such challenge to the fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of the firm: shareholders who actively engage with 
corporate management on issues of social, environmental, and ethical concern such as 
human rights or environmental degradation. This ‘social shareholder engagement’, an 
increasingly relevant phenomenon in practice and research, is explored here both 
empirically and conceptually. 
I provide a new perspective on social shareholder engagement, which 
identifies the political and ethical nature of these actions. In this way I engage with 
and contribute to the corporate governance, responsible investment, social activism 
and business ethics literatures and open a number of future avenues for research. 
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The aim of this introduction is to provide an informative and comprehensive 
backdrop to the following three chapters, thus embedding them in the broader 
research context. Firstly, I unpack the concept of social shareholder engagement 
(SSE) as it is used here and its relevance in both theory and practice. I then move on 
to provide an overview of the main literature streams that have been used to explore 
SSE. I identify the research gaps and clearly state the research questions for the 
following chapters which address these gaps. I then explain the methodologies used in 
this thesis and briefly review the findings. I close this section by highlighting a new 
perspective on SSE to which this research contributes. 
Relevance 
The phenomenon of social shareholder engagement explored in this thesis has 
two key components, both of which are increasingly relevant in today’s world and 
what we might expect in tomorrow’s. 
The first component is ‘shareholder engagement’. This refers to the action 
whereby shareholders use their ownership position to voice their concerns on 
particular issues and to actively influence company policy and practice (Eurosif, 
2006; Sjöström, 2008). Shareholder engagement can be done through letter writing, 
asking questions at annual general meetings, dialogue with management or the board 
either behind-the-scenes or in public confrontation, as well as filing and voting on 
shareholder resolutions (Lydenberg, 2007; Sjöström, 2008). 
Other terms are used for this type of shareholder activity particularly 
shareholder advocacy (USSIF, 2010) and shareholder activism (Gillan & Starks, 
2000; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Sjöström, 2008; Smith, 1996). The term shareholder 
engagement avoids the connotation of public demonstration which activism is 
sometimes seen to imply and is widely used in practice by national and international 
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organisations such as the United Nations backed Principles for Responsible 
Investment (UNPRI), the European Social Investment Forum (Eurosif), the US Forum 
for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (USSIF) as well as other researchers 
(Ferraro & Beunza, 2014; Lydenberg, 2007). 
The relevance of shareholder engagement is increasingly striking. So-called 
gadflies, individuals with an active interest in their investee companies, have been 
credited with initiating the shareholder engagement movement during the 1940s and 
50s (Marens, 2002). Since then, institutional investors have become much more 
involved. The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) was set up in 1985 with the 
objective of pooling resources to have more oversight of investee companies. From 
the mid-1980s until 2012 there was a wave of extensive new corporate governance 
legislation, rules and standard setting around the world which expanded shareholders’ 
rights (Wilcox, 2011). These reforms have had an impact on shareholder engagement, 
which has continued to grow, particularly in the US. The 2013 proxy season in the 
US, where shareholders receive information about topics to be covered at the annual 
general meeting and a proxy ballot to vote their preferences, was dubbed in the recent 
Annual Corporate Governance Review as the ‘Era of Engagement’ (Georgeson, 
2013). This is reflective not only of the increased involvement of shareholders but of 
the more proactive stance that companies have taken in engaging with their 
shareholders. 
The issues on which shareholders engage are wide ranging and include such 
corporate governance issues as executive compensation, the election of directors, and 
majority voting. However, they can also focus on the social and environmental 
performance of the company (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; O'Rourke, 2003; 
Tkac, 2006). This is where the second component of SSE, ‘social’ originates. This 
 22 
term is used to demonstrate societal concerns based on principles rather than the 
singular objective of improved financial performance. Societal concerns include 
social issues such as human rights; environmental issues such as pollution and climate 
change; other ethical issues such as involvement in weapons sale and manufacture; 
and some corporate governance issues related primarily to justice, such as fair pay. 
Multiple terms have been used in the literature for conveying the meaning we 
intend here: social shareholder activism (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011), socially driven 
activism (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010), socially motivated activism (Judge, Gaur, & 
Muller-Kahle, 2010), social policy shareholder resolutions (Rehbein, Waddock, & 
Graves, 2004), and activism for corporate social and environmental responsibility 
(Sjöström, 2008). Here, the term social shareholder engagement is used to convey 
shareholder engagement with management on social, environmental, ethical and some 
governance issues. 
These social concerns in investment can be traced back to religious 
organisations who have been combining ethical behavior into their investments and 
financial actions for hundreds of years through screening and ethical investment 
policies (Goodman, forthcoming; Goodman, Louche, van Cranenburgh, & Arenas, 
2014; Kreander, McPhail, & Molyneaux, 2004; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Van 
Cranenburgh, Arenas, Goodman, & Louche, 2014). In the 1960s and 1970s, high-
profile cases in the US of shareholders protesting the production of napalm by Dow 
Chemical in the Vietnam war and calls for divestment and boycotting of the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa led to regulatory changes at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) which paved the way for much of the SSE which takes 
place today (Glac, 2010; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Vogel, 1983). 
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According to the 2014 USSIF report, more than one out of six dollars invested 
under professional management in the US follow sustainable and responsible 
investment (SRI) practices. This is a total of $6.57 trillion at the start of 2014, a rise 
of 76% since 2012. At the same time, in Europe the seven main strategies for SRI 
have grown annually since 2011 by between 11% and 38%, giving a total of around 
€10 trillion in assets which are invested according to some kind of SRI strategy 
(Eurosif, 2014). Although on a smaller scale, assets invested in SRI in Asia 
(excluding Japan) have grown by 22% annually since 2011 reaching a total of $44.9 
billion (ASrIA, 2014), while in Australia and New Zealand total assets under 
management which take a broad responsible investment approach have grown to $153 
billion (RIAA, 2014). 
Of all of the different mechanisms to undertake sustainable and responsible 
investment including exclusions, best-in-class, screening, sustainability themed 
investment, ESG integration, engagement and impact investing, engagement is seen 
as the driving force behind responsible investment (Juravle & Lewis, 2008). This SRI 
strategy grew in Europe by 85% between 2011 and 2013 reaching a total of almost 
€3.3 trillion. In the US, between 2012 and 2014, shareholder resolutions on 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues were filed by investors 
representing $1.72 trillion of assets (USSIF, 2014). 
The figures above are based on a broad definition of sustainable and 
responsible investment which covers “any type of investor process that combines 
investors’ financial objectives with their concerns about Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) Issues” (Eurosif, 2014: 8). Nevertheless, more specific data on 
social policy shareholder proposals in the US show that these types of proposals are 
the most common types of proposals, despite being less likely to achieve majority 
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support (Copland & O'Keefe, 2014). In 2013 social policy shareholder proposals rose 
to 41% of all US shareholder proposals (Copland & O'Keefe, 2013) and in 2014, 48% 
of shareholder proposals published on US proxy ballots involved social policy issues 
(Copland & O'Keefe, 2014). The overall number of resolutions filed remained the 
same for 2013 and 2014 (Copland & O'Keefe, 2014). 
Clearly SSE is an important way for shareholders to bring social, 
environmental and ethical concerns to the heart of management and is thus of great 
relevance to the management discipline. This is also evident when considering the 
different conceptual platforms from which it has been analysed. The following section 
introduces these platforms and reviews the related literature in each. 
Conceptual platforms and literature review 
SSE has been conceived and researched from a variety of different 
perspectives and is of central importance to a number of broader debates on corporate 
governance structure, and shareholder and stakeholder models of the firm; the 
different motivations, practices and outcomes within responsible investment; the 
influence of social activism on corporations; and business ethics. 
Corporate Governance 
The relationships among shareholders, management and the board is 
fundamental to corporate governance (Ryan, Buchholtz, & Kolb, 2010). Shareholder 
engagement is at the heart of this relationship and is thus central to different theories 
of the firm. Agency theory has been widely used as the foundation for corporate 
governance research (Judge et al., 2010). From this perspective, since the separation 
of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932), shareholders’ or ‘principals’ 
interests are paramount, with managers or ‘agents’ contracted to further these often 
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financial interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). If shareholders are unsatisfied with 
company performance, they have the option of ‘exit’, whereby they sell their shares, 
or ‘voice’ which attempts to reduce the divergence of interests through 
communicating the concerns of principals to management (Hirschman, 1970). 
A number of debates within the corporate governance literature challenge the 
dominant perspective described above. Particularly notable is the growing discussion 
around the trend toward shareholder empowerment (Anabtawi & Stout, 2008; 
Goranova & Ryan, 2014, forthcoming). Proponents of shareholder empowerment 
argue for the importance of oversight by shareholders in reducing the agency gap and 
thus controlling the self-interests of management (Bebchuk, 2005). Others point to the 
fact that large institutional investors have become increasingly powerful over the past 
decades and already have a strong controlling influence over management (Ryan & 
Schneider, 2002) leading to an era of “investor capitalism” (Useem, 1996). In 
contrast, others argue that greater empowerment of shareholders should also come 
with increased responsibility, as self-interest can be manifested by shareholders as 
well as managers (Anabtawi & Stout, 2008; Stout, 2012) and can lead to a 
management focus on simply maximizing share prices (Bratton & Wachter, 2010). 
The legal perspective on this debate is of primary importance in the legal structures 
put in place to regulate the relationship between shareholders, the board and 
management, and has important implications for SSE.  
Another key debate within corporate governance, and closely related to the 
first, is the heterogeneity of shareholders. A variety of different types of shareholders 
exist, even within the financially driven stream of activism (Ryan & Schneider, 2002, 
2003), which challenges the assumption that all shareholders have homogenous 
interests. The situation is further complicated when including the interests of 
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shareholders involved in SSE who may be speaking for other more marginalized 
stakeholders, and when considering that individuals themselves may also have a range 
of different interests (Hoffman, 1996). For example, the public profile of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) as stakeholders is argued by some to increase 
their influence as shareholder activists disproportionately to the number of shares 
owned (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004). 
The representation of multiple interests in the corporate governance 
relationship is related to the ongoing debate about the purpose of the firm, which 
contrasts the shareholder view of the firm (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) with the wider stakeholder view (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholder theory takes into 
account a broader nexus of contracts in corporate decision-making, including other 
groups who have a stake in the actions of corporations beyond shareholders (Freeman 
& Reed, 1983). It has been argued that rather than being ‘owners’ shareholders are 
just one of many stakeholders who hold a contractual relationship with the firm, and 
that the executives have legal duties to the corporation rather than shareholders (Stout, 
2012). 
From a stakeholder perspective, the term ‘stakeholder democracy’ (Freeman, 
1984) has been described as an “alluring prospect” whereby “stakeholders participate 
in processes of organizing, decision making, and governance in corporations” (Matten 
& Crane, 2005: 6). The SSE process provides one means of bringing other, often 
marginalized and voiceless stakeholder concerns to the heart of management using the 
formal agency mechanism. Alternatively, however, are more direct methods of 
stakeholder participation in decision-making (Murphy & Arenas, 2010), as well as 
other forms of protest by stakeholders discussed in the following section on social 
activism. 
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The debate within corporate governance is far from over, and the continual 
changes and evolution of the corporate governance regulation in the US and 
elsewhere provide a rich source for future research. Given the heterogeneity not only 
of stakeholders but also among shareholders themselves, the topic of shareholder 
empowerment will continue to be a complex one. SSE provides an invaluable 
example of this complexity, as it captures both the formal agency mechanisms used 
by shareholders as well as the broader social and environmental and other ethical 
concerns of a wide range of stakeholders. 
Sustainable and Responsible Investment 
Definitions of what exactly constitutes sustainable and responsible investment, 
often known simply as responsible investment (RI), have varied over time and there 
has been no final consensus on a unified definition (Eurosif, 2014). However, 
broadly, it is the “long-term sustainable investment strategy that values 
environmental, social and governance factors in investment decision-making” (Hebb, 
2012: 1) 
The literature on sustainable and responsible investment has grown 
considerably over the past few decades and has mirrored its growth in practice. Much 
of the earlier research within SRI focused on the relationship between corporate social 
performance and corporate financial performance, showing mixed findings. However, 
a positive relationship has been broadly acknowledged (Brammer & Millington, 2008; 
Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Waddock & Graves, 1997) and, as RI has matured 
and become a mainstream strategy (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004), it has been widely 
accepted that investing responsibly does not necessarily imply accepting lower 
returns. Attention has turned, rather, to RI as a means of having a positive impact on 
society; mitigating risk by taking into consideration environmental, social and 
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governance issues; and growing long-term shareholder value (Hebb, 2012). This 
emphasis on shareholder value has established the business case for RI, which has in 
turn led to a change in mindset and the transition of RI from niche to mainstream 
investment strategy (Hebb, 2012; Louche & Lydenberg, 2006).  
Evidently RI links with the corporate governance literature. For example, the 
assumption underlying RI is that active and engaged oversight of management by 
shareholders is beneficial, thus it is grounded in agency theory. From this perspective, 
shareholder empowerment is broadly supported. Investment time horizons are also an 
important area of discussion, echoing corporate governance debates about the 
heterogeneity of shareholders and their demands. 
Shareholder engagement is at the heart of responsible investment. Much of the 
research on engagement has focused on the US due to its high level of shareholder 
activism and the widely used and publicly visible shareholder resolution process. 
Resolutions are publicly available in proxy statements and therefore have been often 
used as a rich and accessible data source for research (Campbell, Gillan, & Niden, 
1999; Graves, Rehbein, & Waddock, 2001; Monks, Miller, & Cook, 2004; Rojas, 
M'Zali, Turcotte, & Merrigan, 2009). Research has identified important differences 
between engagement in US and the UK (Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & Rupp, 2006; 
Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2009; Black & Coffee, 1994; Hill, 2010), and 
numerous studies exist on the specifics of RI in different countries (Lozano, Albareda, 
& Balaguer, 2006; Sakuma & Louche, 2008). 
The collaboration between different investors concerning engagement has 
been discussed in a number of studies (Clark & Hebb, 2004; Crespi & Renneboog, 
2010; Poulsen, Strand, & Thomsen, 2010) and can be seen in the development of such 
umbrella organisations as the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) 
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and the United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) 
Clearinghouse. These organisations facilitate shareholder collaboration (Gond & 
Piani, 2013; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006) and enable the sharing of resources in order to 
make a greater impact on corporate behaviour (Gifford, 2010; Gond & Piani, 2013).  
In addition to coordination among investors, shareholders and stakeholders 
have also built coalitions for SSE (Guay et al., 2004; McLaren, 2004; O'Rourke, 
2003; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). In this way, shareholders can bring the voices and 
demands of external stakeholders to management, in order to create value or limit 
harm-doing. However, on occasion, shareholder activists give their capacity for 
voicing their concerns directly to other stakeholders (Arenas, Sanchez, & Murphy, 
2013).  
Despite the public profile often associated with shareholder activism, behind-
the-scenes dialogue between shareholders and companies is said to represent the 
majority of shareholder engagement and is where the real ‘action’ happens (Becht et 
al., 2009; Goldstein, 2011; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009). 
Much of this research suggests that engaging behind the scenes is more effective. 
However, concerns about the lack of shareholder accountability to stakeholders has 
been raised (Dhir, 2012). 
SSE is a central element of the literature on RI and is likely to be increasingly 
so. The differing expectations of beneficiaries, particularly when considering the 
standardization and comparability of RI, is one reason given for the likelihood of 
increasing scrutiny of RI by stakeholders, which will in turn affect the future success 
of RI (Eurosif, 2014). 
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Social Activism 
The discussion of the increasing influence of secondary stakeholders, such as 
NGOs, civil society and activist organisations, marginal stakeholders and social 
movements on corporate decision-making has become “commonplace” in the 
management literature (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008b). A significant body of 
research has developed on how these stakeholders and social activists influence 
corporations (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Frooman, 1999; Van Huijstee & 
Glasbergen, 2010).  
Social movement theory is often used to explain activist behavior, particularly 
as its focus has shifted from engagement with public institutions to engagement with 
private firms (Dhir, 2012; Soule, 2009). In a landmark paper on shareholder 
engagement, Davis and Thomson (1994) claim that it is necessary to go beyond 
efficiency-oriented approaches to understand the rise of shareholder engagement and 
the “politics of corporate control”. Using a social movement lens to explain the 
balance of power between shareholders and management they claim that institutional 
shareholders are part of a social movement, sharing an ideology of being active 
owners as well as the power to influence corporate and governmental decision-
making.  
While Davis and Thomson’s work focused primarily on shareholder 
engagement for governance issues, the social movement perspective has been used 
more specifically for shareholders involved in RI and SSE. Arjalies (2010) views 
social movements in responsible investment not only as a way of encouraging debate 
but also as a trigger for stimulating change and reform within economic institutions. 
With this perspective, responsible investment including SSE becomes a change agent. 
Sjöström (2010) goes further to suggest that shareholders involved in engagement can 
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be seen as norm entrepreneurs, changing or introducing new norms and having a more 
profound role than influencing single events of corporate behaviour. Other studies 
have drawn on social movement theory to explore SSE by religious organisations 
(Proffitt & Spicer, 2006) and on interest and identity motivations (Rowley & 
Moldoveanu, 2003) to explain how activists decide to target particular corporations 
(Rehbein et al., 2004). 
King and Pearce (2010) recognise two mechanisms for changing the 
‘corporate machine’: social movements within organisations and extrainstitutional 
tactics such as the media. Lee and Lounsbury (2011), in their research on 
environmental shareholder resolutions, conceptualized SSE as the former of these two 
mechanisms. However, much of the research taking a social movement approach 
tends to see shareholder engagement as practised primarily by NGOs and activist 
groups with limited financial interest, and incorporates the role of the media in 
engagement and the framing process (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006).  
This more public engagement tends not to recognise the behind-the-scenes 
dialogues discussed earlier, which are also a key part of SSE. Disagreement remains 
as to whether more publicly visible engagement or behind-the-scenes engagement 
leads to greater success (Goldstein, 2011). However, behind-the-scenes engagement 
has grown considerably (Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009) and has led some to suggest 
that more publicly visible engagement such as shareholder resolutions are merely the 
tip of the iceberg (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). Clearly the challenges here are gaining 
access to data for research when such confidential activities take place away from the 
media spotlight and finding a way to demonstrate the impact or success of such 
engagement (Karpoff, 2001). 
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Business Ethics 
The final body of literature with which SSE engages, is that of business ethics. 
Many of the debates mentioned above in corporate governance, responsible 
investment and social activism have an ethical element. Highlighted below are the 
particularly relevant conversations for SSE. 
One key debate concerns the moral obligation of managers in terms of 
fiduciary duty to shareholders (Ryan et al., 2010; Williams & Ryan, 2007), including 
whether the relationship between management and shareholders is ethically different 
from managers and stakeholders. While some argue that managers have a moral 
obligation to shareholders above all other stakeholders (Goodpaster, 1991; Marcoux, 
2003), others give ultimate importance to a wider set of stakeholders (Boatright, 
1994; Freeman, 1984). Even if managers were to prioritise the best interests of 
shareholders over other stakeholders, it has been argued that fiduciary duty can also 
include the ethical concerns of those shareholders regarding social and environmental 
issues (Freshfields, 2005). Such an argument could open the door, legally and 
ethically, to social and environmental issues becoming an integral part of fiduciary 
duty. 
Corporate democracy and the participation of stakeholders in decision-making 
has been another key area of recent debate for business ethics (Brenkert, 1992; 
Moriarty, 2014). However, little consensus exists concerning how such a stakeholder 
democracy could be achieved (Matten & Crane, 2005). While some have taken an 
instrumental view (Phillips, 1997), others have used a deliberative or discourse ethics 
approach to achieving such participation (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007; O'Dwyer, 2005; 
Stansbury, 2009; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). Participation has also been discussed 
more specifically in RI regarding the inclusion of beneficiaries in ethical deliberations 
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with their trustees and fund managers in designing responsible investment policies 
and priorities for engagement (Richardson, 2013). 
The emphasis on deliberation, participation and process, makes Habermasian 
discourse ethics (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1992) highly relevant to SSE. Given the 
multiple ethea of different stakeholders, discourse ethics provides a valuable starting 
point for analyzing the engagement process. Furthermore, work on political CSR has 
built on the Habermasian deliberative democratic approach (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) 
and offers the opportunity for extending analysis into a political arena. 
SSE is able to contribute to discussions in each of these bodies of literature 
demonstrating its relevance more broadly to the management discipline.  
Gaps 
The previous section describes how different literatures have framed and 
debated SSE and sets the scene for the following chapters. Having established the 
relevance of SSE in practice and theory, this section identifies the gaps which persist 
in those literatures and which provide the motivation for this thesis. 
In corporate governance, the heterogeneity of shareholders and their interests 
provides ample space for better understanding the different types of shareholders, and 
a way for management and shareholders themselves to deal with the multitude of 
different demands on the corporation. While much research has focused on large 
institutional investors, increasingly other types of investors, such as hedge funds, are 
coming under the spotlight. However, religious organisations, despite having been 
identified as the pioneers of responsible investment (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006), have 
not been widely studied in this literature. A deeper understanding of their complex 
role has the potential to provide insights which challenge the dominant economic 
frame in corporate governance. Furthermore, the suggestion that greater shareholder 
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power should be accompanied by greater responsibility (Anabtawi & Stout, 2008) 
provides an opportunity for the responsible investment literature to contribute to the 
shareholder empowerment debate in terms of the oversight and stewardship which RI 
shareholders could offer.  
From both a management and a shareholder perspective, the heterogeneity of 
shareholder demands presents a challenge which has yet to be resolved in corporate 
governance. Even in the responsible investment literature researchers have called for 
fund managers and trustees to better understand the social and environmental 
concerns of their beneficiaries (Richardson, 2013). While much of the RI literature 
stream tends to focus on the overlap among the interests of management, shareholders 
and stakeholders, greatly differing motivations within RI have not been explored in 
depth and could pose challenges as RI becomes increasingly widespread (Richardson 
& Cragg, 2010; Woods & Urwin, 2012). 
While research on shareholder resolutions and voting has been extensive, 
much less is known about behind-the-scenes dialogue, in particular in the process of 
SSE. As discussed above, this process is particularly challenging to study, due to its 
confidential nature, and is therefore relatively unknown in the literature. However, 
better understanding this process and the relationship between shareholders and 
managers is of clear relevance to the corporate governance literature and could 
provide deeper insights into responsible investment. 
Not only does the behind-the-scenes nature of much of SSE make it 
challenging to study, but it also presents a challenge in terms of transparency and 
accountability to other shareholders, beneficiaries, stakeholders and affected parties. 
SSE has no widely accepted standards (McLaren, 2004) and research has identified a 
need for a legitimate and credible engagement process (Dhir, 2012). However, how to 
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achieve such standards and what a credible and ethical process would look like are at 
an early stage of debate in the literature. Ethical theories have not been commonly 
used to explore the SSE process, especially from the perspective of the shareholder, 
leaving very little guidance, either theoretical or practical, for the investor on how to 
engage ethically. 
The following section outlines the research questions which form the basis of 
the research in chapters 2 to 4. These research questions were chosen to address the 
key gaps in the literature identified above.  
Research questions 
Hirshman’s (1970) voice and exit options have often been used in the 
corporate governance literature to explore engagement by large institutional investors. 
By asking how voice and exit are used by religious organisations, chapter 2 aims to 
explore in more depth the under-researched nature of SSE by religious organisations. 
The research question in chapter 3 is designed to address the void of the use of ethical 
theories to explore SSE and to establish a normative standard for SSE. Chapters 3 and 
4 both build on the finding in chapter 2 that there is a political element to SSE and 
aim to explore this through an ethical, deliberative democratic approach, which allows 
for the wide variety of worldviews involved in SSE. All three chapters are linked by 
their intention to deepen knowledge about the process of SSE, particularly behind-
the-scenes dialogue, which is considered to be highly effective yet is relatively 
unknown. 
 
Chapter 2: How and why are Hirschman’s voice and exit options used in Social 
Shareholder Engagement? 
Chapter 3: How can shareholders involved in SSE ensure they engage ethically? 
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Chapter 4: How are participatory and deliberative practices used during behind-the-
scenes dialogue in SSE? 
Research Methods 
This section gives a broad overview of the research methods used in this 
thesis. Further detail is provided in the corresponding chapters. 
The two empirical chapters of this thesis, chapters 2 and 4, both take a 
primarily interpretive, qualitative approach. Qualitative researchers “study things in 
their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms 
of the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000: 3). Qualitative 
research has had a challenging history (Boyatzis, 1998; Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 
2013) and has been claimed, particularly from a positivist approach, to be unscientific 
and biased (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). However, others have argued in support of a 
qualitative approach (Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Van Maanen, 1979). Among other 
virtues, they cite the rich descriptions possible in qualitative research (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000) and the need for an interpretative approach to explore ethics and 
morality in contrast to the dominant economic paradigm of functionalism and 
rationality (Ghoshal, 2005). Qualitative analysis is used here as an alternative to the 
quantitative approach often taken by agency theory in corporate governance research, 
to develop a new perspective on SSE. 
Chapter 2 uses the case study method to build theory inductively, while 
chapter 4 is a takes a hybrid approach, combining a theoretical framework with 
inductive theory building based on interviews and surveys. The following sections 
provide a background to these methods and an explanation for their use in this thesis. 
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Theory Building Through Case Study 
The case study method used in chapter 2 has gained in popularity in recent 
years. It is an ideal research design for descriptive, exploratory work (Yin, 2003). 
According to Yin (1994), one of the key researchers to develop the case study 
methodology, case studies are particularly useful when the phenomenon and the 
context do not have clear borders and in order to answer how and why questions (Yin, 
2003), which we pose in our research question. Case studies are useful for process 
data (Hartley, 2004; Pettigrew, 1990), particularly in RI (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004), 
which corresponds to this research. 
Case study methodology varies and different researchers have developed 
different protocols. Stake (1994) focuses primarily on single case studies, while Yin 
and Eisenhardt (1989a, 1989b; 2007) have worked on multiple case studies and have 
developed detailed protocols for implementing this research design. We use Yin’s 
(1994) multiple embedded case study design as well as Eisenhardt’s (1989a) work on 
theory building through case studies based on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), including theoretical sampling and cross case analysis, to elaborate our study. 
A variety of data can be used in case studies including qualitative and 
quantitative (Yin, 1981) including documents, archival records, interviews, direct and 
participant observation and physical artefacts (Yin, 2003). The research in chapter 2 is 
based on semi-structured interviews, documents and desk research which were used 
to build theory inductively and triangulate findings. An inductive approach is 
necessary here because very little is known, theoretically or empirically, about the 
SSE process and particularly that of religious organisations. In this way, the aim is to 
generate meaning from the data collected (Creswell, 2003). 
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Thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998) was used to analyse the data in an iterative 
process, moving between theory and data to develop categories. Two authors coded 
the data independently using NVivo and then discussed categories through several 
iterations. Within-case and cross-case analysis enabled the development of clear 
process descriptions (Eisenhardt, 1989a). By following these protocols and 
procedures the aim is to address the challenges which qualitative research has often 
faced as a research approach (Boyatzis, 1998). 
Theory Building Through Interviews 
A hybrid or mixed approach was used in chapter 4 (Creswell, 2003; Fereday 
& Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The “a priori” consideration of theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a) 
was used to develop our questionnaire and interview protocol. This approach enables 
us to map the data according to theoretical concepts and then to use inductive analysis 
to explore in more depth the reasons behind the process map.  
Semi-structured interviews (Bryman & Bell, 2007) are the primary source of 
data in chapter 4. Interview data provides one of the most important sources of data in 
qualitative research and can also be valuable in quantitative research (Qu & Dumay, 
2011). Examples of qualitative research based primarily on interviews can be found in 
highly renowned academic publications (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Gutierrez, 
Howard-Grenville, & Scully, 2010). Interview data can be targeted and insightful, 
however poor questions can lead to bias and interviewers may inaccurately recollect 
what was discussed (Yin, 2003). In order to overcome some of these challenges, the 
questions were reviewed by experts in the field and adapted as the research 
progressed. Interviews were all recorded and summaries were written directly after 
each interview, based on notes taken throughout. 
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In addition to the 43 interviews conducted, the research in chapter 4 draws on 
data from surveys. These multiple sources allow the triangulation of interview 
responses with the responses to the surveys. In a similar way to the research in 
chapter 2, we then use an iterative theory-building approach based on grounded 
theory and thematic analysis to analyse the data. 
Overview 
Chapter 2 is the initial exploratory study for this research, on which the later 
chapters build. We chose religious organisations and their engagement processes as 
the subject of this empirical study for their clear example of shareholder engagement 
based on principles and for being an extreme type (Pettigrew, 1990). In this way, we 
contribute to the ongoing conversation about SSE and also to a more specific stream 
of research on the investment practices of religious organisations (Logsdon & Van 
Buren, 2009; Louche, Arenas, & Van Cranenburgh, 2012; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006).  
Through a multiple embedded case research design, we use data from 
interviews and desk research on three religious organisations and seven engagement 
processes. By moving iteratively between the theory and data, we coded the interview 
responses in order to map the process of engagement in cases of successful and 
unsuccessful engagement.  
Our findings are invaluable to better understand the engagement process and 
identify its key stages. The range of behaviours we observed enabled us to see the 
dynamic nature of voice and exit for these shareholders. We find that exit is used as a 
form of voice, that unsatisfactory voice outcomes do not always lead to exit, and that 
voice can also continue after exit. In this way, we also challenge assumptions not only 
about the nature of voice and exit but also about shareholder behavior. One such 
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challenge was our identification of a political motive of the shareholders, rather than 
simply an economic one. 
In chapter 3, the process of SSE is explored conceptually from an ethical 
perspective in response to the gap identified in the literature. As purported 
representatives of marginalized stakeholders, and in light of ethical concerns raised by 
other scholars, we claim that such a perspective is needed. Drawing strongly on 
research by Dhir (2012), who provides an example of how well-intentioned SSE 
damaged the local community which it claimed to represent, a number of ethical 
concerns faced by shareholders in SSE are identified including a lack of 
accountability in closed-door dialogue and the threat of divestment or disclosure. 
To address our research question we structure our analysis at two levels, the 
action and the constitutional levels (Schreck, van Aaken, & Donaldson, 2013), in 
order to explore possible actions within the existing regulatory framework, as well as 
to advocate changes in the rules of the game. Habermasian discourse ethics 
(Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1992) provides a valuable lens through which to examine 
SSE due to its normative, process and ethical nature, with a focus on a plurality of 
ethea or worldviews and the participation of affected parties. 
Our analysis leads us to identify three normative questions:  
1) Given that laws and institutions are as they are, in SSE how should shareholders 
bring the voices of other marginalised stakeholders to managers? 
2) Given that laws and institutions are as they are, in SSE how should shareholders 
promote engagement between corporations and marginalised stakeholders? 
3) Should SSEs promote changes in laws and institutions so that marginalised 
stakeholders have a voice in corporate decision-making? If so, how? 
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In responding to these questions with insights from Habermasian discourse 
ethics, we go beyond the current work on political CSR to argue for the desirability of 
promoting regulatory/institutional change which can ensure marginalised stakeholders 
have a say in corporate decision making which affects them. As in chapter 2 we draw 
out a political aspect to SSE whereby shareholders are involved in changing the rules 
of the game. By implication, shareholders in SSE then face the dilemma of 
relinquishing some of their own power in order for marginalized stakeholders to 
participate. Here the difference in ethical and instrumental motivations of 
shareholders in SSE becomes fully relevant. 
Finally chapter 4 builds on insights from both previous chapters, as well as 
our other publications (Goodman & Arenas, 2014), to examine how participatory and 
deliberative practices are used in the SSE process. This empirical research draws on 
43 interviews conducted with members of the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility (ICCR) to explore whether, how and when stakeholders other than 
shareholders, participate in behind-the-scenes dialogue with investee companies. 
We draw on the motifs of discourse ethics (Goodman & Arenas, 2014, 
forthcoming; Habermas, 1992) as an “a priori” theoretical frame for our research and 
develop a map of the SSE process to include the participation of stakeholders at the 
different stages. Through a process of coding the responses of the interviewees we 
build theory around participation and trust in SSE. 
Our findings enable us to make a contribution to the literature on shareholder 
and stakeholder engagement by identifying when, how and with whom different 
stakeholders are included in the SSE process. While ICCR creates a public-private 
space for deliberations, stakeholders are not commonly included in direct dialogue 
with companies. We find that stakeholder participation in behind-the-scenes dialogues 
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with companies is feared, by shareholders, to lead to an erosion of trust built over 
time between shareholders and management. However, we challenge the claim that it 
is participation per se which erodes trust and identify opportunities for greater 
stakeholder participation.  
This thesis addresses the gaps identified in the earlier sections. Through both 
empirical and conceptual investigation it centres on theory building around the 
process of social shareholder engagement. This enables the development of a new 
perspective on this phenomenon which I summarize briefly below and return to in the 
final section of this thesis. 
New perspective on SSE 
Through the researching and writing of this PhD thesis and the papers, book 
chapters and practitioners’ reports which have resulted from it, I have been able to 
provide conceptual and empirical arguments for a new perspective on SSE. 
The following chapters have stepped away from some of the assumptions of 
agency theory which prevails in the corporate governance literature. The analysis has 
revealed some of the fundamental differences between the motivations, concerns and 
actions of responsible investors often overlooked in the RI and corporate governance 
literature. Further, I have documented behind-the-scenes engagement in contrast to 
the public approach frequently found in the social movement literature. Through 
careful conceptual development, this thesis locates the phenomenon of SSE in the 
business ethics literature and engages in conversation with a more political 
perspective on SSE. 
As SSE continues to evolve, this new perspective provides a foundation for a 
more varied theoretical conceptualization of shareholders with ethical and political 
actors with motives which extend beyond purely maximizing financial returns. It 
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develops a normative view on how shareholders involved in SSE should engage and 
outlines challenges and opportunities for greater stakeholder participation. By 
changing the conversation around shareholders we open numerous avenues for future 
research on an issue which reaches into the heart of management and the fundamental 
theory of the firm. 
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Chapter 2: Paper 1 - Social Shareholder Engagement: The 
Dynamics of Voice and Exit 
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Abstract 
 
Investors concerned about the social and environmental impact of the 
companies they invest in are increasingly choosing to use voice over exit as a 
strategy. This paper addresses the question of how and why the voice and exit options 
(Hirschman, 1970) are used in social shareholder engagement (SSE) by religious 
organisations. Using an inductive case study approach, we examine seven 
engagements by three religious organisations considered to be at the forefront of SSE.  
We analyse the full engagement process rather than focusing on particular tools or on 
outcomes. We map the key stages of the engagement processes and the influences on 
the decisions made at each stage to develop a model of the dynamics of voice and exit 
in SSE. This study finds that religious organisations divest for political rather than 
economic motives, using exit as a form of voice. The silent exit option is not used by 
religious organisations in SSE, exit is not always the consequence of unsatisfactory 
voice outcomes, and voice can continue after exit. We discuss the implications of 
these dynamics and influences on decisions for further research in engagement. 
 
Key words: engagement process, religious organisations, responsible investment, 
social shareholder engagement, voice and exit 
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Introduction 
 
Shareholder engagement as a strategy for Responsible Investment (RI) is 
growing, and social and environmental issues are increasingly included in 
engagement (Goldstein, 2011). This “dramatic ascendancy” (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011: 
156) in social shareholder activism or  “socially conscious shareholder advocacy” 
(Dhir, 2012: 99), here called social shareholder engagement1 (SSE), now represents 
almost €3.3 trillion in Europe (Eurosif, 2014) and a similar figure in the US at $1.72 
trillion (USSIF, 2012). The prediction that SSE will become the preferred approach to 
RI among institutional investors (Guyatt, 2006; Juravle & Lewis, 2008; 
Vandekerckhove, Leys, & Van Braeckel, 2008) and the driving force behind the 
development of RI (Gond & Piani, 2013) makes it increasingly relevant to the broader 
corporate governance debate on active ownership. There have been calls for greater 
use of the voice option by asset managers and improvement in the quality of 
engagement by investors (Kay, 2012). As investors increasingly turn from exit to 
voice (McLaren, 2004) understanding the intricacies and dynamics of these two 
options by experienced engagers is valuable for both investors and firms.  
Much of the corporate governance literature to date has focused on 
engagement by large institutional investors who seek improved financial gains by 
                                                
1 The term ‘social shareholder engagement’ (SSE) used here attempts to reconcile the 
array of definitions used in the SRI and engagement literature whereby shareholders 
voice issues of concern to companies on particular issues (Eurosif 2006). The issues 
focused on in SSE are principle-based and focus on the social, environmental and 
ethical impacts of corporate behaviour. This also includes some governance issues 
related to justice such as pay inequality. SSE speaks to the socially-driven stream of 
engagement research identified in (Chung & Talaulicar 2010). Governance issues 
with the objective of increasing financial return without regard to social, 
environmental and ethical impacts are not included in SSE and form part of the 
financially-driven stream more common in the corporate governance and finance 
literature. 
 
 47 
addressing the agency problem between shareholders and managers (Gillan & Starks, 
2007). In line with Hirschman (1970) it has been widely assumed that voice and exit 
are alternative options for investors, and that a failed voice strategy will lead to exit 
(Withey & Cooper, 1989). However a reading of the SSE literature demonstrates that 
socially-driven investors have a very different ideology to the conventional market 
logic (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011). They engage on principle rather than on an economic 
basis (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010; McLaren, 2004) and take a broader and longer term 
perspective (Clark, Salo, & Hebb, 2008; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). Despite their 
limited financial assets, a social movement perspective shows that shareholder 
activists have a wide influence in terms of setting the global social issue agenda 
(Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Sjöström, 2010). Investment on a moral basis is said to have 
considerable prospects for growth (Clark et al., 2008). The SSE literature has 
explored aspects of engagement such as the key actors (Barber, 2007; Clark & Hebb, 
2004; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006), main issues (Logsdon & Buren, 2008; Rojas et al., 
2009; Tkac, 2006), principal targets (Judge et al., 2010; Rehbein et al., 2004) and 
outcomes (David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001; Engle, 2006; Hebb, Hachigian, & Allen, 
2012; O'Rourke, 2003). Research into the how SSE is undertaken has been more 
limited focusing on particular elements of voice engagement such as resolutions 
(Campbell et al., 1999; Clark et al., 2008; David et al., 2007), behind the scenes 
dialogue (Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009), public campaigning (de Bakker & den Hond, 
2008a; Guay et al., 2004) and letter writing (Vandekerckhove, Leys, & Van Braeckel, 
2007) but there has been little research into the engagement process as a whole or the 
dynamics of the voice and exit options in this context.  
This paper aims to advance research on SSE by theorising the engagement 
process of religious organisations and the dynamics of voice and exit options in a 
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socially-driven shareholder engagement context. Broadly we ask how and why the 
voice and exit options are used in SSE. More specifically we address how 
engagements were undertaken by religious organisations, whether exit and voice are 
mutually exclusive, and when exit will be the result of a failed voice engagement. We 
also contrast our findings about social shareholder engagement by religious 
organisations to what has been described in the literature.  
This research takes a case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989a) to enable us to 
examine the on-going engagement processes in their context (Pettigrew, 1990). A 
qualitative process perspective is particularly suited to understanding how and why 
things evolve over time (Langley, 1999) and has been used to develop stage models in 
the context of group exit (Dyck & Starke, 1999). Due to the difficulty of separating 
influencing factors in shareholder engagement (Gillan & Starks, 2007) a process 
approach which includes the wider context of engagement is used. This enables us to 
open the complex blackbox of interaction between engagers and companies (Carleton, 
Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998) and to investigate the dynamics of voice and exit options 
over the whole process rather than just specific elements of the process. Data is 
collected through interviews and desk research to analyse seven engagements on 
social, environmental and ethical issues by three religious organisations. We choose 
religious organisations as the subject of our empirical investigation because they 
represent an extreme example of SSE and have extensive experience in engagement 
(Pettigrew, 1990). They perceive SSE to be one of the most influencing strategies for 
RI (Louche et al., 2012) but despite their pioneering role have been the subject of very 
little research (Kreander et al., 2004; Louche et al., 2012). 
In studying the SSE processes of religious organisations, this paper makes 
three contributions. First we address the call to better understand engagement 
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processes (Gond & Piani, 2013; Vandekerckhove et al., 2007). Our findings identify 
four procedural stages of engagement: issue raising, information search, change-
seeking and outcomes and detail the specific actions at each stage. Second, from the 
perspective of the activist we analyse the dynamics of voice and exit in SSE and 
extend the literature stemming from Hirschman’s (1970) theory. Although they have 
been conceived as distinguishable options, our study reveals that they are intertwined 
rather than separate or sequential (Marler & Faugère, 2010; Withey & Cooper, 1989). 
This study finds that religious organisations divest for political rather than economic 
motives using exit as a form of voice. The silent exit option is not used by religious 
organisations in SSE, exit is not always the consequence of unsatisfactory voice 
outcomes, and voice can continue after exit. Furthermore this paper contributes to the 
wider engagement literature by identifying key factors influencing decisions for these 
religious organisations at each stage of the SSE process and their implications for the 
wider engagement debate. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first part outlines the theory relevant to 
our research questions and sets the context for the cases. The second part presents the 
research design including methods and data collection. The third part concentrates on 
presenting and analysing the empirical data, including details of the three religious 
organisations and the seven engagements. Our results are discussed in part four 
together with their implications. Part five reflects on the limitations of our study and 
suggests avenues for future research. We end the paper with some conclusions. 
Background literature 
 
This study takes an inductive approach and does not aim to test theory but 
rather is built around guiding concepts that already exist in the literature. Our 
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investigation was influenced by Hirschman’s (1970) theory of voice and exit and the 
growing body of literature on SSE which we discuss in the following subsections. 
This “a priori” consideration of concepts to shape our research is considered valuable 
by Eisenhardt in giving a “firmer empirical grounding for the emergent theory” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a: 536). 
Voice and Exit 
 
Hirschman’s (1970) classification of voice and exit strategies is referred to in 
the 2010 special issue of Corporate Governance: An International Review dedicated 
to shareholder activism (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010). The framework has been used to 
investigate the differing mechanisms used by shareholder activists (Admati & 
Pfleiderer, 2009; Marler & Faugère, 2010; Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2003; Rojas et al., 
2009), and the conditions for their effectiveness (Ryan & Schneider, 2002). 
Exit refers to a market-based economic response to dissatisfaction with a 
firm’s performance characterized as being straightforward, impersonal, and indirect. 
In investment this is often referred to as the ‘Wall Street Walk’ meaning the sale of 
shares by unsatisfied shareholders. On the contrary, voice represents a political 
response using communication in an attempt to rectify performance lapses 
(Hirschman, 1970). It is “an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of 
the firm from which one buys or of the organization to which one belongs.” 
(Hirschman, 1970: 30). Based on dialogue, voice is far more ‘messy’, and implies the 
articulation of one’s critical opinions rather than a private and anonymous market 
action (Hirschman, 1970: 16). In a shareholder engagement context this includes 
activities such as filing and voting on shareholder resolutions, behind-the-scenes 
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dialogue with management, public confrontation with management and engagement 
by coalitions of shareholders (Lydenberg, 2007).  
According to Hirschman, the decision to engage with a company rather than 
exiting when performance is unsatisfactory is based on two elements 1) the evaluation 
of the likelihood of getting the company back on track; and 2) the “judgment that it is 
worthwhile” to remain rather than exit (Hirschman, 1970: 38). Much of the 
investigation into voice and exit has focused on the second of these and has been 
based on large institutional investors from a corporate governance perspective with a 
focus on the financial advantages and disadvantages of each option. Although 
institutional investors are now often indexed or too large to simply exit without 
generating large costs, previous research showed that these investors were reluctant to 
use voice because of “imperfect information, limited institutional capabilities, 
substantial coordination costs, the misaligned incentives of money managers, a 
preference for liquidity, and the uncertain benefits of intervention” (Black & Coffee, 
1994: 2086). Thus exit has been the preferred response by many institutional 
investors, and more common in the US than the UK (Aguilera et al., 2006; Becht et 
al., 2009). However this research does not go far enough to fully explain the exit 
choices in SSE. Hollenbach (1973) describes the vastly different considerations faced 
by religious organisations suggesting that ‘exit’ may be used to relieve guilt and 
enhance feelings of purity and righteousness by not being involved in any companies 
which do not meet their strict social, environmental or ethical criteria. 
Voice can be an unavoidable option in the corporate governance literature, 
used when large stakes make it difficult or costly to divest (Black & Coffee, 1994; 
McLaren, 2004; Ryan & Schneider, 2002). When institutional investors do choose to 
use voice it is with a view to making financial gains (Parrino et al., 2003) over and 
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above the costs of engaging. It is dependent on traditional shareholder power: large 
holdings mean financial returns can outweigh the costs of engaging (Edmans & 
Manso, 2010); some research suggests that 10-15% of shares must be represented in 
order to get management attention (Black & Coffee, 1994); and the financial impact 
on share price that the sale of large shareholdings can have (Parrino et al., 2003). 
Shareholders with large holdings are able to apply economic pressure and can affect 
management decision making through the threat of exit (Marler & Faugère, 2010). 
This divestment threat can be considered a form of voice (Admati & Pfleiderer, 
2009). However, research into the salience of shareholders has demonstrated that this 
traditional source of power is not usually available to shareholders undertaking SSE 
(Gifford, 2010; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011) who tend to be smaller (Clark et al., 2008). 
Furthermore in SSE voice can be interpreted as social action and can be used for the 
pursuit of justice (Hollenbach, 1973) or for wider social change (Proffitt & Spicer, 
2006; Sjöström, 2010), with the financial impact being relatively inconsequential for 
smaller holdings typical of SSE (Clark et al., 2008). We suggest that SSE, 
characterised by smaller, principle-based actors, involves a greater complexity in the 
use of voice or exit than the corporate governance literature to date indicates. 
Voice in SSE  
 
According to Hirschman, exit may be postponed if voice is expected to be 
effective and can be understood as a last resort after voice has failed. Thus exit is a 
consequence of an unsuccessful voice process. In this way the two options can be 
understood as sequential and separate although ‘noisy’ exits are also possible (Withey 
& Cooper, 1989). Similarly, in the RI literature, exit (or divestment) is seen as 
separate and not included within the range of engagement activities (Lydenberg, 
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2007). A voice approach to RI can take a variety of different forms, however research 
has tended to focus on a particular method of engagement rather than the whole 
process.  
Many studies in the SSE literature focus on shareholder resolutions (Sjöström, 
2008). Since resolutions have a greater tradition in the US than in Europe, this 
research frequently uses databases held by US based organisations such as the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) (Campbell et al., 1999; David et al., 
2007; Graves et al., 2001; Rojas et al., 2009), the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility (ICCR) (Clark et al., 2008; Logsdon & Buren, 2008) and others 
(Monks et al., 2004). The use of shareholder resolutions for social and environmental 
purposes dates back to the 1970s when regulation changes at the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) permitted the inclusion of resolutions concerning social 
policy issues (Dhir, 2006; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006).  
There are three possible outcomes for a resolution. Firstly, resolutions can be 
omitted by a company for not meeting the SEC requirements, for example if a 
resolution is identical to one submitted in the previous five years without achieving a 
minimum of votes or concerns matters relating to ordinary business operations 
(Engle, 2006; Glac, 2010). Secondly, engagers may withdraw their resolution before 
it appears on the proxy, or thirdly, resolutions may be added to the proxy statement 
and voted by shareholders.  
There is much disagreement on the significance of the different outcomes of 
resolutions particularly in SSE. According to Rojas et al. (2009) omission is most 
clearly seen as a form of failure. Compared to corporate governance proposals, voting 
levels on SSE proposals tend to be low and rarely pass (Campbell et al., 1999; 
Mackenzie, 1993; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). Moreover, a 
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high vote does not necessarily impact firm behaviour as resolutions are not binding 
(Engle, 2006; Levit & Malenko, 2011; Rojas et al., 2009).  Withdrawals are also 
argued to represent a failure (Rojas et al., 2009) as filers attempt to avoid a low vote 
outcome. However, negotiated withdrawals can also be an indication that a 
corporation is willing to enter into dialogue (Goldstein, 2011; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; 
Rehbein et al., 2004; Tkac, 2006; Vogel, 1983).  
A second voice approach, dialogue between shareholders and management, 
extends research on resolutions enabling a better understanding of the relationship 
between these different tools in the broader engagement process. However, little 
empirical and descriptive work has been done on this (Rehbein, Logsdon, & Van 
Buren, 2013). Logsdon and Van Buren (2009) suggest that behind the scenes dialogue 
is where the “real action typically occurs” and can result from the withdrawal of a 
resolution or as an alternative to filing a resolution. While there is some agreement 
that filing resolutions draws management attention to an issue and can lead to 
dialogue (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Rehbein et al., 2013), others suggest a resolution is 
filed as a last resort when dialogue breaks down (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). This 
differing approach has also been noted among religious organisations (Louche et al., 
2012).  
Thirdly, shareholders can use public confrontation with companies (de Bakker 
& den Hond, 2008a; Guay et al., 2004). An example of a public shareholder 
engagement campaign is the animal rights organisation People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA). They have used their rights as shareholders in 
numerous multinational companies since 1987 to campaign against animal testing for 
cosmetic or medical purposes (PETA, 2012). As well as filing resolutions PETA also 
used media coverage of their campaign to try to achieve change in target companies. 
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Still unclear in the literature is the extent of the use of media and whether it helps or 
hinders engagement. In governance engagement in the US, public pension funds, 
unions and hedge funds have used the media to raise awareness of issues and pressure 
managers (Gillan & Starks, 2007) although behind the scenes engagement is the 
preferred approach of institutional investors in the UK (Aguilera et al., 2006; Black & 
Coffee, 1994). Regulation alone is not able to sufficiently explain this difference 
between us and UK (Black & Coffee, 1994). A social movement perspective suggests 
that because of their limited resources, SSE activists use the media to gain 
management attention (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). Their 
typically small shareholdings mean that they are not strongly penalised by any drop in 
share price due to campaigning and reputation attacks (Clark et al., 2008). However, 
Louche et al. (2012) find confrontational methods like public debate and divesting 
were less attractive among religious organisations than other methods of engagement.  
Vandekerckhove et al. (2007) focus on one voice method, that of letter writing 
even though they emphasise the importance of more research into the whole 
engagement process. The organisational processes involved in collective engagement 
by institutional investors has been studied by Gond and Piani (2013) using the case of 
the UNPRI. Logsdon and Van Buren (2009) develop a model of the shareholder 
resolution process including dialogue as a response by companies. However, it does 
not go as far as to examine the dynamics of voice and exit options which can occur 
when the engagement is deemed to be unsatisfactory. Our study broadens the 
investigation into engagement by developing a model of the different stages of the 
whole process of SSE including a variety of different engagement methods, the 
dynamics of voice and exit and the influences on decisions at each stage. 
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Religious organisations 
 
We study seven cases of engagement undertaken by three religious 
organisations. In line with Pettigrew’s argument for choosing case examples which 
represent extremes or polar types, religious organisations are a clear example of 
socially-driven activism. Drivers of engagement for churches and religious groups are 
their set of moral beliefs and religious values (O'Rourke, 2003; Sparkes & Cowton, 
2004; Tkac, 2006). That is SSE comes from a different ideological perspective than 
more conventional activism, based on principles rather than a market logic (Chung & 
Talaulicar, 2010; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; McLaren, 2004).  
Secondly, also following Pettigrew’s recommendations of choosing 
experienced cases, religious organisations have a long history of engaging on social, 
environmental and ethical issues with companies (Guay et al., 2004; Kreander et al., 
2004; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). They are widely recognized 
as important and experienced actors in SSE (Louche et al., 2012; O'Rourke, 2003) and 
have been the most active shareholders in submitting social policy and human rights 
proposals (Campbell et al., 1999; Dhir, 2006; Monks et al., 2004; Sjöström, 2008; 
Tkac, 2006). They have been orderly and disciplined in their engagement and have 
taken a patient, collaborative and persistent approach (Clark et al. 2008, Proffitt and 
Spicer 2006, Rojas et al. 2009. The formation of umbrella organisations such as the 
ICCR with over 300 members representing $100 billion in invested capital and the 
Church Investors’ Group (CIG) with combined assets of £12-13 billion as well as the 
development of collaborative strategies make them highly relevant to management 
(Glac, 2010).  
Finally, religious organisations perceive SSE to be one of the most influencing 
RI strategies (Louche et al., 2012). Recent research shows that 90% of religious 
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investors believe that active ownership of shares can influence corporate behaviour 
and over 50% indicated they were engaged as shareholders in various ways (Louche 
et al., 2012; Van Cranenburgh, Arenas, Louche, & Vives, 2010). Despite their 
significant and pioneering role in RI there is very limited research into engagement by 
religious organisations (Kreander et al., 2004; Louche et al., 2012) and there have 
been calls for further study in this area (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Sjöström, 2008) 
Method 
 
To explore the engagement processes and how voice and exit options are used 
in SSE, we take an inductive, case study approach. The case study method is suited to 
the in-depth study of a phenomenon in its real-life context where boundaries between 
the phenomenon and context are somewhat blurred (Yin, 1994). It is also suited to 
research questions requiring “detailed understanding of social or organisational 
processes because of the rich data collected in context” (Hartley, 2004: 323). Case 
studies are considered to be particularly valuable for enriching understanding of the 
processes at work in RI (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004) and for complex and long-term 
shareholder engagement (Sjöström, 2008). Using process data allows us to investigate 
the sequence of events over time and the wide variety of influences (Langley, 1999) 
enabling us to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of voice and exit and the 
motives for their use. The case study method has been used in a limited number of 
studies. However, these are either single organisational cases (Hoffman, 1996), or two 
comparative cases (Collier, 2004; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009); a notable exception 
is Hebb et al. (2012) who use three cases. Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests using between 
four and ten cases. 
 58 
The multiple embedded case design allows analysis at two levels (Yin, 1994): 
the religious organisation and the case by case engagement process. This enables us to 
extend our analysis beyond the seven engagement processes to develop a richer 
picture of the relationship between voice and exit as understood by the organisations. 
A descriptive and comparative approach is taken to visualize the stages of the 
shareholder engagement processes, identify the influences at each stage, and analyse 
the dynamics of voice and exit.  
Case selection  
 
In multiple case studies great care must be taken in defining the sampling 
frame, deciding the number of cases to include and dealing with the quantity of data 
collected, as well as ensuring an element of standardization to enable comparison 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
To identify key religious organisations active in the field of engagement we 
conducted desk research and interviews of between forty and sixty minutes with five 
shareholder engagement experts familiar with the work of religious organisations in 
Europe, the UK and the US. These experts represent independent research 
institutions, Church investors, academics, and independent investment advisors all 
directly involved in SSE with religious organisations. These interviews helped us to 
identify a number of religious organisations which we classified according to the 
geographical location, size, religion and engagement history. The religious 
organisations selected for this study were chosen to represent comparable but 
differing characteristics in line with Eisenhardt’s (1989a) emphasis on theoretical 
sampling. The details of the organisations that participated in the study can be seen in 
Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Selected case summaries 
 Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust 
(JRCT), UK  
Missionary Oblates 
of Mary 
Immaculate, US 
Church of 
England, UK 
Organization Independent 
endowed foundation 
International 
missionary 
congregation 
Largest Church in 
the UK 
Denomination  Quaker  Catholic  Anglican  
Congregation  UK based, Quaker 
worldwide 
Italy/US based, 
worldwide  
England based, 
Anglican worldwide 
Engagement 
experience  
Formally since 
1970s 
Formally since 
1980s 
(engaged since 
1970s) 
Formally since 1994 
(engaged prior to 
this) 
AUM (+/-)  £150-200 million $450 million 
(combined Europe 
and US) 
£8 billion  
Ethical 
Investment 
policy 
development 
Investment 
Committee made up 
of six Quaker 
Trustees and a co-
optee (Chief 
Executive of the 
Finance Board of 
the Methodist 
Church) 
Justice, Peace and 
Integrity of Creation 
Office US 
coordinates the 
Faith Consistent 
Investing Program 
Ethical Investment 
Advisory Group 
(EIAG) 18 members 
including investors 
and theologians, 
members from the 
General Synod and 
Archbishops 
Council 
Responsibility 
for ethical 
engagement 
Investment 
Committee and 
Head of Finance 
JPIC Office US. 
Two full time staff 
plus part-time 
support 
EIAG Secretariat, 
two members of 
staff 
Investment 
focus  
UK and European 
listed, small-mid 
cap  
US listed, small-
large cap. 
Mostly UK listed, 
small-large cap.  
Companies held  100  600 2000  
Annual 
engagement 
(approximately)  
5-10 companies Resolutions voted,  
45 letters,  
60 company 
engagements  
Resolutions voted,  
200 letters (UK),  
50 company 
engagements  
 
The main similarities between the three organisations are their Christian faith 
roots, their minimum of 20 years of experience in engagement with companies on 
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social and environmental issues, and their reputation for renowned and proactive 
work on shareholder engagement. The primary language of the three organisations is 
English, and they are based in the UK and US, which are the most active national 
contexts (Eurosif, 2010; Sparkes & Cowton, 2004) and the most widely studied 
(Chung & Talaulicar, 2010) in terms of shareholder engagement. All the organisations 
have an organisational separation between social, environmental and ethical decision-
making and financial decision-making. 
Notable differences are the assets under management which range from £150 
million to £8 billion permitting a comparison of resources, the number of companies 
held in the portfolios and their representation of different religious denominations. 
The differing legal and institutional environments for shareholder engagement in the 
UK and the US may affect approaches to shareholder engagement (Becht et al., 2009; 
Black & Coffee, 1994; Eurosif, 2010; Ryan & Schneider, 2002). These cases 
therefore have been selected to offer a relatively broad spectrum of insights into 
engagement activities and strategies. 
Method and data collection 
 
An interview-based method was used which has been suggested as particularly 
informative for research in this area by Sparkes and Cowton (2004) and Sjöström 
(2008) and in generating insights which probe ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Pettigrew, 
1990). We also used documents such as reports, resolutions, press releases and 
investment policy statements and desk based research of the organisations’ and 
related organisations’ websites to enrich and validate our investigation and triangulate 
our findings (Yin, 1994). 
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Although taking an inductive approach, an interview protocol was developed 
after reviewing the literature to ensure a link between existing theory and the 
inductive elements of the study (Pettigrew, 1990). This was reviewed by peers 
familiar with the topic and refined three times to incorporate their feedback. The 
protocol included questions related to some of the issues raised from the literature but 
the questions were open to enable modifications and refinement to existing theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). We held short introductory calls with the individuals who, from 
our research, appeared to be most closely linked to the organisation’s shareholder 
engagement activities in order to confirm their key role in the organisation’s 
engagement activities.  Each interviewee was asked to prepare an example of a 
successful and an unsuccessful engagement. No further specification of the terms 
‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ was given allowing the interviewees to identify their 
own examples. This form of theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989a) encouraged the 
inclusion of processes with varying outcomes and facilitated the study of both voice 
and exit options. 
Semi-structured interviews were held with the Chairman of the Ethical 
Investment Advisory Group (EIAG) at the Church of England, the Director of the US 
Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation (JPIC) office for the Missionary Oblates of 
Mary Immaculate, and with the Head of Finance and the Chair of the Investment 
Committee at the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (JRCT). These individuals were 
all directly involved in, and responsible for the religious organisations’ engagement 
with the investee corporations. The interviews lasted between fifty and seventy 
minutes with questions designed using relevant issues from the literature to encourage 
detailed reflection on each engagement process. All interviews were conducted by at 
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least two interviewers either in person or by conference call. They were recorded and 
transcribed.  
Follow-up conversations were held with all three organisations to check some 
details from the main interviews and obtain missing information both from the 
interviewees and other staff members involved in engagement. Although each 
organisation’s representative was asked to choose one successful and one 
unsuccessful example, an exception was made for the Oblates where we conducted a 
follow up interview with a third example. This permitted the inclusion of two 
different sectors within the Oblates’ engagement and a consistent mining sector 
example for all the organisations. It further increased the dataset from the US 
perspective. The details of the seven engagement processes can be found in Table 2.2. 
 
Data analysis 
 
We have taken a highly iterative approach to our study moving from theory to 
data and back to theory to continuously refine our analysis. We use both within-case, 
and cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Responses were discussed and coded by 
two researchers using NVivo to identify the key stages and the influences on 
decisions which we then used to further guide our empirical analysis. The emerging 
stages of engagement form the basis of the case analysis and were discussed regularly 
by all four authors. 
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Table 2.2: Successful and Unsuccessful Engagement Processes 
 
Analysis 
 
Before analysing how voice and exit are being used in SSE, we first present 
our findings with regard to the stages of SSE. This examination leads to the 
 Joseph Rowntree Charitable 
Trust (JRCT), UK  
Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate 
(Oblates, JPIC), US 
EIAG, Church of 
England, UK 
 Successful Unsuccessful Successful Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful 
Firm Reed Elsevier 
UK 
Vedanta 
India & UK 
Goldman 
Sachs US 
Newmont 
mining US 
Bank of 
America 
US 
Multiple 
UK 
Vedanta 
India & UK 
Sector Publishing Mining Banking Mining Banking Supermark
ets 
Mining 
Engagement 
target 
Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Sector Firm 
Issue Arms fairs, 
peace 
Environment
al impact 
Financial 
accountabili
ty 
Human 
rights 
Accountabilit
y and human 
rights 
Justice Human rights 
Issue raised 
by 
CAAT 
(NGO) and 
EIRIS 
Churches, 
mining action 
groups, 
EIRIS  
Awareness 
and 
investigatio
n following 
ENRON 
collapse 
2001 
Oblates 
members in 
communitie
s local to 
operations 
Research and 
Oblates 
members in 
local 
communities 
General 
Synod 
 
Church 
members and 
NGOs local 
to operation 
Affected 
stakeholder 
Victims of 
warfare 
Community 
in Orissa 
Developing 
countries 
and the 
poor 
Communitie
s local to 
operations 
in Peru, 
Indonesia 
and Ghana 
Developing 
countries 
with human 
rights abuses 
UK 
farmers 
 
Community 
in Orissa 
Objective 
 
To stop 
company 
involvement 
in arms fairs. 
To meet 
human rights 
and 
environmenta
l standards at 
Orissa plant, 
India 
Obtain 
more 
disclosure 
on risk. 
To make 
financial 
system 
attentive to 
credit needs 
of poor. 
To make 
company 
report on 
social 
impact and 
engagement 
with 
communitie
s 
To develop 
and 
implement 
ethical 
criteria for 
lending  
To gain 
fairer 
treatment 
for small 
farmers 
To meet 
ethical social 
standards at 
Orissa plant, 
India 
Duration 3.5 years 1.5 years 1.5 years 4 years 
ongoing 
2.5 years 
ongoing  
5 years 9 months 
Outcome Divestment, 
sale of 
division, 
reinvestment 
Divestment Dialogue, 
resolution 
withdrawn 
Company 
recommend
ed vote for 
resolution 
and 
achieved 
95% 
Resolution 
withdrawn, 
policy 
developed 
but not 
implemented, 
remained 
investors 
Report and 
recommen
dation for 
ombudsma
n position  
Divestment. 
Some success 
in subsequent 
company 
changes 
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emergence of four main stages in engagement. Firstly, the engagement process is 
initiated when the issue is raised and the decision to respond is made. Second, 
information is sought by the religious organisations and the communication with the 
company begins. Thirdly, change-seeking engagement involves the range of 
communication methods used by the religious organisations, and finally the 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory outcomes lead to differing voice and exit choices. 
Despite dealing with different issues, locations and outcomes, we find that the stages 
are broadly applicable to all the engagement processes we studied. Figure 1 visualizes 
the methods used at each stage, the different outcomes and the influences on decisions 
made reported by the religious organisations. Not all the influences were present in all 
the cases (except for the overriding belief system). 
 
 
Figure 1: Stages of SSE by Religious Organisations 
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•  High profile in media/ 
other large SSE 
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stakeholders 
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Issue raising  
 
The first, preliminary step in initiating the engagement process is where social, 
environmental or ethical issues relating to the companies in which the religious 
organisations have an investment are raised. As shown in Figure 1, issues were 
brought to the attention of the organisations through their organisation members or 
‘grassroots’ networks worldwide, their network of collaborators and in one case as a 
direct request from the governing body of the Church of England. 
While broad issues of concern were defined by core Quaker beliefs or 
‘testimony’, more current concerns were raised by the yearly national meeting of 
Quaker friends in the UK. JRCT’s decisions about whether to engage on particularly 
contentious issues were made collectively by the Trust’s investment committee (see 
Table 1). The decision was influenced not only by the specific issue but by pragmatic 
considerations such as where they thought they could make most difference with the 
limited time they had. An issue high on the popular agenda would encourage JRCT to 
add their voice and build momentum. 
Despite aiming to focus on issues relevant to the main area of business of their 
investee companies, JRCT’s engagement with Reed Elsevier is an example of the 
over-riding importance of their core belief system or Quaker ‘testimony’. Although 
representing less than 1% of Reed Elsevier’s turnover the company’s role in the 
organisation of arms fairs went in strong contradiction to the core belief in peace and 
conflict resolution. The issue was raised through JRCT’s network of collaborators, by 
EIRIS, a not-for-profit responsible investment advisory service, which JRCT worked 
with, and by one of the JRCT Trustees who was closely linked to the NGO Campaign 
Against Arms Trade (CAAT).  
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The Vedanta case concerned human rights of the local communities in Orissa, 
India, over a planned bauxite mine and the expansion of an aluminium foundry on 
sacred land as well as the pollution from the operational foundry. The issue was raised 
by a number of sources from their network of collaborators including mining action 
groups and alerts by EIRIS. Also the involvement of other churches and large NGOs 
such as Amnesty International and Action Aid strengthened the need to act. 
Decisions about engagement by the Oblates were made at the JPIC office (see 
Table 1) without needing authorisation from the Oblates governing body. The broad 
aim of JPIC is to advocate for justice for the poor around the world. They are 
responsive to issues and concerns raised by local communities through their 
missionaries who are present in around 67 countries, two thirds of these in the 
developing world: “We actually hear from people on the ground about some things 
that are going on or have gone on”. This close link with the missionaries or 
‘grassroots’ network has become fundamental to the Oblates’ engagement “we don’t 
often like to engage a company unless we do have some actual contact on the ground 
with local communities”. A more pragmatic consideration which influenced their 
decisions to engage was the probability of achieving success. Thus they preferred to 
engage with US based companies which they claim to be much less complex, large 
companies with international reach, and in collaboration with others (particularly 
ICCR members). 
The Oblates engagement with Newmont Mining was motivated by a concern 
for the “existing and potential opposition from local communities” in Peru, Indonesia 
and Ghana following reports of environmental degradation and social unrest. The 
issue was raised through their grassroots network through direct contact with their 
missionaries in the local community and demonstrates their preference for issues with 
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global reach. The decision to engage was also influenced by the company being based 
in the US. 
The Oblates’ engagement with the financial sector, Goldman Sachs and Bank 
of America in particular was part of a longer-term campaign about debt cancellation. 
The engagement with Goldman Sachs on credit default swaps and derivatives aimed 
to “make the major players in the global finance system more attentive to the credit 
needs of… the poor”. It was also timely and built on the awareness and concern about 
the financial system brought about by the 2008 financial crisis. The concern with 
Bank of America was a lack of ethical lending criteria to protect human rights in local 
communities and was raised by the grassroots network.  
The Church of England has detailed ethical investment policies for a range of 
key issues developed by the EIAG (see Table 1) which are accessible on the EIAG 
website and which guide their engagement. Decisions to engage are made by the 
EIAG, and the Secretariat is the point of contact for concerns raised by members of 
the Church (see Table 1). Issues are often raised by the Church’s “remarkable 
intelligence network around the world” which is made up of Church of England 
members: “through the Anglican Communion we have a very large membership all 
around the world which … gives us tremendous resources”.  
The issue of Vedanta’s “abusive attitude to communities and human rights” 
was raised by members of the Church locally to Vedanta’s operations in India through 
the direct connection between the grassroots network and the EIAG. In the second 
case, EIAG’s work with supermarkets followed a request from the Church of England 
General Synod to look into the relationship between supermarkets and farmers 
(EIAG, 2007). Although the EIAG reports annually to this governing body, it is 
normally not involved in engagement decisions. Prompted by an investigation by the 
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Competition Commission in the UK into the inequitable balance of power between 
large supermarket chains and farmers who supplied them, EIAG decided to engage at 
sector level with multiple stakeholders: the Government, supermarket chains and 
farmers. In their view this was closely related to their belief in justice, which is “very 
central to the New Testament”. The decision to engage was also influenced by the 
Church Commissioners’ unique position as one of the largest owners of farmland in 
the UK giving EIAG “access to a level of knowledge that wouldn’t have been 
available elsewhere or to anyone else”. 
Information search  
 
Once issues were raised and the organisations had decided to engage, 
shareholders began to voice their concerns with the companies and engagement 
moved to a second, information seeking stage. Figure 1 shows the different methods 
used by the religious organisations at this stage. Accurate, factual information was 
considered to be of key importance by all the organisations in achieving their 
objectives and was sought through contact with the company and other sources. 
JRCT wrote initial letters to Reed Elsevier and Vedanta. The Head of Finance 
of JRCT explained that this is a general strategy: “we want to give the company an 
opportunity to explain themselves”. Resources were an important influence on how to 
collect information. The Head of Finance was the only person involved in routine 
engagement and letter writing and where further investigation was needed JRCT 
relied on their grantees. In the case of Reed Elsevier, JRCT decided to write to the 
company and simultaneously approached one of their grantees to produce a report on 
the company’s involvement in organizing arms exhibitions. The AGM was attended 
by two of the JRCT’s trustees. JRCT explained that some engagements did not move 
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further than the information gathering stage if the company responses were 
satisfactory. However, in the Reed Elsevier case the investment committee at JRCT 
were not satisfied with the company’s responses so they moved onto the next stage of 
engagement. In the Vedanta case, after writing to the company and receiving an 
unsatisfactory response, one of JRCT’s Trustees met with a representative from the 
local community in Orissa brought over by an NGO who informed him in detail of the 
situation in Orissa and prompted JRCT to continue to engage. 
The Oblates JPIC staff of two were responsible for researching and writing 
letters to companies asking for information “our general practice is to write a letter 
to ask for something”. This was the process followed for the cases of Bank of 
America and Newmont Mining. The Oblates also drew on their collaborative partners 
such as other religious organisations under the umbrella of the ICCR, to provide 
“information and anecdotes”. Partnerships were said to “bring diversity … bring 
experience … some accounts or … some real life stories … and they bring their own 
research capacity”. These religious partners were considered by the Director of the 
JPIC office to be “diligent researchers”. One exception to the Oblates general practice 
of writing to the companies for information was the case of Goldman Sachs where the 
awareness raised by the current events at the time prompted them to file a resolution 
directly.  
EIAG started all their engagement processes “by fact checking”, and asking 
questions assuming that the company was behaving properly. This was highlighted in 
the Vedanta engagement: “we were very clear to ask the company for information 
and check our facts with the company as well so that everything … was decided on a 
factual basis”. 
 70 
EIAG Secretariat undertook much of its investigation internally in order to fill 
the information gap it identified in each case. After being dissatisfied with a video 
meeting with the CEO of Vedanta whilst in the UK, the Secretary of EIAG travelled 
independently to Orissa on a fact-finding trip where he consulted a wide range of 
stakeholders including a face to face meeting with the CEO, local government 
officials, and management, the NGO ActionAid and community members, and a 
number of diplomats, and development officials. The investigation did not allay the 
concerns EIAG had about the company’s impact. In the case of the unfair practices 
used by supermarkets in their relations with supplier farmers, EIAG had access to a 
large body of information through holding shares in a number of supermarkets in the 
UK and through the Church’s ownership of extensive areas of farmland in the UK. To 
take advantage of this latter source EIAG commissioned the CCLA, an SRI service 
provider, to produce a report “Fair Trade Begins at Home” (EIAG, 2007) involving 
individual and group meetings with farmers over six months. From this report the 
injustice in the farmer-supermarket relationship became clear. With a strong resource 
base, EIAG was able to do more of its own investigation although the extensive 
research necessary for the production and writing of the report was undertaken by the 
SRI consultancy.  
Change-seeking 
 
Once an issue was raised and the facts established, voice became stronger and 
a range of different engagement methods were used by the religious organisations to 
seek change in the investee companies. The Oblates suggested: “it’s like any kind of 
change that you’re working for … you have to use all the arrows in your quiver”. 
These methods included attending annual shareholder meetings to ask questions, letter 
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writing, dialogue and filing resolutions and are summarised in Figure 1. All the 
processes included holding meetings with companies to establish a dialogue to voice 
and discuss concerns. 
JRCT recognised that resource limitations were an important factor in how 
they went about their engagement. Developing a relationship with the company 
through personal contact was seen as beyond their resources. However, writing letters 
to send directly to top managers can be done by the Head of Finance. Trustees can 
then judge whether the responses are satisfactory. Collaboration with other groups 
such as the CIG has become an important part of their engagement strategy, enabling 
them to share research, knowledge and human resources. 
JRCT sent letters requesting information and questioning Reed Elsevier on the 
issue for around two years with the objective of providing the company with an 
opportunity to explain itself. However, they were not satisfied with the responses and 
requested a meeting with the company at which they wanted their NGO grantees to be 
present. While a noisier public campaign was building among stakeholders such as 
employees and customers, JRCT chose to use its position as a shareholder to get 
direct access to top management and attempt to also provide NGOs access to the 
company. The company initially resisted but finally agreed to meet JRCT and the 
NGO CAAT separately. Three of the Trustees and the Head of Finance attended the 
meeting where despite much discussion the company maintained their argument that 
their business was legal and denied any wrongdoing. In the meeting “they did promise 
to write to us ... but they never wrote”. Further contact did not yield the requested 
response either. JRCT did not publicise their meeting with Reed Elsevier.  
Vedanta was unresponsive to JRCT’s initial letter requesting information “to 
actually get the communication going with them was very difficult”; “they’re not 
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listening”. Because of the geographical distance between JRCT and the Indian-based 
company and in order to have more impact with their limited resources, JRCT joined 
a UNPRI special interest group on Vedanta and added their voice to what was already 
a large campaign.  Collaboration enabled them to have access to a telephone meeting 
with the company but JRCT recognized that they had “played a fairly small part”.  
All of the engagements by the Oblates included the filing of a resolution. The 
Director of the JPIC stated: “certainly in the US tradition … the filing of resolutions 
and the engagement with the company is seen as a very productive and effective way 
of getting to the heart of some issues”. This distinction between the US and UK was 
also noted by EIAG: “in the US it is much more common to have specific shareholder 
motions which may be filed by activists and also by some investors”. The Oblates saw 
the public nature of resolutions as an advantage: “it is public which we like, which means 
that it invites the participation of other shareholders and stakeholders; because it’s printed in 
the proxy it informs them [the shareholders of the company] about an issue that other 
shareholders are concerned about”. Furthermore, the regulations surrounding the filing 
of resolutions meant that legally, despite the size of the organisation the company 
must respond in the same way “They [the company] would have to do the same thing 
whether it’s somebody who has a thousand shares or somebody who has a million 
shares, if there’s a resolution presented, they have to respond legally”. 
Generally the Oblates began engagement by writing letters or meeting 
companies to discuss a concern. If the company responded positively to their 
concerns, then communication continued. However, if the response was not 
satisfactory then the Oblates turned to resolutions. These were filed by them or 
another shareholder but almost always in collaboration with other ICCR members. 
The Director of the Oblates JPIC office said collaboration provided “a broader base 
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of experience and knowledge in terms of the issues”, adding that “working with other 
partners is just in our DNA, none of us can adequately do it alone”. This 
collaboration enabled them to overcome their resource limitations just as happened 
with JRCT. 
The case of Goldman Sachs highlights the importance of external influences 
on when making decisions about how to engage. In the “midst of the financial crisis 
and near meltdown we were extremely eager both to focus our own thinking on this 
issue and also focus … the mind of the company on the issue.” Rather than sending an 
initial letter, which often takes weeks or months to get a reply, the Oblates chose to 
file a resolution thus giving the company a limited amount of time to either engage on 
the issue or put it on the proxy. 
In contrast, EIAG stated a strong preference for behind the scenes 
engagement: “most of what we do is confidential and goes on with a company with a 
very constructive relationship”. This was strongly related to the identification of their 
organisation as an institutional investor rather than an ‘activist’ and also to the 
national differences between the engagement process in UK and US.  
EIAG generally tended to engage with investor relations, the chief executive 
or company chairman, and commented that approaching CSR officers can lead to a 
legalistic response rather than to real change: “the Chairman is often the most useful 
place to go as well as being the appropriate one”. After being unable to meet with 
these individuals and undertaking its own investigation, EIAG participated in 
discussions with other investors and in a conference call with the company. Despite 
these discussions, EIAG acted independently during the engagement stating that “in 
the main where we can we engage on our own”, which enabled them to develop a 
clear position and move more quickly. However, they sometimes engaged with the 
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CIG to get a larger voice on certain issues. In the case of the supermarkets, EIAG 
decided to engage with multiple supermarkets as well as government in order to 
achieve sector level change. A key influence in this decision was the highly 
competitive nature of the supermarket industry where regulation changes would 
enable a level playing field which could then lead to changes in behaviour. 
Outcomes 
 
Whilst the engagement processes were chosen as examples of successful and 
unsuccessful engagements, a range of different company responses was found. As 
shown in Figure 1, we classify the immediate outcomes of the engagement processes 
into ‘satisfactory response’, leading to company action, and ‘unsatisfactory response’, 
meaning insufficient or no change, and go on to examine the voice and exit options 
chosen.  
Satisfactory response. Three of the engagements resulted in satisfactory 
action by the company in response to the request while the engagers remained 
shareholders. Newmont Mining produced a report about the impact of their operations 
on local communities following the Oblates’ resolution, which achieved 95% of the 
votes after the company recommended that other shareholders vote for the resolution. 
This was unusual considering the normally low levels of voting support received by 
SSE resolutions (Mackenzie, 1993; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Sparkes & Cowton, 
2004). Despite this success, the Oblates had on-going engagement with the company 
to ensure that the report’s findings led to change in the company. This is depicted in 
Figure 1 with the higher arrow labelled ‘on-going shareholder engagement’. The 
company’s response slowed when it came to implementing the recommendations and 
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the Oblates met with them twice over the second half of 2011. The result of this was 
that the company “reengaged significantly in picking up the recommendations”. 
The Oblates decided to withdraw their resolution with Goldman Sachs 
because they were satisfied with their conversation with the company. This was in 
line with other studies that suggest that resolution withdrawals are a positive outcome 
(Goldstein, 2011; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Tkac, 2006; Vogel, 1983). According to the 
Oblates, Goldman Sachs had a more robust and company-wide risk management 
structure in place since their engagement. Put differently, the use of voice rather than 
exit paid off since it led to an improvement in company performance according to the 
religious organisation. While the satisfactory response on this issue led to no further 
action, their broader on-going campaign on debt cancellation means that they 
continued to dialogue with Goldman Sachs on other related issues. 
Finally, EIAG’s engagement at sector level received the support of the 
competition authorities who announced the creation of a groceries market 
ombudsman position. Nevertheless, the Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill remains in 
the Parliamentary process with no adjudicator yet having been placed. In a similar 
way to the Oblates with Newmont Mining, EIAG remained involved with both 
supermarkets and the government on this issue in order to follow through with their 
demands. They also continued their dialogues with supermarkets in which they held 
shares on other sector level issues such as the clear labelling of produce. The 
importance of remaining engaged until change was actually implemented in the 
company is highlighted in all these examples. 
Unsatisfactory response. The Bank of America engagement was ultimately 
considered to be unsatisfactory by the Oblates because the development of the 
requested criteria did not translate into substantive change at the implementation 
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stage: “it was next to impossible … for us to even get an example of how this criteria 
… was … applied in this situation”. This engagement coincided with an important 
period of change for the bank, which made a number of acquisitions and sold many of 
their operations in the developing world to focus on the US. Despite the 
unsatisfactory response to their use of voice in this case, the Oblates did not exit and 
chose to continue their engagement by focusing on other social issues relating to the 
bank’s larger business in the US. This is depicted in Figure 1 by the lower arrow 
labelled ‘on-going shareholder engagement.  
In contrast, three of the engagement processes included divestment by the 
engagers. For both EIAG and JRCT the engagement process with Vedanta resulted in 
the sale of their shares because they felt it was unlikely that the company would make 
the changes they were requesting. The Secretary of EIAG stated: “The key issue was 
the disconnect between the claims of the company and what I saw and heard on the 
ground” and the Chairman of EIAG confirmed “we were confident the company 
would not change its standards”. One reason for EIAG and JRCT doubting that 
change would be made was the ownership structure of Vedanta where the Executive 
Chairman and his family owned a majority stake in the company. For JRCT, the 
divestment by other larger shareholders engaging on the same issue led them to ask, 
“how can we stay holding this company? They’re not listening and these big 
organisations have put a lot of effort into trying to get them to listen and they haven’t 
listened so we did sell our shares”. Both made public announcements which 
explained their concerns about the companies and thus exited with voice. Although 
JRCT was sharing information with others on the issue, the divestment was not 
coordinated and they took no further action. They suggested in the interviews that 
such coordination could have increased the impact. They pointed out, however, that 
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the decision to exit may be reached at different times by different members of a 
collaborative engagement and that this can add complexity to working with others. 
Subsequently to divestment in 2010, EIAG engaged twice with Vedanta in 
2011 and 2012, although as external stakeholders rather than shareholders. This is 
depicted in Figure 1 by the dashed line labelled ‘external engagement’. Since then, the 
company has “made appointments at a senior level to specifically look at CSR and 
governance and is reviewing its standards”. The Chairman of EIAG regarded the 
engagement as “unsuccessfulish” commenting that “a process which is unsuccessful 
at the time may actually end up being successful as well”. 
JRCT sold their shares in Reed Elsevier. JRCT felt the company did not fully 
address their concerns at the meeting: “they just fell back on not whether it was moral 
or not to make profits out of the arms trade but that basically it was legal”. In a 
similar way Vandekerckhove et al. (2007) refer to the need to move beyond the truth 
value of a specific case to move forward with engagement. Finally communication 
fully broke down, “after about a year of waiting for this answer from them we just 
thought well they’re just ignoring us so … we’ll sell our shares”. JRCT in fact 
considered their engagement with Reed Elsevier to be successful. Thus the 
combination of voice and exit led to the desired outcome and a satisfactory response. 
Their public divestment from Reed Elsevier generated media coverage and 
“invigorated” the campaign by other stakeholders against the arms exhibition 
division. JRCT sold their shares in February 2007, and in July of the same year the 
company announced the sale of the division. JRCT chose the reinvestment option 
shown in Figure 1 and bought back into the company at a later date.  
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Discussion 
 
Having reviewed the theory of voice and exit and the different methods of 
engagement, we then presented seven empirical engagement processes by three 
religious organisations, renowned for their proactive engagement on social, 
environmental and ethical issues. Our analysis of the stages of engagement culminate 
in identifying the dynamics of voice and exit over time in SSE. In this section we 
revisit the theory underlying voice and exit and discuss this in light of our empirical 
findings which show the dynamics of voice and exit options. We then go on to discuss 
the influences on decisions made by the religious organisations in their SSE which 
were highlighted in our investigation.  
Dynamics of voice and exit 
 
According to Hirschman (1970), exit is an economic argument and works by 
creating revenue losses. Management reacts by relating lower revenue and the drop in 
quality. However, the shareholdings of religious organisations tend to be small, for 
example JRCT held less than 1% of Reed Elsevier, and therefore cannot rely on 
traditional shareholder power to have a financial impact on investee companies. Exit 
as a private and anonymous economic act was not an option. Rather, by combining 
divestment with public statements it was used as a political argument more in line 
with a voice strategy. Voice includes “various types of actions and protests, including 
those that are meant to mobilize public opinion” (Hirschman, 1970: 30). The cases 
support this claim as the Chairman of EIAG referring to the Vedanta case explains: 
“the impact of our disinvestment … was part of the process [it] has prompted the 
company to start potentially changing its behaviour”. The Chair of the JRCT 
investment committee, referring to their divestment in Reed Elsevier, shared this 
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view: “selling our shares was the most effective thing we’ve done because it … 
brought this campaign into the headlines of the press and invigorated the other 
people like the doctors and the lawyers, and the NGOs”.  
EIAG’s continued engagement as an external stakeholder with Vedanta 
despite their divestment shows that although they had ‘exited’ the engagement, they 
continued to use the voice option to maintain a dialogue with the company despite not 
being shareholders. By taking a fuller view of the engagement process, our empirical 
evidence goes further than previous studies which have argued that the threat of exit 
by large shareholders is part of voice (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009). We demonstrate 
that in SSE, divestment itself can be part of voice. This finding supports the work of 
Proffitt and Spicer (2006) that religious organisations take a longer term view of 
engagement and that management responses expecting a ‘quick fix’ are likely to 
prove ineffective. The persistence of religious organisations in SSE is further 
emphasized by the fact that even satisfactory outcomes do not necessarily lead to an 
end to engagement as evidence of changes is sought and further issues are picked up.  
In contrast to Hirschman’s assertion that exit can be a consequence of failed 
voice, our empirical evidence provides an example of an engager remaining a 
shareholder despite the fact that attempts at changing the company had failed. This 
leads us to suggest that exit is not a necessary consequence of failure to bring about 
change. Why would an investor choose to remain? Voice is more costly than exit 
(Hirschman, 1970; Marler & Faugère, 2010; Parrino et al., 2003), and religious 
organisations have limited resources for engagement. The cases here demonstrate how 
collaboration has played an important role in overcoming this cost. Connecting to 
other investors such as religious investor groups ICCR and CIG, and other interest 
groups such as the UNPRI provided a wider asset base as well as financial and 
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knowledge resource sharing. The nature of these relationships can vary as well as 
their strength and scope, but they show that the dynamics of shareholder-stakeholder 
relations are becoming increasingly complex. Mobilizing support through forming 
coalitions with both religious shareholders and non-religious stakeholders has evolved 
over time to become a key theme in SSE (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Van Buren, 2007). 
Connections with these groups enabled the religious organisations to share 
information and access to companies, stakeholders and resources, in support of 
Arenas et al. (2013). The Director of the Oblates JPIC said: “we’ve been asked by a 
number of people over the years who want to go to the annual general meeting of a 
corporation but are not shareholders, if we would lend them our proxies and we do”. 
JRCT was insistent on the presence of an NGO at the meeting with Reed Elsevier. 
EIAG and JRCT also connected with NGOs to learn more about the issues they were 
engaging on. 
While corporate governance engagement is concerned with weighing up the 
costs and benefits of engagement, religious organisations judge engagement to be 
worthwhile. EIAG said: “the encouragement from the members of the Church is 
always to do more, we’ve never been asked if it’s worthwhile”. Rather, it is the first of 
Hirschman’s decision elements, the evaluation of the likelihood of getting the 
company back on track, where key voice and exit decisions will be weighed.  
These findings send a clear message to companies that the engagement of 
religious organisations is not based on a ‘rational’ economic model. Rather than 
adhering to market-based economic behaviour, religious organisations have a 
commitment to engagement which goes beyond a simple voice or exit decision. They 
play a political and social role in their engagement with broader consequences than 
anonymous divestment and this should be taken into account by companies when 
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engaging. Public exit and continuing engagement on existing and new issues, whether 
internally as shareholders or externally, are all variations of voice used by these 
religious organisations and which go beyond the typical corporate governance 
expectations. 
Influences on decisions in SSE by religious organisations 
 
In addition to the findings demonstrating the dynamics of voice and exit, the 
analysis of empirical evidence presented here also contributes to the literature on SSE 
by religious organisations by identifying the influences on their decisions at each 
stage of the process and which provide a starting point for future investigation.  
As shown in Figure 1, at the initial stage of the engagement process the 
connections between the religious organisations and their grassroots networks were 
particularly important. This enabled the detection of social, environmental and ethical 
issues in communities affected by companies’ operations and gave the religious 
organisations access to key stakeholders. EIAG stated that “there have been a number 
of occasions that we’ve had companies and we have told them things about their 
operations that they didn’t know and they’ve responded positively”. We suggest that 
this ability to detect issues and raise the voice of often unheard communities quickly 
and directly as shareholders is a particular asset for religious organisations.  
A certain pragmatism also entered into the decisions of the religious 
organisations about whether to engage or not. Resources constraints affected the way 
the religious organisations collected information and the methods they used to engage 
leading them to share costs through collaboration. Alternatively by working 
independently EIAG could make faster decisions than if they were collaborating with 
other partners. Particular issues were taken up due to their timeliness in order to take 
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advantage of current public debate and media attention to build momentum and 
contribute to a larger movement. At other times, distance was an obstacle in 
establishing communication and added unwanted complexity to engagement. 
The change-seeking stage of the engagement process includes the use of a 
wide variety of methods of engagement which are also found in the broader 
engagement literature. The importance of the legal and institutional context is 
demonstrated by the use of resolutions by the Oblates whereby the legal obligation of 
a company to respond to a filing puts both small and large shareholders on a more 
equal footing. In order for a resolution to be filed at the SEC in the US, a shareholder 
must own a value of $2000 in shares of the corresponding company for a minimum 
period of a year. Once this minimum is complied with, companies are obliged to 
respond in the same way regardless of the size of the shareholding. One of the reasons 
the Oblates used shareholder resolutions as a method of voicing concerns was because 
they informed other shareholders and enabled them to vote on particular issues. The 
UK based organisations focused more on dialogue in line with comparative research 
on UK and US engagement such as Aguilera et al. (2006) which suggests that in the 
UK institutional investors play a more consultative role whereas US SEC regulations 
encourage more public disclosure. EIAG confirmed “most of what we do is 
confidential and goes on with a company with a very constructive relationship”. The 
effectiveness of these approaches is debated and whether behind the scenes dialogue 
is where the real action takes place as claimed by Logsdon and Van Buren (2009), or 
if more public campaigning (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008a; Guay et al., 2004) can 
have a greater effect is yet to be resolved. The self-perception of engaging 
organisations as activists or institutional investors could influence the choice of 
approach. 
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Despite their limited resources and typically small shareholdings, in a number 
of cases the religious organisations were able to engage with senior levels of 
management. Meeting the ‘right’ people has been identified in the broader 
engagement literature as an important element for success (Goldstein, 2011). Previous 
research has reported the high degree of legitimacy of SSE demands by religious 
organisations (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Van Buren, 2007) arguing that this is more 
likely to result in resolutions reaching the proxy or dialogue with a company 
(Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009). Despite lower levels of traditional shareholder power, 
our empirical results suggest an advantage in being a religious organisation. EIAG 
claimed: “the Church of England carries a lot of moral authority in the UK” which 
has helped to establish trust in their engagement and the Oblates see their engagement 
as offering a “moral compass” to companies. This legitimacy extends also to the 
media; the Director of Oblates JPIC said: “I don’t think most companies want to be 
put in a position of going against a rather established well known religious 
institution, or their representatives, that doesn’t play well in the media”. The Quaker 
based JRCT stated: “Although we were only a small shareholder … we have got quite 
a reputation”. Religious organisations then may benefit, in a similar way, or perhaps 
more so, to NGOs, from an ability to influence which is disproportionate to the 
number of shares owned (Guay et al., 2004).  
At the final stage, when decisions are made about whether to continue to 
engage or not, the likelihood of change by the company is a key consideration. 
Unfavorable governance structures including majority ownership in the case of 
Vedanta and different international governance cultures were shown to limit the use 
of the voice option. This coincides with Parrino et al. (2003) who find evidence which 
suggests that institutional owners are more likely to sell stocks rather than attempt to 
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voice their concerns when the CEO is part of the family which founded the company. 
However, despite these limitations, EIAG regarded this challenge as part of a learning 
process “dealing with different ownership structures and different cultural structures 
will become much more normal”. The persistent nature of religious organisations’ 
engagement (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006) and the evidence here suggest that these 
organisations will continue to develop and refine their engagement processes.  
Limitations and future research 
 
The engagement processes analysed here have been reported by the members 
of religious organisations directly involved in the engagement. Our objective was to 
understand voice and exit from the perspective of the engagers and our analysis takes 
these reports as its starting point. The company perspective would be a valuable 
source of validation for the stages of the process and the influences on the decisions 
made. Further research is needed to better understand how the company perceives 
engagement by religious organisations. Particularly challenging, however, is the 
frequent denial by companies that their actions are in direct response to engagement 
challenges and the difficulties of establishing causal links among the many factors at 
play (Gillan & Starks, 2007). This prompts a potential line of future research into the 
events surrounding divestment and the prevalence and effects of pre and post-
divestment engagement in SSE. 
The issue of confidentiality in dialogue (Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009) also 
has a limiting effect on this research. EIAG comments that “I have to talk about 
something very public”, highlighting the inability of those who engage privately to 
disclose information on their engagement processes. The definition of whether an 
engagement is public or private and the extent of media involvement in this also 
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remains unclear. Further research into the debate between the effectiveness of ‘public’ 
versus ‘private’ voice methods is needed.  
Our sample is small, with only three religious organisations represented. 
While we have chosen these organisations for their extreme position, experience, 
relevance to RI and comparative features the limited sample size restricts the ability to 
generalize the research findings. Further quantitative research on a larger sample 
would be useful to explore some of the points we have raised here, as would 
investigation into different national contexts. Although likely to be challenging, a 
fuller understanding of religious organisations could be developed by researching 
those which do not choose to engage or participate in RI. Comparative work on the 
processes and influences on decisions of other types of engagers such as NGOs, 
individual investors, SRI funds, pension funds and other institutional investors would 
be a logical extension to the findings shown here. 
Our focus on religious organisations as social shareholder engagers rests on 
the assumption that religious organisations are legitimate in their concerns for 
improving social and environmental performance. We note however that there could 
be conflicting opinions about the motives and agendas of religious organisations 
raising doubts about their ethical objectives.  
Finally, to extend the recent work of Gond and Piani (2013), research into the 
networks and institutions which religious organisations work within would shed 
further light on the nature of these relationships and the type and direction of resource 
flows between them. The strength and scope of these networks and institutions is also 
of great importance to companies as the dynamics between shareholders and 
stakeholders become more complex.  
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Conclusion 
 
This article contributes to the growing literature on social shareholder 
engagement by providing in-depth insight into the engagement process itself. It 
models the engagement process and identifies four key stages: issue raising, 
information search, change-seeking, and outcomes, which religious organisations seen 
as highly proactive in SSE have followed. The engagements include multiple methods 
of engagement and detail the influences on decision at each stage. This has enabled us 
to consider the dynamics of voice and exit options in social shareholder engagement 
and is a basis for future comparative investigation on the issue. 
In contrast to much of the corporate governance literature we find that 
religious organisations do not base their exit and voice decisions on economic 
considerations but political ones using voice to further their beliefs and mission in 
society. The silent exit option is not used by religious organisations in SSE. Voice is 
accepted as worthwhile and it is the likelihood of achieving change in companies 
which has greater influence on voice and exit decisions. We argue that Hirschman’s 
voice and exit options are dynamic, mutually reinforcing and not necessarily 
sequential. Divestment does not close the door to continuing external engagement 
with a company nor is exit always the consequence of an unsatisfactory voice 
strategy. These findings extend the voice approach and the options available within it 
providing practical insights for both managers and other shareholders and widening 
the scope for future research on this topic. 
The paper also sheds light on the influences on the decisions made by 
religious organisations in SSE. Described as pioneers in SSE, religious organisations 
as active and experienced engagers are influenced by a variety of pragmatic and moral 
considerations when deciding on their engagement practices to push for greater social, 
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environmental and ethical responsibility from the companies they invest in. These 
insights are of vital importance for management to gain an understanding of their 
shareholders and stakeholders and to develop adequate responses to their concerns 
and persistent engagement as well as for other activists choosing a voice strategy. 
 
 
The final publication is available at: 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10551-013-1890-0 
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Chapter 3: Paper 2 - Engaging Ethically: A Discourse Ethics 
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Abstract 
 
The primacy of shareholder demands in the traditional theory of the firm has 
typically been to the exclusion of marginalised stakeholder voices. However, 
shareholders involved in social shareholder engagement (SSE) purport to bring these 
voices into corporate decision-making. In response to ethical concerns raised about 
the legitimacy of SSE we use the lens of discourse ethics to provide a much needed 
normative analysis at both action and constitutional levels. By specifying three 
normative questions we extend the analysis of SSE to identify a political role for SSE 
in pursuit of the common good. We demonstrate the desirability for SSE to promote 
regulatory/institutional change to guarantee marginalised stakeholders have a voice in 
corporate decision-making which affects them. The theory of SSE we propose thus 
calls into question the stark separation of the political and economic spheres and 
reveals an underlying tension, often overlooked, within the responsible investment 
literature. 
 
Key words: social shareholder engagement, discourse ethics, communicative action, 
deliberative democracy, stakeholder engagement, Habermas 
 
  
 90 
Introduction 
 
Shareholders are just one of the multiple stakeholders which can affect and are 
affected by corporations (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman & Reed, 1983). The 
shareholder primacy orientation of traditional agency theory assumes shareholders 
will maximize their individual utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, social 
shareholder engagement2 (SSE) poses a challenge to this approach as shareholders 
take the concerns of often voiceless and marginalised stakeholders such as victims of 
human rights abuses and environmental degradation (Dhir, 2012; Hennchen, 
forthcoming; Kraemer, Whiteman, & Banerjee, 2013; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; 
McLaren, 2004; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006) to the heart of corporate decision-making. 
As a dialogue bridging the gap between civil society and corporate interests, SSE by 
its very nature lies at the heart of the business and society relations. Yet despite their 
moral interests, shareholders involved in SSE should not uncritically be assumed to be 
the “good guys” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Research suggests that neglecting to 
consider the ethics of the process of SSE can pose a threat to its legitimacy (Dhir, 
2012; O'Rourke, 2003). 
The role of corporations in addressing social and environmental problems has 
been addressed widely in the management literature, usually under the rubric of 
corporate social responsibility (Garriga & Mele, 2004; Jamali, 2008). Perspectives 
such as stakeholder democracy (Freeman, 1984; Matten & Crane, 2005), corporate 
                                                2	  Social shareholder engagement is used here in line with previous research 
(Goodman et al. forthcoming). This term was used to reconcile the variety of different 
terms found in the literature which refer to shareholders voicing their concerns on 
particular issues to companies (Eurosif, 2006) The use of the word ‘social’ reflects the 
relevance of the issue to society rather than just the shareholder. SSE refers to 
principle-based issues and the social, environmental and ethical impacts of corporate 
behaviour. It also includes some governance issues related to justice. However, those 
governance issues with the sole objective of improving financial returns are not 
included (Eurosif, 2012)	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citizenship (Moon, Crane, & Matten, 2005) and political CSR (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007; Scherer, Palazzo, & Matten, 2014) have defended a much broader set of 
responsibilities for the corporation in society. Research by law scholars (Stout, 2012) 
and in the public domain (Freshfields, 2005) has also challenged the mantra of 
shareholder wealth maximization by focusing on a broader interpretation of fiduciary 
duty. At the same time the growth in responsible investment practice (Eurosif, 2014) 
and research has demonstrated the plurality of demands made by shareholders and the 
continuously growing interest in environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues 
in investment.  
But what of these shareholders who purport to speak for marginalised 
stakeholders? Despite their oft-stated commitment to voicing unheard stakeholder 
concerns related to the environmental and social impacts of corporate operations, and 
the extensive descriptive research on shareholder engagement, a normative, ethical 
approach has so far been neglected. Rather the literature has focused on strategic and 
tactical concerns (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Rojas et al., 
2009) or identity concerns (Arjaliès, 2010; Rehbein et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
existing research has raised ethical concerns about how shareholders undertake SSE. 
These include the need to establish legitimacy in the face of a plurality of demands on 
the firm (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), the potential for shareholders to actually harm 
rather than help the local communities they seek to represent (Coumans, 2012; Dhir, 
2012), the lack of accountability of engagement behind ‘closed doors’ (McLaren, 
2004; O'Rourke, 2003), and the use of divestment or threat of disclosure in SSE 
(Goodman et al., 2014). In addressing this gap we provide a benchmark for reflecting 
on the ethics of the SSE process. 
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This article explores how shareholders involved in SSE can ensure they 
engage ethically. We structure our analysis according to the action and constitutional 
levels identified by Schreck et al. (2013). In this way we address SSE within the 
existing institutional and regulatory constraints, before going on to consider to what 
extent and how SSE should challenge the constraints themselves to change the “rules 
of the game” (North, 1990: 3). 
We approach our analysis through the lens of Habermasian discourse ethics 
(Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1992), which offers a valuable opportunity to examine SSE 
not only from a much-needed normative perspective, but one which also allows for 
the mediation of a plurality of ethea. A particularly relevant aspect of Habermas’s 
discourse ethics to SSE is the emphasis on the participation of all affected parties in 
fair dialogues to establish valid, moral norms (Beschorner, 2006).  Another advantage 
of discourse ethics is that it is process-focused and therefore avoids assumptions of 
the moral content of norms which underlie other ethical theories. Finally, Habermas’s 
later work has extended discourse ethics to deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1996), 
which has become increasingly used in debates about the political role of business in 
society (Moon et al., 2005; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007).  
Our analysis of SSE through a discourse ethics lens enables us to develop a 
normative, ethical perspective of SSE, so far missing in the stakeholder engagement 
literature. This analysis is based on the identification of three normative questions 
related to voicing stakeholder concerns; promoting stakeholder engagement; and 
promoting institutional/regulatory change. The first two questions belong to the action 
level and the last to the constitutional level. We extend the analysis of SSE beyond 
the current work on political CSR to include the desirability of promoting 
regulatory/institutional change to ensure marginalised stakeholders have a voice in 
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corporate decision-making which affects them. In this way we elaborate a deliberative 
democratic political conception of SSE which in turn questions the stark separation of 
the spheres of economics and politics. Our analysis also implies a dilemma for 
shareholders involved in SSE as to whether or not they are prepared to yield power on 
corporate decision-making in order to ensure the participation of marginalised 
stakeholders. This dilemma reveals the significance of an often overlooked difference 
in motivations between purely ethically motivated shareholders and shareholders who 
may also use SSE instrumentally as a means to reduce risk. 
We begin by clarifying the concept of SSE and its prevalence in practice. We 
then review the literature to date on SSE, which reveals the existence of ethical 
challenges/concerns for shareholders in SSE. We next outline discourse ethics and 
present this theory as our lens for developing a normative perspective of SSE along 
with the reasons for doing so. The following section presents our multi-level analysis 
structured around three normative questions and our findings. Then we explore these 
findings and discuss their implications for existing theory on SSE and business ethics, 
and their relevance to practice. We end with avenues for future research and some 
conclusions. 
Social Shareholder Engagement 
 
 
In contrast with the financially-motivated stream of shareholder engagement 
literature, which prioritises financial performance through reducing the agency gap 
between principal and agent (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010; Gillan & Starks, 2007), SSE 
represents the choice by shareholders dissatisfied with a company’s environmental, 
social, governance and ethical performance to use the ‘voice’ rather than ‘exit’ option 
described by Hirschman (1970), or the dynamics between the two, to influence 
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company actions (Goodman et al., 2014). Shareholder engagement can be done 
through letter writing, asking questions at annual general meetings, dialogue with 
management or the board either behind-the-scenes or in public confrontation, as well 
as filing and voting on shareholder resolutions (Lydenberg, 2007; Sjöström, 2008). 
SSE has a powerful tradition in the US and can be traced back to the 1970s 
when regulation changes at the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
allowed social policy topics to be considered3 (Dhir, 2006; Glac, 2010; Proffitt & 
Spicer, 2006). The level of SSE is increasing (Goldstein, 2011; Lee & Lounsbury, 
2011): between 2010 and 2012 over 200 institutions representing $1.5 trillion in 
assets filed or co-filed shareholder resolutions related to environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) issues at US companies (USSIF, 2012). In a study of 81 of the 
largest companies in the US between 2000 and 2003 almost 40% of shareholder 
engagement through shareholder resolutions was socially or CSR-driven (Monks et 
al., 2004). 
Research has identified the main actors in SSE as primarily religious 
organisations, and NGOs, but it also finds involvement by public pension funds, 
individuals and unions (Guay et al., 2004; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Sjöström, 2010; 
Tkac, 2006). Religious organisations in the US are the most active filers of social 
policy shareholder resolutions and are responsible for around 25% of all shareholder 
proposals each year (Copland & O'Keefe, 2013; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006).  
SSE has a different ideology to conventional market logic being driven by 
principle rather than economic rationality (Clark et al., 2008; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; 
McLaren, 2004). One of the largest and most active coalitions of shareholders 
                                                3	  For a detailed discussion of US engagement regulation and history please refer to 
the expansive explanations by Dhir (2006), Proffitt and Spicer (2006), Glac (2010) 
and Rehbein (2013). 
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working on SSE is the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). It claims 
that “it is the impact on people, usually economically vulnerable people, who inspire 
us to act” (ICCR, 2014d). Research has highlighted the challenge of measuring the 
impact of SSE or its success. A large number of studies focus primarily on 
shareholder resolutions in the US and their voting outcomes (Campbell et al., 1999; 
Graves et al., 2001; Monks et al., 2004; Rojas et al., 2009). However, this approach 
can be misleading as even strongly supported resolutions are not necessarily legally 
binding (Engle, 2006; Levit & Malenko, 2011; Rojas et al., 2009). Social movement 
theory frames SSE as a broader movement to effect social change and shape public 
discourse and norms by framing agendas and raising awareness on social, 
environmental and ethical issues (Arjaliès, 2010; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Proffitt & 
Spicer, 2006; Sjöström, 2010). However, as SSE moves increasingly towards private 
dialogue behind the scenes where it is argued to be more effective (Becht et al., 2009; 
Goldstein, 2011; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009), impacts and 
successes on those stakeholders which SSE claims to represent remain opaque. While 
most literature has focused on the success, strategies and identity of SSE (Ferraro & 
Beunza, 2014), in the following section we highlight some of the ethical concerns 
which have been raised about SSE. 
SSE: Ethical Concerns 
 
The previous section clearly demonstrates that the motives of SSE come from 
a moral basis rather than an economic one. However, civil society claims, or those 
shareholders who give voice to them, should not uncritically be assumed to be 
legitimate. As Scherer and Palazzo (2007: 1109) claim it is oversimplistic to conceive 
of the corporation as the “bad guy” representing economic interests and civil society 
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actors as the “good guys” who represent moral interests. With a plurality of civil 
society demands and in light of research which shows that even shareholders from a 
more economic perspective are divided in their demands (Anabtawi, 2007; Barnea & 
Rubin, 2010; Stout, 2012; Williams & Ryan, 2007), the legitimacy of demands must 
be established rather than assumed.  
A second ethical concern raised in the SSE literature is whether shareholders 
are effective representatives of stakeholder interests (Coumans, 2012; Dhir, 2012). 
These studies focus on the actions of a consortium of socially conscious investors 
who, in 2008, submitted a shareholder proposal to a Canadian multinational regarding 
the human rights impacts of its Guatamalan mining operations. Between 2008 and 
2010 there was a strong condemnation by various civil society and international 
organisations of the mine’s contamination of the local environment including water 
sources and the associated significant health risks posed for the local community. The 
condemnations called for a suspension of the mine’s operations until the negative 
impacts could be addressed. The 2008 proposal was withdrawn and the company 
agreed to its demands for an independent human rights impact assessment. However, 
the proposal attracted much controversy. Before the Guatamalan government could 
implement the recommendations of the civil society organisations and suspend the 
mine’s activities, the company announced its own action plan to address the issues 
raised in the impact assessment carried out at the demand of the shareholders. The 
human rights organisations and affected local communities were highly critical of 
their exclusion both from the drafting of the shareholder proposal, and from 
participating in any direct management or oversight of the assessment process. The 
engagement was seen to have provided a whitewashing of the situation for the 
company and its shareholders while harming and undermining the demands of the 
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local community (Dhir, 2012). Thus, the need for shareholder resolutions to 
significantly appeal to “the business or affairs of the corporation” (Dhir, 2012: 106) 
led to the divergence of interests: risk mitigation by investors on one hand, and the 
complete cessation of operations at the mine by the local community. The concern 
arises as to how SSE can avoid doing harm, albeit unwittingly, to the stakeholders 
whose interests they strive to defend. 
Thirdly, as noted in the previous section, it is behind-the-scenes dialogue 
between shareholders and corporations which is said to represent the vast majority of 
shareholder engagement and is where much of the real ‘action’ happens. In light of 
SSE’s purported proximity to stakeholders and civil society, the need for shareholders 
to gain the trust of those stakeholders and to report the effectiveness and quality of 
SSE, it is uncertain whether ‘closed door’ engagement can provide the transparency 
and accountability demanded of SSE (McLaren, 2004; O'Rourke, 2003). Despite its 
importance, very little research has been done on behind-the-scenes engagement 
(Rehbein et al., 2013) not least due to the confidential nature of many dialogues and 
therefore the lack of accessible data. 
Finally, from a legal viewpoint on corporate governance, the notion of 
shareholder democracy has become popular (Anabtawi & Stout, 2008; Bebchuk, 
2005). Following this approach, greater shareholder equality achieved through 
empowering minority shareholders, a group which generally includes SSE 
shareholders (Clark et al., 2008), should go hand in hand with a greater shareholder 
responsibility to both the firm and other shareholders (Anabtawi & Stout, 2008). 
Studies which reveal the use of tactics by shareholders such as the threat to ‘exit’ or 
divest from the company if their demands are not met (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; 
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Goodman et al., 2014) could be interpreted as coercive and therefore raise ethical 
questions about the tactics used by shareholders in SSE. 
Research has primarily taken a descriptive and empirical approach to 
exploring SSE. However, as explained in this section, this research has identified 
some concerns about SSE which appear to be ethical in nature such as the need to 
establish legitimacy in the face of a plurality of demands on the firm, the potential for 
shareholders to actually harm rather than help the local communities they seek to 
represent, the lack of accountability of engagement behind ‘closed doors’, and the use 
of divestment or threat of disclosure in SSE. The following section presents the 
theoretical lens selected for our analysis and its appropriateness for establishing a 
normative perspective on SSE. 
SSE Through The Lens Of Discourse Ethics 
 
In this section we briefly outline a Habermasian discourse ethics approach and 
argue that it is appropriate for the analysis of SSE for 3 main reasons: 1) it focuses on 
the participation of affected parties, 2) it focuses on the process avoiding assumptions 
about moral content and offering a means to include a plurality of worldviews and 
ethea, and 3) it has become recently popular for exploring new aspects of CSR such 
as the political role of firms and the notion of corporate citizenship thus opening up 
the possibility also to discuss the broader implications of SSE. 
Habermasian discourse ethics 
 
Habermasian discourse ethics is a normative, process-oriented ethical theory. 
It is centred on the process of reaching valid, moral norms through participating in 
fair dialogues (Beschorner, 2006; Habermas, 1984, 1987). These dialogues offer an 
opportunity for a wide variety of worldviews and ethea to be deliberated upon and to 
 99 
develop a norm which all participants can accept. Habermas states that for a norm to 
be valid it must fulfil the principle of universalization: 
“All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects 
its general observance can be anticipated to have for the 
satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences 
are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for 
regulation)” (Habermas, 1992: 65 emphasis in original). 
According to this principle the universal validation of a norm is dependent on 
consensus achieved through discursive legitimacy rather than solely on individual 
reflection as other philosophers such as Kant and Rawls have suggested4 (Gilbert & 
Rasche, 2007; McCarthy, 1992: viii; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). Habermas (1992: 
68) states “the justification of norms and commands requires that a real discourse be 
carried out and thus cannot occur in a strictly monological form, i.e., in the form of a 
hypothetical process of argumentation occurring in the individual mind.” 
Habermas then develops a second principle which introduces the ethics of 
discourse: 
“Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could 
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as 
                                                
4 While we recognise that Habermas and Kant indeed have similarities, we follow the 
argument laid out in this journal by Gilbert and Rasche (2007) who claim that 
“whereas Kantian ethics links the process of justification to the individual  
conducting a universalizing test (Kant, 1993, 2004) to see whether she or he wishes 
everyone else to act according to the same maxim, in discourse ethics Habermas 
(1990: 196-98) moves Kant's categorical imperative beyond its ‘monological’ 
reflection. The same criticism applies to Rawls's (1971) ‘Theory of Justice,’ where the 
morality of an action is determined by individuals critically evaluating actions behind 
a ‘veil of ignorance.’ Habermas argues that individual reasoning and self-reflection 
are insufficient to justify acceptable norms because different individuals might come 
to different conclusions regarding the acceptability of particular norms.” (Gilbert & 
Rasche 2007: 193). 	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participants in a practical discourse.” (Habermas, 1992: 66 
emphasis in original) 
Habermas argues that only through the process of ‘communicative action’, whereby a 
plurality of affected actors seek “rationally to motivate” each other through speech 
acts can the universal validity of a moral norm be tested (Habermas, 1992: 58 
emphasis in original). Communicative action is contrasted to ‘strategic action’ where 
actors aim to influence, manipulate or coerce others through sanctions or gratification. 
Strategic action is a concern for Habermas because its objectives are “power, 
economic efficiency, or other egocentric aims” (Smith, 2004: 319) and it seeks to 
achieve individual success (Habermas, 1984). In contrast, communicative action 
adopts an attitude “oriented to reaching understanding” (Habermas, 1984: 286). To 
achieve communicative action Habermas identifies a number of rules for discourse 
that characterize an “ideal speech situation” (Habermas, 1992: 88). We summarise 
these key motifs5 below. 
Argumentation. The notion of transforming preferences through 
argumentation, rather than simply aggregating them, is central to Habermasian 
discourse ethics. In this way discourse ethics focuses on the process of argumentation 
rather than making any moral claims on the content itself. To achieve intersubjective 
understanding it is fundamental that all participants present their own arguments, 
interests and needs, and that they are free to introduce any assertion into the 
discourse. In this way arguments remain undistorted by representation by another and 
participants are open to criticism and questioning by others (Habermas, 1992). 
                                                5	  The term ‘motif’ is used by Bebbington et al. (2007) to refer to the critical 
requirements of authentic engagement in the context of dialogic theory. In a similar 
way we use this term to express the critical requirements of discourse ethics.	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Plural participation. Habermas’s principle of universalization makes clear 
that pluralism is an essential criteria for testing validity since “all affected are 
admitted as participants” (Habermas, 1992: 66). This perspective is formulated into a 
more specific rule: “Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to 
take part in a discourse” (Habermas, 1992: 89). 
Non-coercion. According to Habermas “No speaker may be prevented, by 
internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights” (Habermas, 1992: 89); rights 
in this case refer to the right of participation and of introducing and questioning 
assertions and expressing interests. The aim of communicative action is reaching 
“rationally motivated agreement” (Habermas, 1992: 88) based on the primacy of the 
best argument rather than any power-related threat or incentive (Lozano, 2001). 
Transparency. Communicative action also requires transparency, which in 
turn demands truthful arguments. Habermas states that with “every intelligible 
utterance” (Habermas, 1992: 136 emphasis in original) the speaker claims that the 
utterance is true, is right in a particular normative context, and is truthful with no 
intention to mislead. 
Discourse ethics relevance to SSE 
 
While we do not attempt to discount other ethical theories, in the following 
paragraphs we present our case for using discourse ethics as a compelling normative 
perspective to analyze SSE. 
Firstly, there have been wide-ranging claims for the use of a participatory 
dialogue approach, such as that proposed by Habermas, to be taken by corporations in 
their relationships with stakeholders (Brenkert, 1992; Gilbert & Rasche, 2007; Matten 
& Crane, 2005; O'Dwyer, 2005; Reed, 1999; Unerman & Bennett, 2004).  Since 
shareholders in SSE are speaking for stakeholders or addressing issues which can 
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strongly affect the lives of other stakeholders (Goodman et al., 2014; O'Rourke, 
2003), we argue that discourse ethics, with its focus on the participation of all affected 
by decisions, is highly relevant to SSE. Discourse ethics offers a useful point of entry 
for analyzing concerns raised about stakeholder participation (Stansbury, 2009), 
transparency in behind-the-scenes engagement (O'Rourke, 2003) and the potentially 
misguided reframing of stakeholder demands by shareholders in SSE (Dhir, 2012). 
Second, discourse ethics focuses on the process of establishing moral norms 
by rational argumentation. As such, this perspective holds that those affected by 
decisions are able to reach a reasoned agreement on what outcome they seek to 
achieve (Dryzek, 2000) rather than assuming that they are limited to an economic or 
utilitarian framework. In this way it avoids making any (culturally restricted) 
assumptions as to the ethical content of outcomes or “material norms” (Beschorner, 
2006: 127)6. If we take this perspective to shareholders involved in SSE, they would 
be expected to present arguments and to assume that others (managers and 
stakeholders, including other shareholders) are capable of being convinced if and 
when they realise that the other's argument is cogent. Given that stakeholders can be 
expected to hold different worldviews (Arenas, Lozano, & Albareda, 2009), that 
shareholders have been shown to have differing ethea (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; 
McLaren, 2004), and that norms can change in a pluralistic business environment 
(Stansbury, 2009), an approach to SSE that avoids specific ethical content and allows 
for mediation and deliberation of this diversity of perspectives is particularly 
valuable.  
                                                6	  An example of such an assumption is the proposed objective of stakeholder 
happiness enhancement from a neo-utilitarian approach (Jones & Felps, 2013) From a 
discourse ethics perspective, the goal of SSE would be to achieve rational 
argumentation and participation in line with communicative action rather than the 
enhancement of the happiness of particular stakeholders.	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Finally, Habermasian discourse ethics has received much attention in recent 
discussions of the political role of CSR (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Whelan, 2012) and 
corporate citizenship (Moon et al., 2005) understanding direct participation of firms 
and stakeholders as a useful way to resolve problems in society, especially global 
issues that escape the capacities of national governments. As such, the use of a 
discourse ethics perspective to analyze SSE enables us to extend the analysis of 
ethical questions to address broader, political implications of SSE; that is, to discuss 
the consequences of SSE for the rules of the game at a regulatory/institutional level. It 
also enables us to develop a political view of the corporation which is concerned with 
the common good rather than the more frequent focus on power games with egoistic 
motives (Scherer et al., 2014). 
As stated at the start of this section, we do not dismiss the appropriateness of 
other ethical theories. While we do not fully review all alternatives here, we do briefly 
note some shortcomings of two other well-established ethical theories. A utilitarian 
perspective, in addition to its focus on ethical content as noted above, is perhaps not 
best placed to deal with the voices of marginalised or ‘unheard’ stakeholders which 
have been shown to be of concern to shareholders in SSE (Goodman et al., 2014). By 
emphasising the greatest happiness for the greatest number the views of marginalised 
stakeholders may be overlooked. Examples of such stakeholders can be found in the 
social and environmental impacts on indigenous people who live on land destined for 
mineral or oil extraction such as the cases of the Ogoni in Nigeria (Hennchen, 
forthcoming) and the Dongria Kondh in India (Kraemer et al., 2013).  
A contractarian approach (Phillips, 1997) takes a more instrumental view of 
stakeholders. By assuming that corporations and their stakeholders act only for 
strategic reasons and seek mutual advantage, this approach overlooks the ability of 
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individuals to take a position which goes beyond self-interest and to transform their 
judgments upon hearing others’ arguments in a deliberation process. Actions taken by 
shareholders in SSE have been shown to be principle-based or concerned with 
collective and social benefits (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; McLaren, 2004) thus 
indicating that SSE goes beyond instrumentalism. One should not rule out the 
possibility that shareholders in SSE are open to changing their point of view through 
arguments presenting better alternatives. 
Discourse ethics is not without its critics. Doubts are raised even by Habermas 
himself about the possibility of attaining an ideal speech situation in practical 
discourse (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007; Habermas, 1992; Smith, 2004). However, many 
proponents of discourse ethics have claimed that it is not necessary to achieve full 
ideal speech to benefit from the positive effects of deliberation and communicative 
action (Arnold, 2013; O'Dwyer, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Unerman & Bennett, 
2004). A normative ideal has been argued to increase the discursive quality (Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2007), help develop authentic moral norms for dialogue (Lozano, 2001), 
and evaluate the interaction between NGOs and corporations (Baur and Arenas, 
2014). From a responsible investment perspective, McLaren (2004) suggests that 
norms and standards would help investors using an engagement approach assess their 
effectiveness and quality.   
Another possible difficulty is that Habermas himself separates political and 
economic spheres (Scherer et al., 2014) seeing deliberation as relevant primarily for 
“a separate, constitutionally organized political system, but not as a model for all 
social institutions” (Habermas, 1996: 305). However, there are a number of 
supporters of discourse ethics who have argued for the application of deliberation in a 
broader context including the business environment (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004: 
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32-33; Lozano, 2001). More specifically, scholars have demonstrated the applicability 
of discourse ethics as a normative frame for business ethics (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007). We thus follow those who suggest that Habermas’s objective of 
universalization whereby all participants can accept the consequences of decisions 
taken through deliberation is still a valid yardstick by which to judge the moral 
legitimacy of company and stakeholder actions. In particular, we apply this 
perspective to shareholders involved in SSE. 
Multi-Level Analysis Of SSE 
 
To get a fuller picture of the possibilities of applying a discourse ethics 
perspective to the analysis of shareholders in SSE, we divide our inquiry into two 
different levels, where different ethical concerns emerge. In order to avoid the 
normativistic fallacy of ignoring the existing practical constraints imposed by the 
rules of the game, we follow the distinction used by Schreck et al (2013) of an action 
level, where actors face choices within a set of given constraints, and a constitutional 
level, where choices about the rules of the game are made. According to Schreck et al. 
(2013: 306) “[e]mpirical constraints cannot entirely disburden the bearer of a 
responsibility” which “implies the obligation to discover a "can"”. This implies 
examining the constitutional level as well as the action level. By exploring both the 
action and constitutional levels we are able to examine the choices facing SSE within 
the given constraints, as well as extending the analysis to consider how shareholders 
could and should influence these constraints. We identify two normative questions at 
the action level, and one at the constitutional level. Table 3.1 pinpoints the ethical 
concerns and questions at each level and identifies the insights for SSE from a 
discourse ethics perspective.  
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Table 3.1: Map of the empirical concerns, normative questions and insights provided 
for SSE 
 
Figure 2 maps visually the engagement format in response to each of the 
questions. The figure shows the increasingly participatory nature of corporate 
decision-making on issues affecting marginalised stakeholders with the arrows 
representing the structure of communication between the different parties. 
Figure 2: Engagement format in response to each question 
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Voicing stakeholder concerns 
 
At this action level existing laws, regulations and institutions are taken as 
given. As highlighted in the ‘Social Shareholder Engagement’ section of this paper, 
shareholders concerned with a particular environmental, social or ethical issue of 
company behavior affecting marginalised stakeholders, choose to engage with that 
company to express their concerns and bring about change in that specific behavior. 
With its focus on a normative ethical process discourse ethics prompts us to ask, given 
that laws and institutions are as they are, in SSE how should shareholders bring the 
voice of other marginalised stakeholders to managers? 
In answering this question, one needs to take into account the ethical concern 
of shareholders harming stakeholders who they claim to represent. Among other 
reasons this can happen because of a misalignment of interests. Dhir’s example 
demonstrates the prioritization of strategic action over communicative action by 
shareholders, whereby the desire to reduce risk or perceived risk for the company 
were paramount. Dhir (2012) proposes a number of steps for shareholders involved in 
SSE which include establishing meaningful and ongoing connections with civil 
society groups and gaining wide community support for any investment engagement 
initiatives. Particularly important, is that shareholders not only consult the affected 
communities, but also obtain community consent, when developing the resolution and 
further related agreements. These steps are in line with understanding SSE as a 
communicative action process whereby stakeholders have participated to put forward 
their own arguments. 
Secondly, shareholders who voice marginalised stakeholder concerns in SSE 
must be aware that different social issues and different perspectives on these issues 
can also be represented by other shareholders. Such differences might include the 
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prioritization by some shareholders of human rights and environmental degradation 
while others focus on job creation and reducing poverty in local communities (Dhir, 
2012). The plurality of demands represents a challenge for both shareholders and 
management. From a discourse ethics perspective, shareholders should be prepared to 
deliberate and provide reasoned arguments to explain, question and challenge 
different perspectives presented, and should be open to changing their preferences to 
arrive at the common good. In this way a process following communicative action 
would provide a means for shareholders and managers to explore and address difficult 
issues from multiple perspectives in order to establish legitimacy and strive for an 
outcome that everyone can be satisfied with.  In contrast, the aggregation mechanism 
favours the majority and does not offer the opportunity for marginalised stakeholder 
perspectives, often the minority, to transform the preferences of other participants.  
As an extension of addressing the plurality of demands, investment funds 
which represent numerous individual beneficiaries, such as pension funds or mutual 
funds, should also consider deliberating on the multiple perspectives which exist 
among their own beneficiaries (Ryan, 2000). The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) Finance Initiative sponsored research into the scope of fiduciary 
duty is supportive of the inclusion of environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues within fiduciary duty if they are considered to have a financial impact, but also, 
and of particular relevance to our argument, when a consensus is formed between 
beneficiaries which may be values-based (Freshfields, 2005). However, “[i]n contrast 
to the democratic ethical deliberation that we might assume would underpin the 
development of an SRI policy, mutual funds, even SRI-focused ones, generally do not 
involve investors in their decisions.” (Richardson, 2013: 6). This implies the need for 
fund managers to establish communicative fora for their beneficiaries in order to 
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deliberate and reach a reasoned agreement on the relative importance of different 
values and financial return. 
Communicative action demands transparency and truthfulness in terms of the 
information available to participants in dialogue. Shareholders therefore must ensure 
that the information they present, and the arguments they make, are truthful and right 
in line with the motifs of communicative action. This is even more necessary since, as 
shown by Vandekerckhove et al. (2007), while management is prepared to engage 
with shareholders on non-financial issues, it is generally with the objective of denying 
the truth of the allegations against them.  
Further, to ensure the legitimacy of the deliberative and participatory process 
as required by discourse ethics (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, & Thomson, 2007; 
Cohen, 1997), transparency should apply to the process itself in order to gain the trust 
of other stakeholders (McLaren, 2004). The lack of process transparency was seen as 
one of the main failings in the damage done to stakeholders in the Guatemalan mining 
example (Dhir, 2012; Murphy & Arenas, 2010). A further example is the recent 
support of the obligatory reporting of corporate political spending at the SEC by over 
a million commentators suggesting there is currently confidential information which 
is widely considered to be of public interest (Bebchuk, 2014; ICCR, 2014a). This can 
be contrasted with sensitive information which could be crucial to informed and 
reasoned argumentation, but which may also be highly sensitive and fundamental to 
corporate strategy such as market research, product development and launch, 
succession plans, and specific product contribution to margins. From a deliberative 
viewpoint, secrecy in some deliberations is not considered to violate the principle of 
accessibility of information if good reasons can be given for secrecy and if there is an 
opportunity later on to challenge the information (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004).  
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Even if it is behind closed doors, from a discourse ethics perspective, SSE can aspire 
to these aspects of transparency. 
Another element to consider when answering this question is that discourse 
ethics is centred on the strength of arguments rather than incentives and the threat of 
sanction. However, ‘exit’ or the sale of shares (Hirschman, 1970) is considered to be a 
form of sanction in engagement (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009). Shareholder resolutions, 
which disclose issues in the public domain, as well as public activism campaigns 
could also be seen as a threat to reputation and legitimacy. However, whether these 
threats are genuinely an obstacle to achieving reasoned agreement through 
communicative action is questionable. The threats referred to here are not illegal or 
violent or of an insulting nature. Rather, threats of exit or disclosure could be a way of 
drawing attention to an issue to initiate a dialogue process (Hebb, Hoepner, 
Rodionova, & Sanchez, 2014; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009; Rehbein et al., 2013) and 
do not prevent participants from expressing their reasoned arguments. Alternatively, 
such measures by shareholders can be conceived as a means to keep the company at 
the discussion table, and provide motivation to reach a reasoned agreement in keeping 
with the aims of communicative action.  
This section has addressed the ethical concerns identified in the shareholder 
engagement literature by using discourse ethics to respond to the question of how 
shareholders should bring the voice of other marginalised stakeholders to managers. 
These responses include: consulting communities and obtaining their consent; being 
open to other viewpoints; understanding investment beneficiaries’ expectations; being 
truthful about claims and transparent about the process; and using threat of sanctions 
purely for the sake of keeping parties involved in discourse. Striving to attain, 
however imperfectly, an ideal speech situation of communicative action would 
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provide a guide to shareholders voicing stakeholder concerns and working within the 
constraints of the rules of the game. However, a number of problems still remain. 
Firstly, Dhir (2012) recognises that shareholders’ efforts must be situated within 
existing legal and regulatory frameworks and that there is an imbalance of power 
between stakeholders. He further claims, in line with Welcomer et al. (2000), that 
power differentials between shareholders and stakeholders can be perpetuated through 
the engagement process. Secondly, doubts remain as to what mechanisms are 
available to shareholders in SSE to encourage corporations to enter into direct 
engagement with stakeholders following an ideal speech situation including the 
motifs of communicative action. Finally, one needs to consider, as we do at the 
constitutional level, whether regulation favours, or becomes an obstacle to, the 
alignment of interests between shareholders and the stakeholders they represent. We 
address these issues in the following sections.   
Promoting stakeholder engagement 
 
Maintaining the regulatory, institutional and legal constraints as above, a 
second normative question emerges. Following the communicative action rule of 
participation of all affected, we consider whether it is enough to channel stakeholder 
views through shareholders, or if the goal of SSE should include promoting broader 
stakeholder participation. Thus, the question is: given that laws and institutions are as 
they are, in SSE, how should shareholders encourage corporations to engage in 
dialogue directly with marginalised stakeholders? In contrast to the first question, 
here the focus is on shareholders creating opportunities for direct stakeholder 
participation in corporate decision-making. 
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Through a discourse ethics lens, SSE would have the moral obligation to 
promote the creation of communicative fora, or some other sort of mechanism, so that 
firms enter into direct dialogue with other stakeholders, especially marginalised ones. 
Despite arguments that shareholders in the US have more limited power than their 
counterparts in the UK (Bebchuk, 2005), shareholders are usually considered as the 
most powerful stakeholders (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007; Matten & Crane, 2005). In 
order to redress power imbalances and move towards an ideal speech situation, it is 
essential to ensure the participation of other stakeholders following the motifs 
described above (argumentation, plural participation, non-coercion and transparency). 
One way for more stakeholders to have access to deliberation about issues 
which affect them is if they are invited to participate in behind-the-scenes dialogues 
between corporations and shareholders. Such participation in SSE must be understood 
with regard to the degree of sensitivity of the relevant information as we discussed in 
the previous section. In this case the use of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), or the 
de-identification of sensitive information, could facilitate the increased participation 
of non-shareholders in SSE without jeopardising the confidentiality of this 
information. If information is time-sensitive, ex-post disclosure can form the basis for 
deliberation on future practice. (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). 
A second way to involve stakeholders in direct deliberations with corporations 
is to create broader communicative fora for stakeholders, shareholders and businesses 
so they can listen to each others viewpoints. One such example is the US based 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). As a coalition of responsible 
shareholders committed to engaging on environmental, social, governance and ethical 
issues with companies, the ICCR holds annual multi-stakeholder roundtable events. 
These events seek to bring together shareholders, stakeholders, experts and 
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representatives from multiple companies and sectors affected by the issue of concern. 
Examples include access to HIV/AIDS medication with the pharmaceutical sector, 
responsible marketing to children in the food and beverage sector, and the protection 
of the right to water with companies from multiple sectors (ICCR, 2014b). 
An important challenge in addressing this second normative question is when 
marginalised stakeholders themselves reject communicative action fearing it is a 
“strategy of co-optation” by the company (Welcomer, Gioia, & Kilduff, 2000: 1193). 
This challenge is significant because true communicative action would require the 
participation of all affected by the decision in order to achieve legitimate outcomes. 
Understanding the reasons why marginalised stakeholders do not participate becomes 
of primary importance here. Welcomer et al. (2000) highlight a case where the local 
community saw the dialogue process as ‘window dressing’ where they would have no 
true power to veto the planned site leading to a rejection of dialogue. Lack of power 
and insufficient capacity and skills are argued to be key reasons for the lack of 
success or unwillingness to participate of marginalised groups in deliberation 
(Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). Welcomer et al. (2000) draw on Beck 
(1994) to offer a number of facilitators arguing that it is particularly important that all 
participants are aware that key decisions are yet to be made and that all potential 
outcomes will be reasonably considered. This is in line with a discourse ethics 
perspective which emphasizes adopting an attitude to seek understanding rather than 
the strategic pursuit of individual interests. 
The inclusion of affected stakeholders in behind-the-scenes dialogue, the use 
of communicative fora, and an openness to all potential outcomes, offer opportunities 
for SSE to turn the corporation into a more participative and deliberative arena 
focusing on communicative action and the common good. Such stakeholder 
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participation can be seen as a first step in moving towards a more political view of the 
firm similar to the concept of stakeholder democracy. The translation of the political 
concept of democracy into the economic sphere to create the notion of stakeholder 
democracy (Matten & Crane, 2005) is challenging, not least because democracy is a 
term disputed even in politics (Moon et al., 2005). In the context of SSE, a 
deliberative democratic approach, which some Habermasians also advocate7, offers a 
particular opportunity for marginalised stakeholders, often represented by minority 
shareholders to voice their concerns. Further, while democracy, understood in a more 
classical sense, would assume that preferences are fixed and can be determined 
through voting, a deliberative approach recognises that preferences can be 
transformed through reasoning, given time and space (Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998). In 
this way deliberative democracy provides an opportunity to go beyond the simple 
imposition of social preferences of the majority through aggregative methods which 
may “reinforce existing distributions of power in society” (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004: 16). Rather, it allows the minority a chance to voice their arguments, address 
questions and criticism, and potentially change the minds of other participants. If SSE 
is morally obliged to promote such deliberative democratic spaces in the firm rather 
than merely voicing the grievances of affected stakeholders (or claiming to speak in 
their name), this suggests SSE assumes a “quasi-political role” (Baur & Arenas, 
2014).  
Some real life examples show some practical concerns in answering this 
normative question. The ICCR acknowledges that although the roundtables are 
effective and can encourage the generation of rapid responses to issues of concern, 
                                                7	  Scherer and Palazzo (2007) distinguish two Habermasian conceptions of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), the first focuses on ideal discourse while the second takes 
the more political view of deliberative discourse. 
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they are also complicated to organize and therefore undertaken infrequently (ICCR, 
2014b). SSE should also consider that not all firms or all stakeholders have the 
resources, the desire or the capacity to participate in this type of voluntary dialogue. 
Similarly, O’Rourke (2003) concludes that SSE within the rules of engagement, on an 
issue by issue basis, is not enough. She suggests that engagement is limited to those 
with resources of time and money and that legal constraints mean that current rules 
limit a more fundamental critique of corporate behavior and lead to an incremental 
approach rather than more transformative change. This leads us to consider whether 
working within the given regulatory and institutional context and using the existing 
institutionalized channels (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011) is sufficient for the SSE mandate.  
Promoting regulatory/institutional change 
 
While the above discussion provides some guidance about ethical SSE within 
existing regulatory and institutional constraints, we expand the view of SSE from a 
discourse ethics perspective to raise a normative question at the constitutional level. 
Should SSE promote changes in regulations and institutions so that marginalised 
stakeholders have a voice in corporate decision-making? If so, how? 
Despite the popularity of theories of the political role of corporations, few 
have specified which regulatory and institutional changes are necessary to ensure that 
the voices of affected parties are heard by firm managers. The regulatory environment 
can affect SSE directly, for example in terms of the issues which shareholders can file 
on, requirements of minimum holdings over a certain time and minimum voting 
requirements (Clark et al., 2008; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009). The question here is 
whether the commitment of shareholders in SSE to those affected by company 
activities should lead these shareholders not only to promote voluntary stakeholder 
dialogue, but regulatory and institutional reforms to ensure that marginalised voices 
 116
are heard. Indeed, it is hard to see what deliberative stakeholder democracy means if 
there are no effective institutions in place which oblige the inclusion of these voices 
according to the motifs specified above.  
Habermas’s work on discourse ethics has extended into political theory to 
establish the way democratic institutions are built (Habermas, 1996, 1999; Smith, 
2004). As previously mentioned Habermasian deliberative democracy focuses on the 
formal political sphere rather than the economic sphere (Habermas, 1996). However, 
we build on the work of others who have argued that the economic and political 
divide is often blurred (Scherer et al., 2014), and suggest that shareholders concerned 
with social, environmental and ethical issues affecting stakeholders would also have a 
moral obligation to work towards the empowerment and participation of all affected 
stakeholders according to new institutions and the rules of the game concerning 
business and society relations. This reform would really be in the spirit of discourse 
ethics and communicative action. Rather than promoting stakeholder democracy on a 
voluntary basis, striving for change at the regulatory/institutional level implies some 
forms of binding stakeholder democracy. 
While much of the research in SSE focuses on the UK and US, examples of 
more participative corporate governance arrangements can be found in national 
contexts such as Germany and Japan (Hendry, 2001; Kang & Moon, 2012). 
According to some scholars, these countries’ institutions both demonstrate a concern 
for stakeholder interests in the governing of the firm which reflects a consensus “that 
businesses exist to serve the interest of society and not just to make a profit” (Hendry, 
2001: 167). In Germany, sometimes referred to as a ‘stakeholder economy’, a system 
of codetermination exists whereby the supervisory board, which oversees the 
management board, has both shareholder and employee representatives and can 
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accept or reject decisions made by the executive directors (Gorton & Schmid, 2004; 
Hendry, 2001). This is a possible step in the direction of increased stakeholder 
participation in decision-making at the board level, which traditionally serves the 
purpose of deliberating on company issues. Furthermore, in Germany, the legal 
responsibility of managers is to the firm rather than to shareholders (Allen, Carletti, & 
Marquez, 2009) therefore providing a greater legal potential for considering interests 
other than those of shareholders. The German system could then be considered as 
further along the “continuum towards the theoretical ideal speech situation” 
(Unerman & Bennett, 2004: 702). However, this system continues to exclude the 
voices of marginalised stakeholders in its governance structure. Advancing 
deliberative democracy in corporate decision-making would also require accessibility 
of citizens and marginalised stakeholders or their representatives, the transparency of 
justifications and reasoning, and a commitment to the common good (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004; Habermas, 1996). 
Soskice (1997) warns that stakeholder democracy should not be transferred 
from Northern Europe to an Anglo-Saxon model of governance due to “deeply 
entrenched rules and rituals of participation” in each country’s democratic model. 
However, in striving to spell out the full implications of the ethics of an ethical 
approach to SSE in line with discourse ethics, we argue that while taking into account 
each country’s tradition, attempts at institutional, legal and regulatory change should 
also be a goal for SSE in order to give all affected stakeholders a greater voice in 
corporate decision-making. While this may be considered a daunting objective and 
certainly not without its difficulties, we are reminded in the discussion of labour 
rights that this does not mean that it is an invalid objective (Arnold, 2013). 
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A further challenge in responding to this question is the criticism made of 
deliberative democracy that it privileges a certain way to present one’s views and 
involves some degree of self-restraint, discipline or formality which favours more 
advantaged groups in society (Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). An 
obligation to participate in decision-making may compound concerns of cooptation 
held by marginalised, and often disadvantaged, stakeholders. One way to overcome 
this concern would be to extend our response in the previous section, to the 
constitutional level, in the sense that shareholders in SSE advocate rules of the game 
that guarantee veto power for marginalised stakeholders over decisions that affect 
them. In parallel, providing resources or institutional support for marginalised 
stakeholders who choose to contend this direct deliberation could be another 
possibility by shareholders involved in SSE. 
A further option for shareholders in SSE as an answer to this third question 
would be to promote the creation of institutions such as national ethics councils 
(Richardson & Cragg, 2010). These councils should include a broad range of 
participants to ensure the representation of different perspectives who could then 
deliberate in order to set standards for ethical investment. Ethics councils already 
exist in Sweden and Norway to advise their national pension funds and have led to 
divestment recommendations in some companies for ethical motives (Richardson & 
Cragg, 2010). 
Finally, in addressing this third question of obligations of shareholders 
involved in SSE, we consider their role in specific public policy debate on responsible 
investment and the participation of marginalised stakeholders. It has been argued that 
“legal reforms must aim to create conditions for participatory ethical deliberation 
underpinning SRI decisions” (Richardson, 2008: 25). Recent discussion in the US 
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(Stout, 2012) and UK (Freshfields, 2005) about the definition and nature of fiduciary 
duty indicates that environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues are entering 
the legal sphere. This has led to a broadening of the concept of fiduciary duty as 
reported in our response to the first question and highlights the potential for different 
actors, including shareholders in SSE to stimulate discussion at the societal level to 
discuss and reframe deeply entrenched assumptions. 
Discussion And Implications 
 
The identification and analysis of three questions through a Habermasian 
discourse ethics lens have enabled us to develop a normative, ethical perspective of 
SSE, so far missing in the stakeholder engagement literature. By dividing it into 
different levels, we have further extended the analysis of SSE to include the 
regulatory/institutional implications, going beyond the work to date on political CSR, 
and contributing to a deliberative democratic political conception of SSE. Our 
analysis has a number of theoretical implications for business ethics as well as 
practical implications for SSE, shareholders more broadly, and managers. We discuss 
these implications in this section. 
Implications for theory  
 
While Habermas wanted to maintain a clear separation of the spheres of 
economics and politics (Habermas, 1996; Scherer et al., 2014), others have extended 
his work on deliberative democracy taking into account the fact that powerful 
corporations are playing an increasingly political role in the face of weak nations 
states (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Scherer et al., 2014). Still others have called for 
alternative conceptions of deliberative democracy to analyse the role of the 
corporation (Mäkinen & Kourula, 2012). The discourse ethics approach to SSE, when 
 120
extended to the regulatory/institutional level, reveals the desirability of stimulating 
changes to address imbalances of power and moving towards more democratic 
organisational structures. In other words, the moral obligation of SSE includes 
reflection about the ultimate role of SSE and the type of desirable society it envisions. 
By showing how some shareholders, typically assumed to be purely economic actors, 
are compelled to promote participation of various stakeholders at the firm level and 
reforms in the rules of the game to make this participation possible we echo the work 
on political CSR, which suggests that the boundaries between the political and 
economic spheres have become blurred. However, while previous work has 
considered the political role of the firm in global governance (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007), or politics in the sense of power games with egoistic motives within the firm 
using an applied psychology perspective8, we build a normative theoretical argument 
for a political role for shareholders in SSE in pursuit of the common good. This 
perspective challenges the underlying assumptions in much of the management 
research that shareholders confine themselves to purely economic matters. It then 
follows that new approaches to understanding SSE, including deliberative theory and 
other ethical and political approaches, should take into account the 
reconceptualization of shareholders as political agents working for the common good.  
Research on political CSR to date has been both endorsed and criticized. One 
of the limitations noted by Scherer and Palazzo (2007: 1112) themselves is that 
corporations in a political role “are neither elected nor democratically controlled by 
the public”, thus raising questions about the legitimacy of their political activity. 
Rather than the portrayal of the corporation as a monolithic and homogenous entity, 
by demonstrating the plurality of demands on corporations and a political role for 
                                                8	  This review of previous research has been clearly summarised in (Scherer et al., 
2014)	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shareholders in SSE we provide insights into the often neglected motivations and 
influences on corporate decision-making (Holzer, 2008; Whelan, 2012). The 
deliberation of multiple perspectives including those of marginalised stakeholders 
according to the motifs of communicative action reinforces the view that corporations 
are political fields, and not only from a strategic perspective. This in turn reveals that 
accounts about the political role of the corporation inspired on deliberative motifs 
need to include an internal as well as an external dimension, and the interconnections 
between the two, as the example of SSE demonstrates. Since they have to go through 
the filter of deliberation, this process also provides a means to address the concerns 
raised by Scherer and Palazzo (2007) about the legitimacy of claims of civil society 
actors mentioned above. 
By taking up issues on behalf of marginalised stakeholders, shareholders have 
been shown to effectively bring social, environmental and ethical concerns to the 
attention of managers, often behind closed doors. However, by drawing on Schreck’s 
(2013) division between an action and a constitutional level of analysis, we go beyond 
existing theorising of political CSR (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) and suggest that a 
discourse ethics perspective, which endorses the participation of those affected by 
decisions, inevitably pushes the reflection beyond voluntary agreements towards 
regulatory and broad institutional change to strengthen the participation of 
stakeholders, including marginalized ones. These changes would approximate what 
some have called stakeholder democracy and would in turn limit shareholders’ power 
in management decision-making.  
Shareholders in SSE are faced with a clear dilemma. To continue with their 
behind-the-scenes engagement which has been shown to be effective (Goodman et al., 
2014; Hebb et al., 2014), which would in fact perpetuate their position of power as 
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well as entailing the ethical concerns we have reported; or, to yield power to other 
affected stakeholders either voluntarily as shown in the analysis of the second 
question, or by promoting institutional and regulatory change to ensure marginalised 
stakeholders have a voice in corporate decision-making on issues which affect them. 
This dilemma, exposed through the use of a discourse ethics lens to explore SSE, 
reveals a fundamental theoretical difference between the SSE based on social and 
environmental issues affecting marginalised stakeholders regardless of the 
instrumental returns, and the SSE of those shareholders who engage with corporations 
on ESG issues as strategic action in order to reduce risk. This is an important 
distinction, which is often overlooked in the responsible investment literature 
(Richardson & Cragg, 2010; Woods & Urwin, 2012). Introducing a deliberative 
democratic forum in corporate decision-making would make these distinctions 
evident as each party provides the reasoning of their different arguments. For 
instrumentally motivated shareholders, even if they do SSE, voluntarily ceding power 
to stakeholders is likely to be strongly contested (Whelan, 2012), while purely 
ethically motivated shareholders would potentially be more accepting of such a 
proposal. This distinction reinforces an underlying tension within the responsible 
investment movement and the literature on this phenomenon, which has focused 
mostly on how responsible investors gain influence or mobilize, rather than on what 
they base their legitimacy and what their ultimate social and political goals are. 
One way to navigate this dilemma is a reconceptualization of the role of 
shareholders involved in SSE through the theory of stewardship, which has been 
applied to the role of managers in corporations (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 
1997; Hernandez, 2008, 2012). In contrast to the traditional agency approach, 
“stewardship theorists focus on structures that facilitate and empower rather than 
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those that monitor and control” (Davis et al., 1997: 26) and where the collective 
interest is prioritized over individual interests (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012). 
“Stewards in loosely coupled, heterogeneous organizations with competing 
stakeholders and competing shareholder objectives are motivated to make decisions 
that they perceive are in the best interests of the group” (Davis et al., 1997: 25). 
Stewardship is used to refer to shareholders in a number of ways, both in 
practice and research: the UK Stewardship Code understands shareholders as 
stewards of corporations encouraging purposeful dialogue on a number of corporate 
governance and risk management issues (FRC, 2012) or ESG concerns (Eurosif, 
2013); more specifically shareholders involved in SSE have been shown to see 
themselves in a stewardship role (Clark et al., 2008; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Van 
Cranenburgh, Goodman, Louche, & Arenas, 2012). A deliberative approach allows us 
to conceptualise shareholders in SSE as adopting a new role as stewards of the 
process of SSE; as champions and facilitators of a deliberative and democratic forum 
for corporate decision-making on issues of social, environmental and ethical concern.  
Implications for practice 
 
As SSE continues to evolve, Habermasian discourse ethics and the rules of 
communicative action can provide a valuable benchmark to strive towards responding 
to calls for standards in SSE (Dhir, 2012; McLaren, 2004). In response to the three 
questions we pose, we have highlighted some steps that can be important for 
shareholders involved in the practice of SSE. While each of these steps has practical 
implications, this section draws on the most significant. 
Firstly, we review the steps which SSE should follow according to our 
analysis. Our first question identifies the importance of community consultation and 
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consent, keeping an open mind to diverse perspectives, and better understanding 
beneficiaries’ expectations. Also key are being truthful about claims, transparent 
about the process, and using threat of exit or sanctions purely for the sake of keeping 
parties involved in discourse. In response to the second question we explore the 
inclusion of affected stakeholders in behind-the-scenes dialogue, the use of 
communicative fora, and the importance of being open to all potential outcomes. At 
the constitutional level of analysis, the actionable steps include promoting regulatory 
change for a stakeholder democracy, establishing institutions such as ethics councils, 
stimulating societal discussion to address and reframe broader issues, and ensuring 
marginalised stakeholder hold veto power in some cases. 
Almost all of the responses to the ethical challenges we discuss would imply a 
considerable investment in terms of time and money by shareholders. For example at 
the action level, building ongoing links with local communities, to understand their 
perspectives, to consult with them and to gain consent implies a long term 
involvement and commitment. Expertise may be required in community liaison and 
local knowledge, as well as in education to prepare stakeholders where necessary to 
deliberate and represent themselves in an informed and rational way (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). Also at this level, the inclusion of 
marginalised stakeholders in behind-the-scenes engagement would imply possible 
costs for transport and dissemination of information. As mentioned earlier, the 
organisation of communicative fora also poses a challenge for shareholders with 
limited resources and skills. At the constitutional level the promotion of institutional 
and regulatory change, as well as educating marginalised stakeholders in deliberative 
democracy (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004), suggests a commitment of both time and 
money and a long term perspective in order to bring about change. This would 
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certainly require political skills and legal expertise as well as reflection on ethical 
policy. These costs could lead, as O’Rourke (2003) suggests, to engagement being 
limited to those with time and money, especially considering the resource constraints 
faced by marginalised stakeholders and shareholders involved in SSE (Goodman et 
al., 2014). The consideration of how to finance such activities should play an 
important part in further discussions of this subject. 
Our analysis supports the need for reflection by mutual funds and other 
investment vehicles on their internal deliberative practices. As argued by Richardson 
(2013: 13), ethical deliberation within funds “could help inspire a critical 
reassessment of what a truly socially and ecologically sustainable investment 
portfolio should provide”. Again, such action requires significant changes in behavior 
for fund managers as well as beneficiaries, and would incur greater costs. 
Our analysis also has implications for corporations. Managers need to be 
cognizant of the diversity of shareholder demands and be conscious of the extent of 
their potential reach. A rebalancing of power through multi-stakeholder and 
shareholder alliances and a growing political role for shareholders makes for a 
complex and challenging environment for managers. The development of 
communicative fora based on the motifs of communicative action could provide a 
valuable means of detecting, contemplating and addressing this range of voices. 
Furthermore, the reforms at the regulatory/institutional level would have implications 
not only for publicly owned companies who deal directly with SSE at the action level 
but also for those business firms which do not have public ownership and are 
therefore not accountable to shareholders. SSE involved in influencing the rules of the 
game would want to make sure these companies are also held to account to 
stakeholder demands. 
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Future Research 
 
In developing a normative perspective to SSE we offer an alternative view of 
the role of shareholders in society. Our analysis poses both empirical and theoretical 
challenges, and possibly raises many more questions than answers. However, by 
developing a structured normative ethical perspective we provide insights for future 
research and analysis.  
First, future research should focus on addressing some of the empirical issues 
at an action level; for example, whether an attitude of reaching reasoned agreement is 
present among participants in SSE and, if not, how this can be instilled in participants. 
Further, to what extent do existing communicative fora promote the motifs of 
discourse ethics and communicative action? How much do shareholders in SSE 
currently promote the participation of marginalised stakeholders in their engagement? 
This research has been undertaken from the perspective of the engager rather 
than the corporation. Future research into the company perspective is essential to gain 
insights into how the SSE process is perceived and implemented by firms. The firm is 
highly relevant for ethical SSE processes in terms of the importance of selecting and 
restricting participants, and providing truthful and accurate information and 
transparency, without which ethical SSE is not attainable. 
While our model focuses on the action and constitutional levels identified by 
Schreck (2013), a normative approach to SSE should also be considered at the level of 
an ideal just society (Hendry, 2001). Future theoretical inquiry should also address the 
role of SSE in an ideal just society. Would SSE be completely unnecessary since the 
institutions would already be in place for all affected parties to participate in corporate 
decision-making? Would SSE disappear and those shareholders become like any 
other shareholder and worry only about their dividends? Or would all shareholders 
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become involved in SSE and be vigilant about the possibility of company 
misbehavior regarding social and environmental practices? 
The use of discourse ethics does not exhaust the ethical discussions 
concerning SSE and further research should explore alternative approaches such as 
other ethical perspectives and stewardship theory. Further consideration of power is 
needed, for example does SSE perpetuate or remedy power imbalances among 
different stakeholders? Regarding political CSR, an examination of the potential for 
deliberative democratic spaces including shareholders, other traditional stakeholders 
and marginalised stakeholders in corporate decision-making affecting their welfare 
would be valuable to assess the legitimate basis for the corporation to engage in 
global political deliberations. 
Finally, the unresolved tension in the responsible investment literature 
between instrumental and ethical motivations needs to be explored in future research. 
There is great scope to differentiate between the types of investors involved in SSE 
and responsible investment which could reveal different underlying approaches 
currently aggregated under the umbrella of shareholder engagement. 
Conclusion 
 
By using a discourse ethics lens to examine the phenomenon of SSE we have 
provided a normative, multi-level analysis which extends the current conversation on 
responsible investment and on political CSR to conclude that shareholders involved in 
SSE should take a political role, which goes beyond merely representing stakeholder 
voices to companies, and actually cede power to marginalised stakeholders and 
regulators in order to achieve their morally motivated goals. 
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The implications of our analysis are wide ranging addressing both theoretical 
and practical aspects. Theoretically extending the existing debate on political CSR to 
include SSE provides a deliberative democratic political view of actors seen 
traditionally as economically rational. This also opens the possibility to discuss more 
broadly the conflicting motivations of shareholders in responsible investment, which 
are frequently overlooked as long as other common interests can be found. 
Practically, our analysis is able to identify actionable steps for shareholders in SSE as 
well as management to practice communicative action. In doing so provides a 
benchmark for the inclusion of stakeholders in SSE and provides an important 
guideline for establishing standards in shareholder engagement. 
While SSE does not represent the majority of shareholders, it does provide a 
fascinating entry point for opening up debate on the ethical responsibilities of 
shareholders in general. This debate is not only relevant to SSE but all of those 
shareholders whose actions as owners of powerful multinationals impact countless 
marginalised individuals around the world. Seen in this way, an ethical consideration 
of shareholder engagement has not only been overlooked but is long overdue.  
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Chapter 4: Paper 3 – Shareholder Dialogue Behind The 
Scenes: Addressing The Bulk Of The Iceberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130
Abstract 
 
The ever-growing literature on shareholder engagement has, understandably, 
focused much of its attention on the most visible aspects of engagement despite 
claims that this represents only the tip of the iceberg. Behind-the-scenes engagement, 
a crucial mechanism of corporate governance, remains largely unexplored. Whereas 
deliberative and participatory approaches have become widely supported in 
stakeholder engagement, the behind-the-scenes nature of much of shareholder 
engagement and the privacy on which it is said to depend for its success appear to 
conflict with these approaches. This large-scale, in-depth study of behind-the-scenes 
dialogue investigates how participatory and deliberative practices are used, with 
whom, and at what stage of the engagement process. Through a discourse ethics lens 
we use the motifs of Habermas’ ideal speech situation to interrogate the responses of 
shareholder members of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). 
We find evidence of participative and deliberative practices at different stages of 
dialogue, which are facilitated by ICCR. However, there is a perceived trade-off 
between having direct conversations with companies and inviting broader societal 
participation in SSE; the latter is feared to erode the trust relationship built up through 
direct conversation between the company and engager over time. We claim that it is 
not participation per se which erodes trust and argue in support of greater 
participation in direct dialogue. 
 
Key words: shareholder engagement, responsible investment, religious organisations, 
discourse ethics, stakeholder engagement  
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Introduction 
 
 ‘Dialogue’ between the corporation and shareholders is said to be where the 
“real action typically occurs” (Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009: 353) in social 
shareholder engagement (SSE). Dialogue aimed at changing corporate behaviour on 
environmental, social and ethical issues goes beyond looking at shareholder 
resolutions (Lewis & Mackenzie, 2000; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009), which could 
represent only the tip of the iceberg of shareholder activism (Goranova & Ryan, 
2014). While highly relevant to corporate governance, little is known about behind-
the-scenes dialogue due to its private and confidential nature. In an era of calls for 
greater transparency and accountability of business in society (Bebbington et al., 
2007) and a more democratic role for stakeholders in corporate governance (Matten & 
Crane, 2005; Moriarty, 2014), we question how broad participation can be ensured in 
behind-the-scenes dialogue on social, environmental and ethical issues. By applying a 
participatory and deliberative approach to primary stakeholders: shareholders active 
in SSE, we analyse the public nature of their dialogue. 
The participation of stakeholders in decision making has given rise to the 
concept of stakeholder democracy, whereby all stakeholders have some degree of 
democratic influence on management decisions which substantially affect their 
welfare (Matten & Crane, 2005; Moriarty, 2014; O'Dwyer, 2005). Public deliberation 
between a company and its stakeholders has “exploded in popularity” among 
organisations (Lee & Romano, 2013: 734), and the appearance of a multitude of 
multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) appears to substantiate this view. 
Shareholders in SSE have also been shown to bring the voices of other stakeholders to 
the attention of management (Goodman et al., 2014; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009). 
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However, research indicates the vast majority of shareholder engagement remains 
private (Becht et al., 2009; Carleton et al., 1998; Goldstein, 2011) with privacy 
frequently cited as essential for building trust (Black & Coffee, 1994; Gifford, 2010; 
Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009). While SSE can lead to positive outcomes (Goodman et 
al., 2014; Hebb, Hoepner, Rodionova, & Sanchez, 2013), ethical concerns have been 
raised about SSE involving human rights issues when those parties who are affected 
by the shareholder action have not participated fully in, or approved the action 
(Coumans, 2012; Dhir, 2012).  
The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) is one of the largest 
shareholder coalitions with around 300, primarily faith-based organisations, 
representing over $100 billion in invested capital. Founded in the early 1970s and at 
the forefront of SSE, ICCR is highly active and filed over 200 resolutions and led 250 
dialogues with companies in 2013 alone (ICCR, 2013, 2014c). As well as being 
increasingly prevalent, these behind-the-scenes dialogues occur when “corporations 
and shareholder activist groups mutually agree to engage in ongoing communications 
to deal with a serious social issue as an alternative to the formal vote on a shareholder 
resolution.” (Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009: 354) and are considered by ICCR 
members to be “by far a more successful course of action [than resolutions]”9. Given 
the coalition’s long history and pioneering status in SSE, its preference for behind-
the-scenes dialogue, and its strong promotion of the need for stakeholder inclusion in 
corporate decision-making, ICCR provides a valuable opportunity for exploring this 
little researched, crucial, and largely invisible, mechanism of corporate governance. 
This paper unpacks the nature of behind-the-scenes dialogue in SSE. We ask how 
participatory and deliberative practices are used during the dialogue process: who 
                                                9	  All quotations from the interviewees in this study are used anonymously and are 
referred to by numbers. Interviewee 22	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participates in behind-the-scenes dialogue; what the nature of their participation is; 
and at what stage of the engagement process these practices occur. 
A discourse ethics approach (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1992) provides a 
normative, ethical, process perspective with which to analyse the participatory and 
deliberative nature of behind-the-scenes dialogue in SSE. This approach has been 
used to inform stakeholder engagement (O'Dwyer, 2005; Smith, 2004), corporate 
social responsibility (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), social accountability (Gilbert & 
Rasche, 2007) and codes of ethics (Lozano, 2001) and has more recently been 
proposed as relevant to SSE (Goodman & Arenas, 2014, forthcoming). We 
interrogate the responses of 43 semi-structured interviews with shareholder members 
of ICCR against the key motifs of Habermas’ discourse ethics approach (Goodman & 
Arenas, 2014; Habermas, 1992). Four key motifs have been summarized from 
Habermasian discourse ethics: argumentation, plural participation, non-coercion, and 
transparency (Goodman & Arenas, 2014, forthcoming). We test these ideal motifs 
against current practice in SSE. We complement and triangulate our qualitative 
investigation with survey data.  
We contribute to the SSE literature by providing insights into the under-
researched area of behind-the-scenes dialogue developing a clearer picture of when, 
how and with whom participatory and deliberative practices are used. We add to the 
notion of shareholder coalitions as creating a public-private space (Gond & Piani, 
2013) to enhance participatory and deliberative practices. In response to calls for a 
credible and legitimate process to ensure other stakeholder voices are considered in 
decision-making (Dhir, 2012; O'Dwyer, 2005) we evaluate behind-the-scenes 
dialogue according to the motifs of Habermasian discourse ethics. The analysis 
reveals a distance between current practice and ideal speech, and that stakeholder 
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participation is perceived by shareholders as eroding the trust built between 
individuals over time. However, we challenge the notion that it is stakeholder 
participation per se which erodes trust and identify ways in which stakeholders could 
extend their participation in behind-the-scenes dialogue. 
This article firstly reviews the literature on participatory and deliberative 
approaches to stakeholder engagement, and then relates that to what is known about 
SSE. Thirdly, we explore the motifs of Habermasian discourse ethics and apply this to 
behind-the-scenes dialogue. We then present our method and data. The fifth section 
analyses our interview data according to the key motifs of discourse ethics. Our 
findings are discussed and then we conclude with some limitations and final 
comments. 
Background 
 
In this section we review the literature to date on participatory and deliberative 
processes and relate these concepts to corporate decision-making and stakeholder 
engagement. We then move on to address the nature of SSE and the substantial body 
of literature on shareholder activism. Publicly available data such as minority 
shareholder resolutions and media campaigns have been the main focus of research 
while behind-the-scenes dialogue has been, understandably, more challenging to 
access. We finally consider the role of discourse ethics in SSE and build on this to 
create our theoretical frame. 
A participatory and deliberative approach to organizational decision-making 
 
The development of concepts such as ‘stakeholder democracy’ reflects 
increasing interest in the participation of a broader range of stakeholders in 
management decision-making (Freeman, 1984; Matten & Crane, 2005; Smith, 2004). 
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Democratic governance involves extending the narrow view of governance from 
accountability to shareholders, to include all stakeholders whose welfare is affected 
by organizational decisions (O'Dwyer, 2005). In a world where corporate 
accountability is sought and reporting standards on social and environmental issues 
proliferate, stakeholder democracy appears to offer a tantalizing opportunity to 
improve corporate responsibility (Matten & Crane, 2005). It has been claimed that 
leading companies are accepting a more inclusive and stakeholder-based approach to 
achieve good governance (Mason & O'Mahony, 2008). 
This increasingly participative view of corporate governance is closely linked 
with a deliberative approach. Work on deliberative democracy in the public sphere 
(Fung, 2005) has been extended to firm-society relations (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004) and the notion of the politicization of the corporation has developed (Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2006). Deliberation and discourse with civic society are argued to lead to 
greater organizational legitimacy (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006) and have been applied to 
social and environmental accounting (Bebbington et al., 2007; Gilbert & Rasche, 
2007). In practice, public deliberation has become highly popular as an organizational 
strategy for managers in public, private or even the non-profit sectors (Lee & 
Romano, 2013).  
Whilst participatory and deliberative processes have received widespread 
support, some have questioned their role in empowering stakeholders and reducing 
the negative effects of corporations on society and the environment. Lee and Romano 
(2013) suggest that public deliberation events are an organizational strategy which 
can repress social movements and are employed by organisations to manage political 
and economic challenges. Others have raised concerns that stakeholder consultation 
can be a form of whitewashing and can actually harm affected stakeholders (Dhir, 
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2012) or point to the normative idealism of these approaches in light of the continuing 
predominance of shareholder-centric forms of governance and the reluctance of 
shareholders to relinquish their traditional power (Matten & Crane, 2005). 
However, even from a shareholder perspective there is some evidence of 
broader stakeholder participation and deliberation. Research into investment shows 
there has been growing collaboration between investors and other stakeholders cutting 
across national boundaries and different sectors (McLaren, 2004). “The SRI 
intermediary can also pool the interests of multiple stakeholders and thereby 
potentially overcome collective action problems. SRI engagement can therefore 
represent stakeholder interests with more credibility and influence.” (McLaren, 2004: 
195). In addition, companies have been led to engage directly with a broader group of 
stakeholders through pension fund corporate activism which has increasingly focused 
on transparency (Hebb, 2006).  
The development of collaborative groups such as the United Nations 
sponsored Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) and its Clearinghouse, 
CERES, the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) and ICCR add another layer of 
collaborative relationships to the shareholder-company-stakeholder relationship 
creating a communicative space for dialogue (Gond & Piani, 2013). ICCR states: 
[faith-based members] “have one foot in companies as shareholders and one foot in 
communities as religious organizations with local, national and global faith-based 
partners. This dual role as investors and as community participants places ICCR 
members in a unique position to address the relationship between corporate operations 
and their social impacts on communities.” (ICCR, 2011: 7). We would therefore 
expect to find evidence of participatory and deliberative practices in the SSE process 
at ICCR. The following section reviews SSE and highlights the potential risks of 
 137 
neglecting participatory and deliberative practices.  
Social shareholder engagement in public and behind-the-scenes 
 
Social shareholder engagement, “the use of ownership position to actively 
influence company policy and practice” (Sjöström, 2008: 142) on social, 
environmental, ethical and some governance issues (Goodman et al., 2014) is 
recognised as one of the main responsible investment (RI) strategies (Eurosif, 2014). 
RI is predicted to become the preferred approach of institutional investors (Juravle & 
Lewis, 2008; Vandekerckhove et al., 2008). Currently investors who practice RI 
manage assets of €10 trillion in Europe and $6.57 trillion in the US (Eurosif, 2014; 
USSIF, 2014) and the United Nations backed Principles for Responsible Investment 
(UNPRI) represents signatory assets of $45 trillion (UNPRI, 2014). 
SSE includes a broad range of strategies, some more publically visible than 
others. Social movement literature has generally tended to take a public activism 
approach focusing on more visible protest and a proactive use of the media in 
attempts to achieve symbolic or material damage or gain (den Hond & de Bakker, 
2007). However, shareholder resolutions and proxy filings, public letters, and focus 
lists can also be considered public (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). SSE can thus be 
described as involving increasing degrees of publicity from behind-the-scenes 
dialogue, to resolutions and on to public and media campaigns (Sikavica & Hillman, 
2008). While much research on shareholder engagement has focused on the more 
visible and public aspects of engagement, not least because of the difficulty of 
accessing confidential data (Black & Coffee, 1994; O'Rourke, 2003), behind-the-
scenes dialogue is claimed to be where the vast majority of corporate engagement 
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happens (Becht et al., 2009; Carleton et al., 1998; Goldstein, 2011; Goranova & Ryan, 
2014; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009).  
It is frequently assumed that behind-the-scenes dialogue is more influential 
than public activism, “dialogue is by far a more successful course of action [than 
resolutions] because it builds on a relationship over time, and as trust builds the 
willingness to discuss the topic, or even related topics, improves”10. As demonstrated 
in this quote from a SSE practitioner, one key reason for its success is that trust 
between shareholders and managers is essential in engagement and can be destroyed 
by high profile media campaigns (Gifford, 2010; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009; 
O'Rourke, 2003). However, critics suggest there is no consensus on the effectiveness 
of these different engagement approaches (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). Differing views 
on what constitutes success in SSE (Goldstein, 2011; Karpoff, 2001), the challenges 
of measuring effectiveness of both non-binding public resolutions (Levit & Malenko, 
2011; Rojas et al., 2009) and confidential private discussions (Black & Coffee, 1994; 
O'Rourke, 2003), varying temporal horizons (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006) and 
contextual factors all add to the complexity of establishing engagement effectiveness. 
Rather than debating the effectiveness of public versus behind-the-scenes 
SSE, this article focuses solely on the more widespread, but less well-understood 
option of behind-the-scenes dialogue. A potential risk of this type of engagement has 
developed around the non-participatory approach which is a hallmark of this type of 
dialogue. Coumans (2012) and Dhir (2012) highlight the dangers of SSE without full 
consultation with, and participation of local communities. Both draw on the case of 
Canadian mining company and the impact of its mining operations in Guatemala on 
the human rights of indigenous people local to the mine. While a shareholder 
                                                10	  Interviewee 22	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coalition attempted to use their power to address the human rights issues in question, 
their use of business language and concepts and the lack of full consultation and 
participation of local community members led to claims that the shareholder 
engagement actually undermined the interests of those it was trying to help 
(Coumans, 2012; Dhir, 2012). 
While this criticism is based on one case and includes the more public strategy 
of filing a minority shareholder resolution it raises important questions about the 
nature and quality of behind-the-scenes dialogue, its credibility and legitimacy (Dhir, 
2012). The following section identifies and explains the theoretical lens used in this 
study to explore the nature of dialogue in answer to our research question of how, and 
at what stage of the dialogue process participatory and deliberative practices are used 
in SSE.  
A discourse ethics approach to SSE 
 
In order to help develop some standard of deliberation and participation, 
Habermasian discourse ethics has been used by a number of researchers. For example, 
to develop codes of ethics (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007; Lozano, 2001), for work on CSR 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) and particularly in the broader stakeholder engagement 
literature (O'Dwyer, 2005; Reed, 1999; Smith, 2004; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). 
More recently it has been argued to be applicable as a lens for viewing shareholder 
engagement when focused on issues of broader social and environmental concern 
(Goodman & Arenas, 2014, forthcoming).  
Discourse ethics is particularly relevant to SSE as if focuses on the 
participation of affected parties in fair dialogues to reach moral norms (Beschorner, 
2006; Habermas, 1984, 1987) and therefore is suited to the inclusion of shareholders, 
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corporate management and other stakeholders. Secondly, by emphasizing the 
importance of the process, discourse ethics avoids making judgements on the moral 
content of different arguments. It therefore offers the opportunity of including a 
variety of differing perspectives and worldviews (Goodman & Arenas, forthcoming) 
and also responds to calls for ensuring the quality of the process (Dhir, 2012; Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2007). A discourse ethics approach gives primacy to moral reasons 
beyond profit seeking (Beschorner, 2006) which is in line with the ideology of 
socially-driven investors such as religious organisations (Goodman et al., 2014; Lee 
& Lounsbury, 2011). Finally, as a normative approach, discourse ethics addresses the 
need for norms and standards in shareholder engagement (McLaren, 2004).  
“Discourse ethics is a normative framework that is appropriate for deliberating 
on the moral problems that emerge in a pluralistic business context” (Stansbury, 2009: 
34). Such a normative framework presents an ideal which is arguably unattainable in 
practice (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007; Habermas, 1992; Smith, 2004). However, by 
providing a standard and an ideal to strive towards, the positive effects of deliberation 
and communicative action can be felt (O'Dwyer, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; 
Unerman & Bennett, 2004). 
The underlying philosophical principles of discourse ethics are to achieve a 
universally validated norm which requires participants to reach an understanding 
through practical discourse (Habermas, 1992). This orientation towards reaching an 
understanding is known as ‘communicative action’ which is in contrast to what 
Habermas describes as ‘strategic action’ (Habermas, 1984). The goal of dialogue in 
SSE from this perspective should be to reach a decision which everyone affected finds 
acceptable, rather than the individual and egocentric goals associated with strategic 
action.  
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Habermas lays out rules or motifs for an “ideal speech situation” (Habermas, 
1992: 88) which are necessary to achieve communicative action. The first of these 
motifs is argumentation (Goodman & Arenas, forthcoming) which states that 
participants should aim to transform the preferences of others through using rational 
arguments rather than aggregating individual preferences. Arguments should be 
vocalized by each person who is then open to questioning and criticism (Habermas, 
1992).  
Secondly, all those affected by the decision and who are competent to speak 
and act should be admitted as a participant (Habermas, 1992). This plural 
participation should be unrelated to the power held by different stakeholders. Such 
participation is particularly challenging in a real life business context (Lozano, 2001; 
O'Dwyer, 2005; Unerman & Bennett, 2004) but can still serve as an aspirational ideal 
to move towards (Lozano, 2001). 
Communicative action is non-corercive by nature and Habermas states: “No 
speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his 
rights” (Habermas, 1992: 89). The rights that he refers to here are 1), to be allowed to 
participate and 2), for all participants to be permitted to introduce and question 
assertions and to express interests. It should be the best argument that wins rather than 
any coercive or power related tactics (Lozano, 2001). 
Finally transparency plays a key role in Habermasian discourse ethics. All 
utterances should be true, right and truthful, or without the intention to mislead. In 
order to achieve this, information must be available and accessible to participants 
(Lozano, 2001; O'Dwyer, 2005). The use of rhetoric and the denial of responsibility in 
the face of facts to the contrary would not be acceptable in the ideal speech situation. 
As well as transparency in terms of the content of discussion, the process should also 
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be transparent in order to gain the trust of stakeholders (McLaren, 2004), ideally the 
process should be public (Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). 
Viewing behind-the-scenes dialogue through the lens of discourse ethics 
provides a way of assessing the ethics of the process of engagement, something which 
is lacking and needed in the engagement literature (Goodman & Arenas, 
forthcoming). It allows a consideration of the degree to which behind-the-scenes 
dialogue incorporates participatory and deliberative ideals and the distance between 
this ideal and current practice. We use the key motifs of Habermasian discourse ethics 
to interrogate our interview responses in order to build a picture of the nature of 
behind-the-scenes dialogue. 
Method 
 
Approach 
 
This study takes a hybrid approach (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006) 
combining the structure of a theoretical framework with the explorative interpretative 
nature of a grounded theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) in order to develop a 
deep understanding of behind-the-scenes dialogue. The application of a framework to 
our data analysis provides us with a guide to the interrogation and interpretation of 
our data while maintaining the exploratory nature of this study as one of the first to 
examine the nature of behind the scenes dialogue (Hebb, 2006). Grounded theory is 
particularly suited to rich data concerning processes and sequences (Orlikowski, 
1993). We use a survey, extensive semi-structured interviews and desk-based research 
to inform our research questions and provide triangulation of the data (Yin, 1994) in 
line with other qualitative research designs (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Gutierrez et al., 
2010).  
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Data sample 
 
We use the ICCR database of shareholder dialogues as the basis for our 
investigation. Dating back to 1971 this database keeps track of all resolutions and 
dialogues undertaken by the ICCR and its members and has been used in a number of 
research papers (Clark et al., 2008; Ferraro & Beunza, 2014; Hebb et al., 2014; 
Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009; Logsdon & Buren, 2008; Rehbein et al., 2013). The 
ICCR is based in the United States and represents over $100 billion of invested 
capital (ICCR, 2013) and the database contains information on the 3166 dialogues 
conducted from 1971-2013 and contact details for each member organization and the 
individuals which represent them. 
ICCR’s history, experience and extensive tracking of behind-the-scenes 
dialogues as well as the more public resolutions make it a rich source of data. Made 
up primarily of US religious organisations, ICCR also counts among its members 
large healthcare systems, pension funds, unions and fund managers and has 
collaborated with notable institutional investors such as California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) and New York City Employees’ Retirement System 
(NYCERS). The breadth and depth of experience within the ICCR makes it an ideal 
source for qualitative in-depth interviews. The ICCR states that: “in order to make 
long-term change, community organizations and institutions need to be engaged with 
other stakeholders in every aspect of the process from the beginning." (ICCR, 2011: 
7). Such a statement would appear to be in line with the participatory element of 
discourse ethics but contradict the nature of behind-the-scenes dialogue. 
We developed a survey to identify the key characteristics of behind-the-scenes 
dialogue based on the literature and reviewed by five academics familiar with the 
engagement literature (see appendix 1). The survey was internet-based and the link 
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was sent out to all ICCR members in their July 2013 newsletter and supported by the 
Director of ICCR. After sending a reminder we received a total of 7 responses. We 
then contacted the identified individuals at each organisation to request an interview 
and encouraged those individuals to complete the survey leading to a final total of 27 
survey responses. While this is not a random sample we use the survey responses to 
triangulate and supplement the interview responses. 
Our sample for the interviews was the organisation members of the ICCR. We 
used the organisations listed on its website, in its annual report 2012 and those 
registered on its database, corrected for duplicates and searched coalitions under the 
umbrella names. This narrowed down the sample to 207 organisations. Taking only 
those organisations which have been involved in at least one dialogue over the 1971-
2013 period resulted in a total sample of 112. We identified the contact person for 
each of these organisations from their most recent dialogue involvement. After 
eliminating contact duplicates we finally arrived at a total of 100 individuals, each 
representing a different organisation, who we contacted for an interview. Of those we 
contacted, 6 declined the interview, 48 did not respond, 3 were unable to schedule the 
interview. We conducted a total of 43 interviews with those who responded and were 
willing to take part in the research.  
The characteristics of the organisations represented by the 43 respondents are 
described below. To indicate the experience of the organization in engagement, the 
number of dialogues the organisations had been involved in between 1971 and 2013 
were counted. We found the experience of respondents was similar to the contacted 
sample. The distribution of types of membership among the respondents was also 
very similar to that of the sample we contacted indicating that the respondents were 
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representative and reducing selection bias. The characteristics of the contacted sample 
and final respondents can be found in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Characteristics of contacted sample and final respondents 
 Contacted sample 
(100) 
Respondents 
(43) 
 Number % Number % 
Number of dialogues per organization 
(1971-2013): 
1-50 
51-100 
101-200 
>200 
 
56 
18 
14 
12 
 
56% 
18% 
14% 
12% 
 
23 
6 
5 
9 
 
53% 
14% 
12% 
21% 
Current membership type: 
Faith-based 
Associate 
Affiliate 
Non-defined 
 
63 
14 
19 
4 
 
63% 
14% 
19% 
4% 
 
29 
7 
4 
3 
 
67% 
16% 
9% 
7% 
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
We use semi-structured interviews to allow for an in-depth exploration of the 
nature of dialogue. An interview protocol was developed with key questions however 
the order of the questions was flexible according to each interview (Bryman & Bell, 
2007). Interviewees were first asked to describe their organisation and its relationship 
to the ICCR as well as each individual’s involvement in SSE. The questions then 
prompted the interviewees to describe their involvement with ICCR and dialogues in 
detail, including their motives for choosing this type of engagement method, the 
dialogue process from initiation to conclusion, whether they have ever invited in 
participants external to the shareholder members and corporate management and their 
motives for doing so or not, as well as their experiences of the benefits and challenges 
faced in collaboration, the role of the media in their engagement and their perception 
of corporate responsiveness. Interviews were conducted by telephone and lasted 
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between 30 minutes and an hour each. They were summarized immediately as well as 
being recorded and later transcribed. 
In order to reduce the potential for bias in the interviews, particularly social 
desirability bias, we used a number of strategies. We made clear to participants at the 
start of the interviews that their responses would be anonymous and that findings 
would not be accredited to individuals or particular organisations. To reduce 
interviewer bias we used an interview protocol and recorded the interviews. Findings 
were discussed regularly by the three authors which resulted in several additional 
questions being added based on the answers of the first ten interviews. For example 
whether the individual considered themselves to be acting in a consultancy role. 
The results from the surveys and data from the interviews were compiled to 
generate a detailed spreadsheet of responses. Analysis of the interviews was 
undertaken by reviewing and coding the 43 interview transcripts. Repeated iterations 
were made between the data and the theoretical perspective to constantly compare the 
two (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The first iteration enabled us to 
construct a map of the dialogue process at the ICCR. The following iterations drew 
from the theoretical perspective established a priori and the interview transcripts were 
coded for evidence of the motifs of discourse ethics. The third iteration involved 
thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998) related to the emerging theme of trust. NVivo 10 
software was used to facilitate the coding process. 
Findings 
 
In this section we present our findings by firstly identifying the stages of the 
dialogue process used at the ICCR. We also briefly outline the facilitating role of the 
ICCR investor coalition. We then use the frame of discourse ethics and the four key 
motifs to show how participatory and deliberative practices are used during the 
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dialogue process: who participates in behind-the-scenes dialogue; what the nature of 
their participation is; and at what stage in the engagement process these practices 
occur. Finally we go on to explore the motives given by the interviewees for the lack 
of participation of stakeholders in the dialogue process, essentially that participation 
is feared to erode the trust relationship built up through direct conversation between 
the company and engager over time. We claim that it is not participation per se which 
erodes trust and argue in support of greater participation in direct dialogue. 
There was widespread consensus from the interviews and surveys about the 
sequence of activities in the ICCR dialogue process. This falls broadly in line with the 
engagement process identified in previous research (Goodman et al., 2014; Logsdon 
& Van Buren, 2009). However, our findings extend this work by exposing in detail 
the activities and actors involved in behind-the-scenes dialogue. Figure 3 provides a 
summary of the main activities and the actors involved at each stage of behind-the-
scenes dialogue. 
Figure 3: Main stages and actors of ICCR dialogue 
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Issues are first selected through the ICCR board and by individual members. 
ICCR holds three face to face meetings annually where these issues of concern are 
discussed. Workshops are held on specific issues and which are open to participation 
by a range of stakeholders including those affected by the issue, company 
representatives, experts, researchers and NGOs. One such example was the Water 
Round Table in 2012. Following these open and informative sessions, one 
shareholder, usually with a particular interest or knowledge of a certain issue, 
proposes to be the ‘lead’ shareholder for the dialogue and other interested shareholder 
members choose whether to collaborate on the engagement. These groups vary in size 
from 3 to 50 different shareholder members with the most common size being 
between 4 and 10. The role of the lead shareholder is to coordinate the meetings and 
interactions with the company and to share this information with the other 
shareholders who are collaborating on the engagement. The ICCR database, although 
not including broader stakeholders, allows collaborating shareholders to be in 
communication and share updates and information about the dialogues. The objective 
of the dialogue is set within the collaborating group of shareholders and preparations 
are made for meeting with the company. In-person meetings or conference calls with 
companies are arranged by the lead shareholder and attended by company 
representatives, the lead shareholder and any other collaborating shareholders who are 
able to attend. External experts are included infrequently and only if company 
approval was given. Although a few examples were given of when an NGO was in 
attendance this was only considered to be occasional and most of the respondents had 
never experienced any NGO participation. The decision of whether to conclude or to 
continue a dialogue is made by the members of the collaborating group. 
The ICCR coalition plays a key facilitating role in enabling the SSE of its 
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members. Working through this ICCR coalition for many of the religious 
organisations was the only way they could participate in dialogue due to their own 
very limited staffing and the resource intensive nature of dialogue. For many of them 
all their engagement is done through ICCR. ICCR’s knowhow, combined financial 
assets, its contacts, the range of different types of members, its dispersed geographical 
presence across the US and its reputation were all given as benefits for engaging 
through the coalition. 
Discourse ethics and the dialogue process 
 
Our investigation finds clear evidence that elements of participatory and 
deliberative approaches are used in behind-the-scenes dialogue however different 
elements are used at different stages. This section firstly considers the ICCR 
members’ orientation towards dialogue and then uses the motifs of discourse ethics to 
identify the distance between current practice and ideal speech. 
The orientation towards reaching understanding, which is fundamental to 
communicative action was a common theme in the interview responses. One 
interviewee expressed the underlying objective as: 
“we’re all going for the higher good.”11 
At the issue selection stage, concerns about particular issues arose from a 
variety of sources including the news, reports from grassroots networks around the 
world, discussion and surveys of ICCR member interests and priorities. They were 
then discussed by the Board and agreed upon through consensus of Board members. 
The fact that different members come from different faith backgrounds means that the 
moral content of some issues could not always be agreed on. However, the 
interviewees reported that only issues on which members shared a common ground 
                                                11	  Interviewee 4	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would be selected.  
At the objective setting stage, the overarching aim was to reach a decision on 
the objectives that could be agreed on: 
“Ordinarily we are able to come to a consensus that everybody in the 
group can live with even though it wasn’t their first choice”12 
A number of interviewees mentioned that this could take time but was almost always 
achieved.  
“the consensus of the group tends to reign”, “sometimes conversations 
among shareholders go on for quite a bit of time while…planning is 
happening”13 
The deliberative approach of the ICCR members and the objective of finding a 
common objective at this stage is strongly in line with the principles behind 
Habermasian discourse ethics (Habermas, 1992).  
When it came to dialogue with companies we find evidence of an orientation 
of understanding in terms of seeking a “win-win” situation for the shareholders and 
the company. However, as discussed in the following sections, the lack of 
participation of other stakeholders at this stage raises the question of whether the 
norms agreed upon are in line with those stakeholders affected by the consequences of 
the decision.  
The decision of when to conclude dialogue was said to be where most 
disagreements arose between coalition shareholders.  
“it is very hard for us to sunset a dialogue so to speak because we 
always feel like there’s more to be done”14 
                                                12	  Interviewee 37	  13	  Interviewee 26	  14	  Interviewee 07	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While some shareholders were satisfied with ending dialogue after a measurable 
degree of progress had been made, others were keen to continue to develop the issue 
or move on to address a new issue with the same company. The freedom allowed by 
ICCR for self-selection of collaboration in working groups meant that those who were 
satisfied might leave the group while others continued dialogue, rather than reaching a 
consensus. 
Argumentation. The workshops facilitated by the ICCR at the information 
search stage provided a space for a wide variety of stakeholders to hear different 
viewpoints, ask questions and learn from experts. This openness to sharing multiple 
perspectives is closely in line with the motif of argumentation required for an ideal 
speech situation. 
Discussions among shareholders to decide dialogue objectives were reported 
to be “robust”15. Another interviewee commented: 
“we definitely have some very strenuous discussions about what the 
exact strategies and short term goals should be with any given 
company”16 
 Interviewees reported that they felt the process was democratic, interactive and 
participative17. 
“it’s a pretty iterative, participative process not very scientific I guess 
but it’s within a group discussion context”18  
                                                15	  Interviewee 33	  16	  Interviewee 37	  
17 “Participative” was used by the interviewees to mean that those present took part 
and contributed rather than in terms of the degree of inclusion of different affected 
parties 18	  Interviewee 35	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In direct dialogue with companies, the motif which performed most closely to 
ideal speech was that of argumentation. When dialoguing with the company many of 
the interviewees emphasised the importance of using reason: 
“there’s no attempt at flexing muscles or using any kind of aggressive 
stance, so usually it’s just a matter of … appealing to reason”19 
The inclusion of experts on particular issues in the dialogues demonstrates a 
desire for facts and reasoning and the knowledge to question the claims of the 
company. The majority of shareholders reported their tone as “informational”, other 
frequent responses were “rational”, “persuasive”, “respectful”, and “assertive” with 
only one saying occasionally the tone was “adversarial”. Shareholders were willing 
to give the company a chance to explain an issue and the challenges involved in 
addressing it, which the shareholders may not have been aware of. 
Plural participation. We find evidence that the participation of broader 
stakeholders when searching for information was strong.  
“We do endeavor to have community members as frequently as 
possible come to the gathered groups of ICCR we meet three times a 
year and frequently that will include first nations people to talk about 
… things like indigenous people rights infringement”20 
The ICCR facilitated workshops on certain issues which were opened up to a broad 
group of participants including experts, community representatives, NGOs and 
researchers who were able to represent their own positions and raise questions among 
the group.  
In contrast to issue workshops at the information search stage, our findings 
suggest that when it came to deciding the objectives of particular dialogues, the 
                                                19	  Interviewee 02	  20	  Interviewee 32	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degree of participation of broader stakeholders was much more limited. Practice at 
this stage was far from an ideal speech situation and involved only collaborating 
shareholders or those asset managers engaging on behalf of shareholders.  
A distance between practice and ideal speech was also evident at the stage of 
the actual dialogue with companies, where participation was almost always limited to 
shareholders with no wider stakeholder participation. Exceptions such as the 
infrequent presence of an external expert on the issue, or occasionally an NGO were 
identified:  
“Generally speaking it is shareowners”, “occasionally ... if it’s an issue 
that deals with some of the science we might bring someone to the 
table”21 
“I would say a handful of times I’ve been in a dialogue when an outside 
expert has been in the room, and the company was willing to have that 
person there”22 
The participation of experts was widely seen to be positive as they were able to bring 
detailed knowledge of the issue to the discussion table. 
 One of the interviewees felt very strongly about the participation of 
other stakeholders: 
“the people that are most affected by whatever it is that we’re talking 
about, that’s who we need to have at the table, and if the company won’t 
allow those persons at the table then we have to represent that we are 
the voice of the voiceless, and if people have voice and they can be there 
and the company allows it, they need to be there”23 
                                                21	  Interviewee 24	  22	  Interviewee 13	  23	  Interviewee 17	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However, the interviews strongly demonstrated a distance between practice and ideal 
speech through a lack of participation of affected stakeholders. Various reasons were 
given for not including other stakeholders at this stage of the dialogue; the overriding 
motive was trust, which is discussed in the following section. 
Decisions over when to end dialogue were made between the collaborating 
shareholders and did not bring in broader stakeholder participation. When asked 
whether the dialogue was having the intended impact on those affected by the issue 
the majority of the shareholders indicated it was very difficult to know. One 
interviewee said they would check with the NGO who raised the issue to see if 
measures had been implemented: 
“we would go back … to the source which would probably be a local 
NGO and say OK well what do you think now? Have you been there? 
Have you assessed it? And then and if the NGO says ‘yeah actually 
we’ve been there and we’ve talked to them and it seems like now they 
work reasonable days they’ve taken care of the wiring in the factory or 
the fire safety equipment or whatever it is that needed fixing’ … then 
of course we’d be inclined to believe them because they are the ones 
who originally complained about the problem”24  
The lack of participation of affected stakeholders at the objective setting, the 
dialogue and at the dialogue conclusion stages appears, at the outset, to support the 
concerns voiced about the potential for shareholder objectives to be misaligned with 
affected stakeholder welfare (Coumans, 2012; Dhir, 2012). 
Non-coercion. The objective setting stage was considered to be democratic 
and non-coercive by the interviewees. Despite the dialogue leads being self-selected 
                                                24	  Interviewee 39	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rather than democratically elected, and having the power to decide on the ultimate 
objective, interviewees reported that decisions were rarely made without a consensus. 
Dialogue leads were always faith-based members of ICCR who generally tended to 
have smaller asset bases than non faith-based members, so power differentials based 
on financial power were mitigated. 
During dialogue with the company, in some cases shareholders reported that 
they were asked to sign a confidentiality agreement before beginning dialogue: 
“I’ve been doing this since 2000, I think 6, 7 times I’ve signed a 
confidentiality agreement with a company”25 
The interviewees broadly reported that if they wanted to invite an external party to the 
dialogue they would have to facilitate the company with this information in advance 
and get their permission. This suggests that power is in the hands of the company to 
dictate the conditions of dialogue and shareholders oblige for fear of jeopardising 
their relationship. On the other hand, although not openly threatening the company 
with potentially reputation-damaging and costly publicity and resolutions (Black & 
Coffee, 1994), shareholders did keep this option open to keep the company at the 
negotiating table 
“I don’t want to damage ongoing engagement but it’s OK to have a 
gentle threat in there, but you don’t want to close the door”26  
The potentially positive impact of media coverage which could result from the 
ICCR’s public recognition that some progress had been made, could be seen as a form 
of incentive: 
 “once a company really does move forward with objectives and makes 
them public then … we can also issue press releases…. We’ve done this 
                                                25	  Interviewee 09	  26	  Interviewee 04	  
 156
a number of times, praising the company for what they’ve done and then 
noting that we’ve been in dialogue with them for a number of years”27 
Companies were reported to be keen to do a press release with the 
shareholders which acted as good publicity for them using ICCR almost as an 
endorsement. When an outcome was unsuccessful or an impasse was reached with a 
company, public mechanisms like filing a resolution were used. This was seen as a 
“gentle threat” or sanction indicating the presence of some coercive measures. 
Divestment could also be seen as a threat (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009), however 
respondents felt the holdings of the shareholders were often too small to have any 
financial impact: 
“our view has tended to be that in the absence of a capital constrained 
market environment, divestment is not going to be overly impactful”28 
On some occasions only the minimum of $2000 of stock was held in order to engage. 
Some felt that divestment was a loss because any influence that could have been 
exerted as a shareholder was lost: 
“to me divesting is a retreat, I mean what do you do? You divest, you 
say you’ve divested, and then what do you do the day after that? You’re 
out of the game”29 
“if you totally divest, well you lose the leverage of engagement”30 
Others felt strongly that coordinated and public divestment campaigns could have an 
impact and be used as a sanction: 
“we will divest of the company but our big thing when we do any kind 
of divestment is to get as much media coverage as we can”31 
                                                27	  Interviewee 07	  28	  Interviewee 28	  29	  Interviewee 33	  30	  Interviewee 10	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Power appears to reside in the hands of the company in terms of establishing 
the participants of dialogues. However, recourse to public disclosure or divestment as 
a form of gentle threat was also evident on the part of the shareholders in order to 
keep the company at the dialogue table. 
Transparency. The workshops at the information search stage facilitated the 
flow of information to all parties and were transparent in line with communicative 
action (Habermas, 1992). At the objective setting stage there was transparency and 
information flow among the collaboration members about discussions and agreements 
reached between members. This was facilitated by the ICCR website however this 
information did not flow back to other stakeholders. 
There was an acknowledgment that companies were reluctant to disclose 
information particularly on issues of lobbying and political spending. The survey 
responses showed that the company’s tone in dialogue was seen by the majority as 
“placating” defined as negotiating and bargaining to reach a response (Oliver, 1991), 
only half as many suggested they were “compliant”. Knowing if and when the 
company was trying being truthful was seen by one of the respondents as one of the 
hardest things about dialogue:  
“you have to judge whether, it’s, they’re being forthcoming and whether 
what they say is true, whether it’s the whole truth or are you being 
manipulated, there’s always a concern that you’re being 
manipulated”32 
This insight suggests that there is a distance between practice and an ideal 
speech situation, which is based on truthful exchange. The denial of truth by 
companies in engagement has been reported in other studies (Vandekerckhove et al., 
                                                                                                                                      31	  Interviewee 27	  32	  Interviewee 33	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2007). Transparency and information flow were also claimed by the interviewees to 
be limited by the companies’ imposition of Chatham House rules or privacy 
statements and by SEC disclosure regulation. 
Transparency moved closer to the ideal at the dialogue conclusion stage as 
information shared by the company was also shared between all collaborating 
shareholders after meetings. The ICCR online platform, conference calls, emails and 
face-to-face meetings facilitated the flow of information between shareholders. Press 
releases of progress on particular issues were used to inform constituencies, 
customers and other stakeholders of the outcomes of ICCR behind-the-scenes 
dialogue efforts although details were often not included. 
In summary, we find evidence of the different key motifs of discourse ethics at 
different stages of the dialogue process. However the distance between practice and 
an ideal speech situation was evident throughout the process. The information search 
stage of behind-the-scenes dialogue was closest to an ideal speech situation with 
ICCR strongly facilitating participatory and deliberative practices. However, 
participation and transparency were neglected at the later stages of the dialogues 
particularly in dialogues with companies and there was some evidence of the use of 
coercive practices.  
Parallels can be drawn between our findings and the critique of the 
shareholder resolution process whereby affected stakeholders did not participate in 
setting the objectives of the engagement (Coumans, 2012; Dhir, 2012). In this latter 
case the lack of inclusion of broader stakeholders during the objective setting and 
dialogue stages resulted in investor demands not reflecting “the reality of life” in 
affected communities and was claimed to have harmed rather than helped those 
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communities (Dhir, 2012: 106). We argue that this risk is equally likely in the behind-
the-scenes dialogue process. 
The role of trust in behind-the-scenes dialogue 
 
By far the most frequent and widespread reason given for the effectiveness of 
behind-the-scenes dialogue was trust. The fear of the erosion of this trust was also the 
principal reason given for not inviting broader stakeholder participation into direct 
dialogue with companies. We challenge the perceived negative causal relationship 
between participation and trust and argue that the factors important for trust are not 
necessarily attributable to stakeholder participation per se. Thus, we suggest that trust 
relationships could be maintained while participation is increased. 
Long-term perspective. Trust was seen by many of the respondents to grow 
from relationships which had been built over time through the ICCR’s long history of 
engaging and its patient and persistent approach to SSE. Interviewees reported that:  
“if an engagement has been ongoing for ten years it’s like anything, 
there’s more relationship and there’s more trust”33 
 “it [dialogue] builds on a relationship over time, and as trust builds the 
willingness to discuss the topic or even related topics improve”34 
“It’s really relationship building, long time relationship building”35  
The extensive experience and knowledge held by ICCR members who had 
participated in dialogues over the past 40 years was seen as one of the key assets of 
the organisation and contributors to the effectiveness of ICCR dialogues. What is 
more, the trust relationship was suggested to work both ways with one shareholder 
                                                33	  Interviewee 31	  34	  Interviewee 22	  35	  Interviewee 13	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commenting that they did not trust companies to provide full disclosure unless they 
knew the company well. 
“I guess I would be reluctant to trust that a company is providing us 
with everything unless I know them well enough.”36 
 However, we would argue that the development of long-term relationships 
does not necessarily depend on being a shareholder. There are numerous civil society 
organisations or NGOs which have existed over the long term and have ongoing 
relationships with corporations. Also the communities local to corporate operations 
are potentially able to build long-term relationships with companies.  
Individual relationships. A number of interviewees identified the 
development of trust between individuals as important for the effectiveness of 
dialogue:  
“you get to know people, and because you get to know people you 
create a trust relationship”37 
 “when you have a successful dialogue, my experience has been that 
there’s been a level of trust established between corporate leadership 
oftentimes and the lead shareholder for sure in the dialogue, and they 
tend to look at one another as mutual resources”38 
“I don’t relate to companies…. I am engaged in dialogue with people 
who happen to work with these companies and over the years you 
establish relationships and people know to trust you”39 
                                                36	  Interviewee 07	  37	  Interviewee 19	  38	  Interviewee 26	  39	  Interviewee 18	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 “it does become personal, sometimes you’re dealing with clearly 
packaged positions and other times you feel like you’re dealing with a 
real human being and that tends to be more productive”40 
There was evidence of shareholders approaching an individual on a corporate 
board because they belonged to a particular church group and thus the religious 
organisation concerned felt a certain relationship already existed.  
“I have not found independent engagement to be that effective unless of 
course there’s a strong point of connection between the company and 
the organisation for instance like a board member who felt very 
strongly about a particular religious order or a religious order was in 
the vicinity of the corporate headquarters of a particular company”41 
“as faith based investors we look for people with like minded concerns 
and issues and you have representation on your board in this regard”42 
We argue that these individual relationships are not dependent on being a 
shareholder of the company. If board members can be members of religious 
organisations, they may well also be members of other NGOs or members of local 
communities, or have other connections with stakeholders which could lead to the 
development of relationships between individuals. 
Truthfulness. One example was given by an interviewee where a non-
shareholder had used untruthful data. The company was able to clearly deny any 
connection to the evidence provided by the stakeholder and this was seen by the 
interviewee to undermine the shareholders’ argument and cast doubt on whether they 
were being truthful: 
                                                40	  Interviewee 33	  41	  Interviewee 26	  42	  Interviewee 26	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“And that did irreparable harm but it was also a serious learning 
experience” “you really have to be very careful about who you bring 
in” “it’s really important to have good solid community intelligence 
and that works really well to have people who are creditable giving you 
legitimate information” 43 
The interviewee felt that participation had damaged the trust relationship with the 
company. However, rather than the participation of an NGO per se, we suggest that 
trust was damaged because the individual had not been truthful. As a response this 
shareholder developed the perception that NGOs were less truthful which had limited 
their inclusion of NGOs in dialogue with companies. 
Respectful tone. Another example of where participation was claimed to have 
damaged trust was related to the tone taken by invited stakeholders. The interviewees 
described their own approach as “informational” and involving “quiet diplomacy”, 
“civility” and “respect”: 
“this is quite typical for ICCR because those people are really 
committed to long term respectful engagement”44 
Two interviewees gave an example of an invited stakeholder using a more aggressive 
tone, which they claimed had damaged the dialogue and the trust relationship built up 
with the company. This more “in your face” activism was not seen as consistent with 
the approach of ICCR. In this case the interviewee felt that this participant had used 
aggression. We would argue that establishing a respectful tone in dialogue is not 
dependent on being a shareholder and can be achieved regardless of whether 
participants are stakeholders or shareholders. 
                                                43	  Interviewee 29	  44	  Interviewee 33	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Vested interest. Trust was reported to stem from the “vested interest” which 
shareholders had in the company in terms of their financial investment. A number of 
shareholders spoke of the importance of reassuring the company that as shareholders, 
they had the company’s best interests at heart: 
“people have begun to trust us that we’re not trying to ruin them, we’re 
trying to help them to be a better company”45 
“helping the company to realize that we are investors, we’re owners, 
we’re interested in the long term good of the company, and the long 
term good is related to … how it lives out its corporate citizenship, its 
environmental performance, its social license to operate and all that, so 
helping them to see the connections to the issues we’re bringing up and 
the long term good of the company”46 
This vested interest can be understood here as a shared concern for financial 
performance whereby the danger of disclosure of sensitive information to the media 
could negatively impact the company’s reputation, financial performance and even 
survival. However, a number of the faith-based shareholder organisations have 
established an activism fund where they purchase the minimum of $2000 worth of 
shares necessary in order to engage as shareholders. One organization said that any 
money earned from a particular investment was given to charity which supported 
people suffering from the ill effects of the company’s product. It could therefore be 
argued that being a shareholder does not necessarily lead to a significant vested 
financial interest which suggests there is no reason why stakeholders could not also 
participate. 
                                                45	  Interviewee 21	  46	  Interviewee 13	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In summary we argue that it is not the participation of stakeholders per se 
which damages the trust relationship built between shareholders and companies, but 
rather a number of other factors, which are not necessarily dependent on holding 
shareholder status. We suggest that the potential for stakeholder participation is 
greater than is currently perceived in practice and that the distance between practice 
and ideal speech could be reduced to include broader stakeholder participation in 
behind-the-scenes dialogue. 
Discussion and implications 
 
As a shareholder coalition, ICCR plays a valuable facilitating role in providing 
a space and resources for participatory and deliberative practices (Gond & Piani, 
2013). While its stated belief in the importance of involving stakeholders at every step 
of the process might not hold in the majority of direct conversations with companies, 
its pooled resources undoubtedly empower and enable participatory and deliberative 
practices at the information search stage which may not be found among other RI 
shareholders. 
Our findings suggest that the potential for misalignment of dialogue objectives 
with affected stakeholder interests exists in the same way as it does through 
resolutions (Coumans, 2012; Dhir, 2012). In order to minimize the potential for 
reputation damage under the increased scrutiny of responsible investment practices 
(Eurosif, 2014), it is important that this is recognized by those engaging in SSE, 
particularly the ICCR which has gained recognition and legitimacy over decades of 
experience. 
Interestingly, while ICCR has gained organizational legitimacy and is itself a 
facilitator of dialogue providing space for participatory and deliberative practices, our 
findings indicate that individual relationships are one of the biggest perceived 
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influences on developing trust and the success of behind-the-scenes dialogue. 
Building on this, questions of identity (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003) and 
identification (Gutierrez et al., 2010) could be argued to play an important role in the 
effectiveness of behind-the-scenes dialogue. This implies that stakeholders other than 
shareholders, could also engage corporations effectively through personal 
relationships. The importance of individual relationships also has practical 
implications. Dependence on particular individuals poses somewhat of a challenge to 
ICCR as an organisation. A suitable method of knowledge transfer will be required in 
order to sustain its potential for effective SSE in the future. 
The private nature of dialogue and the lack involvement of the media by 
engaged shareholders indicates that behind-the-scenes dialogue is a lot more prevalent 
than research focusing on more public forms of SSE would suggest. This underlines 
the notion that dialogue represents the bulk of the iceberg when it comes to 
shareholder engagement (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). Our research indicates that there 
is a vast amount of dialogue in SSE which goes on between shareholders and 
companies and this would suggest the extent of the influence of SSE is much more 
extensive than is currently reported. While many of the interviewees noted their 
inability to report their activities in dialogue to the media as frustrating, it appears to 
be a necessary sacrifice for dialogue effectiveness. 
Behind-the-scenes dialogue was noted by interviewees to serve as a means of 
addressing issues which may not be permissible as resolutions because of SEC rules 
on the admissibility of certain issues and word limit constraints. While resolutions 
must legally relate to the business case, the development of relationships through 
dialogue have led to shareholders continuing their conversations with companies even 
when initial requests have been met. A number of interviewees claimed that dialogue 
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allows for discussion of the ethical case as well as the business case, and that the 
former can be more effective, in contrast to previous studies (Gifford, 2010). This 
again suggests that the influence of shareholders in behind-the-scenes dialogue may 
extend beyond what is frequently reported. 
It should be recognized that not all issues have a specific community which is 
affected by the issue or, in the case of a global issue like climate change, everyone 
could be affected. Several of the interviewees comment that in these cases the only 
possibility for including broader stakeholder participation would be to invite in a 
specialist or expert. Therefore the potential for participation can be understood to vary 
according to the issue of concern. This provides an opportunity for future research 
into different issue categories in behind-the-scenes dialogue. 
Limitations 
 
Our study is focused on the ICCR for reasons laid out in the methodology 
section. Due to the faith-based nature of this organisation our findings cannot 
necessarily be generalized to other engagement coalitions and different types of 
investors. The beliefs of religious organisation members may not be open to 
negotiation resulting in some issues being neglected due to the opposing positions of 
some members. Other, non faith-based organisations may be more willing to question 
their own positions.  
Our research is focused primarily on the US and therefore refers to the 
engagement and filing regulations in place there. Different national contexts have 
different regulatory systems and corporate governance arrangements which have been 
shown to affect the public or private nature of shareholder engagement (Aguilera et 
al., 2006; Black & Coffee, 1994). The nature and challenges of engagement in an 
international context was raised several times by interviewees providing an 
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opportunity for future research as investors increasingly search for ways to engage 
multinationals headquartered in other countries and shareholders around the world. 
Our research is based on reports from ICCR members. Our large sample helps 
to make these results reliable and we triangulate responses with a survey. However, 
both the company perspective and longitudinal participant observation are crucial to 
provide a fuller picture of behind-the-scenes dialogue. 
Conclusion 
 
This exploration of behind-the-scenes dialogue from the perspective of 
shareholders involved in SSE provides valuable insights into the as yet under-
researched area of shareholder dialogue. By shedding light on the actors involved and 
their activities at different stages of the dialogue process we have been able to identify 
the presence of a number of participatory and deliberative practices. The ICCR 
coalition facilitates these processes through sharing resources and knowledge. 
The key motifs of Habermasian discourse ethics provide a useful normative 
ideal from which to compare the quality and standards of shareholder dialogue in 
practice with an ideal speech situation. From this analysis we are able to identify a 
lack of stakeholder participation and transparency at the stages of objective setting, 
company dialogue and dialogue conclusion. This indicates that the potential for 
misalignment between shareholder demands and stakeholder interests identified in 
previous studies on resolutions, exists also in behind-the-scenes dialogue. 
Lack of stakeholder participation in dialogue with companies stems from a 
fear that the trust necessary for effective engagement, which is seen to grow from 
individual relationships built up over time, will be eroded by broader stakeholder 
participation. Through exploring this perception in-depth we argue that it is not 
participation of stakeholders per se which can damage trust. In this way we highlight 
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the potential for greater stakeholder participation and ensuring the adherence to a 
quality of dialogue which strives to attain an ideal speech situation. 
We claim that the extent and impact of behind-the-scenes dialogue is under-
estimated and under-reported. With hundreds, if not thousands of dialogues taking 
place each year, the importance of assuring the voices of all those affected by 
corporate activities are considered in this crucial mechanism of corporate governance, 
becomes increasingly important to SSE.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 170
 
 
This thesis generates a number of important findings, which contribute to the 
different literatures associated with SSE and outlined in the introduction. This section 
reiterates the key findings of chapters 2, 3 and 4, it then identifies some of the 
challenges facing research in this area, and finally identifies avenues and 
opportunities for future research. 
Firstly, the chapters presented here have focused on the process of SSE. 
Chapter 2 elaborated the stages of engagement, the methods used, and the influences 
on decision-making at each stage. Chapter 3 draws on Habermasian discourse ethics 
to explore the ethical nature of the SSE process. This approach enables the 
development of a normative, process-oriented, ethical approach to SSE. Chapter 4 
builds on this argument to empirically map the involvement of marginalised 
stakeholders at different stages of the dialogue process. As such, this thesis exposes, 
both empirically and conceptually, the workings of a relatively unknown but 
influential activity and in this way differentiates itself from previous research. This 
leads the way for further and more detailed analysis of specific elements of the 
process. It also raises political and ethical questions as well as economic ones, which 
are further discussed below. 
The findings in Chapter 2 demonstrate the intertwined and dynamic nature of 
voice and exit. While typically voice and exit have been understood as separate, we 
find that voice was used during and after exit as part of ongoing engagement, 
suggesting that the voice and exit options are more nuanced than previously argued. 
The reconceptualization of exit as a form of voice invites further discussion, and 
research is needed to explore the similarities and differences between ongoing 
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engagement by current shareholders, by shareholders who have exited the company, 
and by activists who have not previously held a shareholder status. 
The research conducted in chapter 2 points towards the reconceptualisation of 
shareholders in SSE as politically rather than economically motivated. This finding is 
further explored in Chapter 3 where a deliberative democratic political conception of 
SSE is identified, calling into question the stark separation of political and economic 
spheres and extending the work to date on political CSR. By identifying a political 
role for SSE shareholders in pursuit of the common good, this chapter challenges 
some economic assumptions of the theory of the firm and contributes to the corporate 
governance literature, which often assumes that shareholders are concerned purely 
with economic matters. The extent of such a political role among different types of 
shareholders invites further research in this area. 
The conceptual analysis in chapter 3 leads to the development of a normative, 
ethical approach, so far neglected in SSE, and therefore makes a clear contribution to 
the ethics literature. The ideal nature of Habermasian discourse ethics has drawn 
critique for being difficult to achieve in reality. Within the US corporate governance 
framework, where shareholders have become increasingly powerful over the past 
three decades, such an ideal standard remains distant from practice. However, 
reflection on a normative position is still valuable and reveals differing approaches 
underlying RI. Further exploration of the ultimate social and political goals of 
responsible investors will contribute greatly to the RI literature. 
Chapters 3 and 4 both identify a mediating role that shareholders in SSE can 
play in business and civil society relations. In chapter 3, figure 2 reveals different 
engagement formats: an intermediary position for shareholders; shareholders as 
promoters of direct engagement between corporations and marginalised stakeholders; 
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and a more complex role involving promoting regulatory and institutional change. 
Chapter 4 goes into more detail about the participation of marginalised stakeholders at 
different stages of the SSE process and explores how trust and individual 
relationships can play a crucial role in SSE. These individual relationships are likely 
to provide a rich source for future research. 
These findings contribute to building a new perspective on an increasingly 
relevant phenomenon. They challenge dominant theoretical assumptions and raise a 
number of questions for further research. SSE, and especially behind-the-scenes 
dialogue, also pose challenges for researchers. These are discussed in the following 
section. 
Challenges 
 
Clearly challenges remain in accessing data related to the behind-the-scenes 
dialogues between shareholders and companies. As noted throughout the thesis, the 
confidential nature of such dialogues and the affirmation that much of their success is 
based on trusting that the conversations will remain confidential, is a significant 
challenge for research. 
Research which focuses on the perspective of the corporation is vitally 
important to gaining an understanding of how SSE can bring about change. Research 
opportunities exist both at the individual level, in understanding how particular actors 
and their relationships may influence the SSE process, and at the organizational level, 
in establishing, for example, the degree of stakeholder integration into corporate 
decision-making and organizational sensemaking (Basu & Palazzo, 2008). 
Longitudinal research using ethnographic and participatory research methods in 
behind-the-scenes dialogue would be of great value, although it would be challenging 
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to achieve due to confidentiality issues. An opportunity to overcome this challenge 
would be to revisit cases after a period of five or ten years to explore their evolution. 
The impact or success of SSE is also a particularly challenging area to study. 
There are differing understandings of success and varying time frames, which make 
this a complicated area to measure. Voting results of resolutions is one way to 
measure this. However, objectives such as changing attitudes and reframing ideas and 
the long time frames which SSE can take could tell a very different story about the 
impact of SSE. 
Future research directions 
 
This thesis has made important contributions to the academic literature on 
corporate governance, responsible investment, social activism and business ethics. 
Despite the empirical and conceptual insights developed in this thesis, behind-the-
scenes dialogue is still a relatively little known and under researched phenomenon 
and there is great opportunities remain for further research in this area. By providing 
greater insights and a new perspective on SSE, which challenges the traditional 
agency view that has dominated corporate governance research, this thesis extends the 
debate on SSE into the ethical and political domains and opens a number of avenues 
for future research. 
Despite the SSE shareholders’ stated commitment to include other 
stakeholders throughout the dialogue process and their dedication to a common good 
and rational argumentation, the importance of personal relationships suggests that 
SSE communication embodies a strategic element in which individuals have a strong 
role. Drawing on the identity literature stream (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003), and 
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behavioural theory (Sikavica & Hillman, 2008) could provide opportunities to better 
understand these key individuals. 
Further research into participative governance mechanisms and stakeholder 
engagement in corporate decision-making could be informed by the literature on 
cross-sector collaborations and partnerships (Murphy & Arenas, 2010; Selsky & 
Parker, 2005). The challenges and benefits of these collaborations could be a rich 
source of learning for corporations as well as for shareholders and stakeholders 
involved in SSE. 
Now considered a mainstream investment practice, responsible investment is 
an umbrella term for an increasingly complex and varied range of motives and 
strategies. While focusing on the overlaps in interests has enabled the RI movement to 
gain traction, the increasing scrutiny of these practices requires more detailed 
investigation of the heterogeneous demands of different shareholders within 
responsible investment to identify areas of potential contention and collaboration. By 
extension, further research could also explore how managers of large pension and 
mutual funds deal with the differing social, environmental and ethical concerns of 
beneficiaries in establishing their investment policies and engagement strategies. 
The findings here suggest that more fine-grained research into the nature of 
the different issues addressed within the broad spectrum of environmental, social, 
ethical and governance concerns could provide useful insights. Richardson’s (2008) 
work has highlighted some of the differences between the business case and the 
ethical case by distinguishing between examples of climate change and human rights 
issues. Examining SSE through different issue lenses could provide valuable insights 
into the use of different strategies to influence management decision-making. 
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This thesis provides evidence of a political and ethical role for shareholders in 
SSE which challenges economic assumptions about shareholder behavior. The 
blurring of the economic and political spheres evident in work on political CSR 
(Scherer et al., 2014), lobbying, and corporate political spending, merits further study 
from the perspective of shareholders and SSE. Research into mechanisms for 
managers in dealing with political and ethical as well as financial demands from 
shareholders is much needed, as is a potentially expanded understanding of fiduciary 
duty (Stout, 2012). Our conceptualization of shareholders having an empowered role 
as facilitators or stewards provides an alternative view to the traditional agency 
perspective of shareholders as monitoring and controlling and opens the door to future 
research and theory building.  
The research here and elsewhere has identified a wide range of tactics in SSE 
(Goranova & Ryan, 2014). From a social activism perspective, the variety of 
strategies and actors involved in improving the social, environmental and ethical 
performance of corporations could lend itself to a theory of fields approach (Fligstein 
& McAdam, 2012). The combination of different strategies such as behind-the-scenes 
dialogue, public resolutions, and social protest could be explored to identify 
alternative, complementary or optimal configurations for achieving change.  
The research undertaken in this thesis raised a number of concerns from 
practitioners. One such concern was about the increasing complexity of engaging 
through international coalitions and in countries where the corporate governance 
context is unfamiliar. Research has already identified some of the national differences 
in corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). The international operations of 
many companies and their listings on multiple stock exchanges provide a level of 
complexity which could be explored in future research. Practitioners also identified 
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the measurement of impact as a challenging area to develop in order for shareholders 
in SSE to be held accountable to their constituencies or beneficiaries. Finally, the fine 
line between being involved in long-term, ongoing SSE dialogue and providing ‘free’ 
consultancy as a mutual resource could be further explored. 
The questions that are raised in the findings of this thesis provide ample 
opportunity for future research on the topic of SSE in different literatures. It is my 
hope that this thesis draws attention to the potential that SSE represents in challenging 
some of the key assumptions underlying corporate governance and the theory of the 
firm.  By opening a number of avenues for future research, the potential impact of this 
research is extended, opening the door to further contributions to management 
science. 
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